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The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]].

The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]].

==Senses of being==

==Senses of being==

"[[Being]]", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions:

"[[Being]]", [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions:

* Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó).

* Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó).

* Being as potency (dýnamis) and [[act]] (enérgeia or entelécheia).

* Being as potency (dýnamis) and [[act]] (enérgeia or entelécheia).

<center>For lessons on the related [[topic]] of '''''[[Potential]]''''', follow [http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Potential '''''this link'''''].</center>

<center>For lessons on the related [[topic]] of '''''[[Potential]]''''', follow [https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Potential '''''this link'''''].</center>

The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.

The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.

==Potency and actuality as a real distinction==

==Potency and actuality as a real distinction==

Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes:

Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes:

1. That potency is a real sense of being3.

1. That potency is a real sense of being3.

[[Act]] is, therefore, the primal sense. Potency is always said in [[reference]] to it. Accordingly, the different senses of act, which Aristotle also recognizes, must correspond to different senses of potency.

[[Act]] is, therefore, the primal sense. Potency is always said in [[reference]] to it. Accordingly, the different senses of act, which Aristotle also recognizes, must correspond to different senses of potency.

==Senses of act==

==Senses of act==

According to Aristotle, there are three great senses of act: [[movement]] (kinesis), [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms form], and [[knowledge]]. Other senses, like [[nature]] (phusis), [[habit]] (hexis), etc., may be reduced to these three. Movement is defined by Aristotle in his book on Physics as "The [[fulfillment]] of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is [[motion]]". This is known as a ''transitive'' act. Transitivity is the [[expression]] of an act in which something [[changes]] for something else. Movement can therefore be understood under the more general term of metabolé, that is, change. The corresponding potency is, thus, a transitive potency, or kinetic potency.

According to Aristotle, there are three great senses of act: [[movement]] (kinesis), [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms form], and [[knowledge]]. Other senses, like [[nature]] (phusis), [[habit]] (hexis), etc., may be reduced to these three. Movement is defined by Aristotle in his book on Physics as "The [[fulfillment]] of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is [[motion]]". This is known as a ''transitive'' act. Transitivity is the [[expression]] of an act in which something [[changes]] for something else. Movement can therefore be understood under the more general term of metabolé, that is, change. The corresponding potency is, thus, a transitive potency, or kinetic potency.

Now, substance is a [[formal]] act. Moreover, a formal act is always the end of a transitive movement. Substance can also then be understood as metabolé. Indeed, as Aristotle explains movement, it always implies: a cause from which it takes place, a subject in which it takes place, and a form (end, péras) it which knowledge takes place. In all these cases, movement is always found within the categories (the second sense of being mentioned above) and is always a [[Causality|causal]] act.

Now, substance is a [[formal]] act. Moreover, a formal act is always the end of a transitive movement. Substance can also then be understood as metabolé. Indeed, as Aristotle explains movement, it always implies: a cause from which it takes place, a subject in which it takes place, and a form (end, péras) it which knowledge takes place. In all these cases, movement is always found within the categories (the second sense of being mentioned above) and is always a [[Causality|causal]] act.

*2. Absolute and Subabsolute. Absolute realities are [[eternity]] [[existences]]. Subabsolute realities are projected on two levels: [[Absonite]]s—realities which are [[relative]] with respect to both [[time]] and [[eternity]]. Finites—realities which are projected in space and are actualized in time.

*2. Absolute and Subabsolute. Absolute realities are [[eternity]] [[existences]]. Subabsolute realities are projected on two levels: [[Absonite]]s—realities which are [[relative]] with respect to both [[time]] and [[eternity]]. Finites—realities which are projected in space and are actualized in time.

*3. Existential and Experiential. [[Paradise]] [[Deity]] is existential, but the emerging [[Supreme]] and [[Ultimate]] are experiential.

*3. Existential and Experiential. [[Paradise]] [[Deity]] is existential, but the emerging [[Supreme]] and [[Ultimate]] are experiential.

*4. Personal and Impersonal. Deity expansion, personality expression, and universe evolution are forever conditioned by the Father's [[freewill]] act which forever separated the mind-spirit-personal [[meanings]] and [[values]] of actuality and potentiality [[center]]ing in the [[Eternal Son]] from those things which center and inhere in the eternal [[Isle of Paradise]].[http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Foreword#IV._UNIVERSE_REALITY]

*4. Personal and Impersonal. Deity expansion, personality expression, and universe evolution are forever conditioned by the Father's [[freewill]] act which forever separated the mind-spirit-personal [[meanings]] and [[values]] of actuality and potentiality [[center]]ing in the [[Eternal Son]] from those things which center and inhere in the eternal [[Isle of Paradise]].[https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Foreword#IV._UNIVERSE_REALITY]

==See Also==

==See Also==

*[http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Paper_104#104:5._TRIODITIES '''''Triodities''''']

*[https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Paper_104#104:5._TRIODITIES '''''Triodities''''']

==Notes==

==Notes==

# For example: Metaphysics V, 7; VI, 2, etc.

# For example: Metaphysics V, 7; VI, 2, etc.