Changes

A primary concern of philosophy of action is to [[analyze]] the [[nature]] of actions and distinguish them from similar [[phenomena]]. Other concerns include individuating actions, explaining the relationship between actions and their effects, explaining how an action is related to the [[belief]]s and [[desires]] which cause and/or justify it (see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason]), as well as examining the nature of agency. A primary concern is the nature of [[free will]] and whether actions are determined by the mental [[state]]s that precede them (see [[determinism]]). Some philosophers (e.g. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher) Donald Davidson]) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are [[physical]] states that cause the action. Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduce to mere physical causes. Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work. If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent.

A primary concern of philosophy of action is to [[analyze]] the [[nature]] of actions and distinguish them from similar [[phenomena]]. Other concerns include individuating actions, explaining the relationship between actions and their effects, explaining how an action is related to the [[belief]]s and [[desires]] which cause and/or justify it (see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason]), as well as examining the nature of agency. A primary concern is the nature of [[free will]] and whether actions are determined by the mental [[state]]s that precede them (see [[determinism]]). Some philosophers (e.g. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher) Donald Davidson]) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are [[physical]] states that cause the action. Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduce to mere physical causes. Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work. If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent.

==External Link==

==External Link==