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| [[File:lighterstill.jpg]][[File:Fractuality2.jpg|right|frame]] | | [[File:lighterstill.jpg]][[File:Fractuality2.jpg|right|frame]] |
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− | The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]]. | + | The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]]. |
| ==Senses of being== | | ==Senses of being== |
− | "[[Being]]", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions: | + | "[[Being]]", [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions: |
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| * Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó). | | * Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó). |
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| ==Potency and actuality as a real distinction== | | ==Potency and actuality as a real distinction== |
− | Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes: | + | Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes: |
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| 1. That potency is a real sense of being3. | | 1. That potency is a real sense of being3. |
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| [[Act]] is, therefore, the primal sense. Potency is always said in [[reference]] to it. Accordingly, the different senses of act, which Aristotle also recognizes, must correspond to different senses of potency. | | [[Act]] is, therefore, the primal sense. Potency is always said in [[reference]] to it. Accordingly, the different senses of act, which Aristotle also recognizes, must correspond to different senses of potency. |
| ==Senses of act== | | ==Senses of act== |
− | According to Aristotle, there are three great senses of act: [[movement]] (kinesis), [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms form], and [[knowledge]]. Other senses, like [[nature]] (phusis), [[habit]] (hexis), etc., may be reduced to these three. Movement is defined by Aristotle in his book on Physics as "The [[fulfillment]] of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is [[motion]]". This is known as a ''transitive'' act. Transitivity is the [[expression]] of an act in which something [[changes]] for something else. Movement can therefore be understood under the more general term of metabolé, that is, change. The corresponding potency is, thus, a transitive potency, or kinetic potency. | + | According to Aristotle, there are three great senses of act: [[movement]] (kinesis), [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Forms form], and [[knowledge]]. Other senses, like [[nature]] (phusis), [[habit]] (hexis), etc., may be reduced to these three. Movement is defined by Aristotle in his book on Physics as "The [[fulfillment]] of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is [[motion]]". This is known as a ''transitive'' act. Transitivity is the [[expression]] of an act in which something [[changes]] for something else. Movement can therefore be understood under the more general term of metabolé, that is, change. The corresponding potency is, thus, a transitive potency, or kinetic potency. |
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| Now, substance is a [[formal]] act. Moreover, a formal act is always the end of a transitive movement. Substance can also then be understood as metabolé. Indeed, as Aristotle explains movement, it always implies: a cause from which it takes place, a subject in which it takes place, and a form (end, péras) it which knowledge takes place. In all these cases, movement is always found within the categories (the second sense of being mentioned above) and is always a [[Causality|causal]] act. | | Now, substance is a [[formal]] act. Moreover, a formal act is always the end of a transitive movement. Substance can also then be understood as metabolé. Indeed, as Aristotle explains movement, it always implies: a cause from which it takes place, a subject in which it takes place, and a form (end, péras) it which knowledge takes place. In all these cases, movement is always found within the categories (the second sense of being mentioned above) and is always a [[Causality|causal]] act. |