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The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]].

The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]].

==Senses of being==

==Senses of being==

"[[Being]]", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions:

"[[Being]]", [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions:

* Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó).

* Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó).

* Being as potency (dýnamis) and [[act]] (enérgeia or entelécheia).

* Being as potency (dýnamis) and [[act]] (enérgeia or entelécheia).

The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.

The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.

==Potency and actuality as a real distinction==

==Potency and actuality as a real distinction==

Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes:

Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes:

1. That potency is a real sense of being3.

1. That potency is a real sense of being3.

[[Act]] is, therefore, the primal sense. Potency is always said in [[reference]] to it. Accordingly, the different senses of act, which Aristotle also recognizes, must correspond to different senses of potency.

[[Act]] is, therefore, the primal sense. Potency is always said in [[reference]] to it. Accordingly, the different senses of act, which Aristotle also recognizes, must correspond to different senses of potency.

==Senses of act==

==Senses of act==

According to Aristotle, there are three great senses of act: [[movement]] (kinesis), [[form]], and [[knowledge]]. Other senses, like [[nature]] (phusis), [[habit]] (hexis), etc., may be reduced to these three. Movement is defined by Aristotle in his book on Physics as "The [[fulfillment]] of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is [[motion]]". This is known as a ''transitive'' act. Transitivity is the [[expression]] of an act in which something [[changes]] for something else. Movement can therefore be understood under the more general term of metabolé, that is, change. The corresponding potency is, thus, a transitive potency, or kinetic potency.

According to Aristotle, there are three great senses of act: [[movement]] (kinesis), [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms form], and [[knowledge]]. Other senses, like [[nature]] (phusis), [[habit]] (hexis), etc., may be reduced to these three. Movement is defined by Aristotle in his book on Physics as "The [[fulfillment]] of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is [[motion]]". This is known as a ''transitive'' act. Transitivity is the [[expression]] of an act in which something [[changes]] for something else. Movement can therefore be understood under the more general term of metabolé, that is, change. The corresponding potency is, thus, a transitive potency, or kinetic potency.

Now, substance is a [[formal]] act. Moreover, a formal act is always the end of a transitive movement. Substance can also then be understood as metabolé. Indeed, as Aristotle explains movement, it always implies: a cause from which it takes place, a subject in which it takes place, and a form (end, péras) it which knowledge takes place. In all these cases, movement is always found within the categories (the second sense of being mentioned above) and is always a [[Causality|causal]] act.

Now, substance is a [[formal]] act. Moreover, a formal act is always the end of a transitive movement. Substance can also then be understood as metabolé. Indeed, as Aristotle explains movement, it always implies: a cause from which it takes place, a subject in which it takes place, and a form (end, péras) it which knowledge takes place. In all these cases, movement is always found within the categories (the second sense of being mentioned above) and is always a [[Causality|causal]] act.

In the ''Metaphysics'' Aristotle gives extraordinary examples: we see and we have seen, we think and have thought; but we don’t build and have built. Building is a transitive action, an imperfect action. In the [[perfect]] action, ''praxis'', the object (the end of the action) is immediately possessed, at the same time, [[simultaneously]]. Knowledge is not a change of a form, a change of [[quality]], because a form is not corrupted by the acquisition of a new one; rather, both forms co-exist in one act. That is why knowledge is not only the possession of a form: it is the possession of another being’s form. And not only that: knowledge is the possession of another’s form as another’s form. When knowing a stone, we do not become the stone, even as we do have its form as one in act with the act of knowledge. Movement does not possess its object. Movement does not exist at once with its object, for possessing the object would mean the end of movement. Movement is not co-actual with its end, as knowledge is.

In the ''Metaphysics'' Aristotle gives extraordinary examples: we see and we have seen, we think and have thought; but we don’t build and have built. Building is a transitive action, an imperfect action. In the [[perfect]] action, ''praxis'', the object (the end of the action) is immediately possessed, at the same time, [[simultaneously]]. Knowledge is not a change of a form, a change of [[quality]], because a form is not corrupted by the acquisition of a new one; rather, both forms co-exist in one act. That is why knowledge is not only the possession of a form: it is the possession of another being’s form. And not only that: knowledge is the possession of another’s form as another’s form. When knowing a stone, we do not become the stone, even as we do have its form as one in act with the act of knowledge. Movement does not possess its object. Movement does not exist at once with its object, for possessing the object would mean the end of movement. Movement is not co-actual with its end, as knowledge is.

==Potency and possibility==

==Potency and possibility==

According to what we have said, if knowledge is not a transitive action, its correspondent potency should also be intransitive. Indeed, it is possible in some [[texts]] to find an account of possibility which suggests that Aristotle has in [[mind]] a different form of potency. However, the texts are not clear enough, and many [[interpretations]] have been given to them. One could, for example, read the following passages: ''Metaphysics IX, 3, Bk 1047a 24'';IX, 6, Bk 1048a 28-30; ''De Interpretatione 23a 8-16''. In this last text Aristotle states that this potency corresponds not only to [[Temporal|mobile]] [[being]], but also to [[eternal]] beings (that is, beings outside the range of kinesis).

According to what we have said, if knowledge is not a transitive action, its correspondent potency should also be intransitive. Indeed, it is possible in some [[texts]] to find an account of possibility which suggests that Aristotle has in [[mind]] a different form of potency. However, the texts are not clear enough, and many [[interpretations]] have been given to them. One could, for example, read the following passages: ''Metaphysics IX, 3, Bk 1047a 24'';IX, 6, Bk 1048a 28-30; ''De Interpretatione 23a 8-16''. In this last text Aristotle states that this potency corresponds not only to [[Temporal|mobile]] [[being]], but also to [[eternal]] beings (that is, beings outside the range of kinesis).

*2. Absolute and Subabsolute. Absolute realities are [[eternity]] [[existences]]. Subabsolute realities are projected on two levels: [[Absonite]]s—realities which are [[relative]] with respect to both [[time]] and [[eternity]]. Finites—realities which are projected in space and are actualized in time.

*2. Absolute and Subabsolute. Absolute realities are [[eternity]] [[existences]]. Subabsolute realities are projected on two levels: [[Absonite]]s—realities which are [[relative]] with respect to both [[time]] and [[eternity]]. Finites—realities which are projected in space and are actualized in time.

*3. Existential and Experiential. [[Paradise]] [[Deity]] is existential, but the emerging [[Supreme]] and [[Ultimate]] are experiential.

*3. Existential and Experiential. [[Paradise]] [[Deity]] is existential, but the emerging [[Supreme]] and [[Ultimate]] are experiential.

*4. Personal and Impersonal. Deity expansion, personality expression, and universe evolution are forever conditioned by the Father's [[freewill]] act which forever separated the mind-spirit-personal [[meanings]] and [[values]] of actuality and potentiality [[center]]ing in the [[Eternal Son]] from those things which center and inhere in the eternal [[Isle of Paradise]].[http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Foreword#IV._UNIVERSE_REALITY]

*4. Personal and Impersonal. Deity expansion, personality expression, and universe evolution are forever conditioned by the Father's [[freewill]] act which forever separated the mind-spirit-personal [[meanings]] and [[values]] of actuality and potentiality [[center]]ing in the [[Eternal Son]] from those things which center and inhere in the eternal [[Isle of Paradise]].[https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Foreword#IV._UNIVERSE_REALITY]

==See Also==

==See Also==

*[http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Paper_104#104:5._TRIODITIES '''''Triodities''''']

*[https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Paper_104#104:5._TRIODITIES '''''Triodities''''']

==Notes==

==Notes==

# For example: Metaphysics V, 7; VI, 2, etc.

# For example: Metaphysics V, 7; VI, 2, etc.