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The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]].
The [[theory]] of [[Potentiality]] and '''Actuality''' is one of the central themes of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle Aristotle's] [[philosophy]] and [[metaphysics]]. With these two notions, Aristotle [[intends]] to provide a [[structure]] for the [[comprehension]] of [[reality]]. Potency refers, generally, to the capacity or [[power]] of a [[virtual]] reality to come to be in actuality. In broad terms, potency is a capacity, and actuality is its [[fulfillment]].
==Senses of being==
==Senses of being==
"[[Being]]", [[ontology]] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions:
"[[Being]]", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology ontology] according to Aristotle, has many [[senses]]. As being can be studied by many [[sciences]] in many different aspects, there are different senses in which being can be [[understood]] (indeed, if we do not take into account these multiple aspects, philosophy may lose some of its [[universal]] scope). In numerous passages of his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes the following divisions:
* Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó).
* Being as per accidens (katà symbebekós) and being as per se (kath' autó).
The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.
The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.
==Potency and actuality as a real distinction==
==Potency and actuality as a real distinction==
Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes:
Aristotle [[argues]] against those who claim that potency is only a mental [[concept]] (that is, not a real sense of being). In ''Metaphysics IX, 3-4'', he argues against [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megarian_school Megarics], who claimed that potency could only be had by a subject when the subject was actually [[performing]] a specific [[action]]. Aristotle claims this is not [[logical]], because then one would only possess a potency when one was exerting its corresponding act. A man who is sitting, for example, would not have the potency to stand. He would only have the potency of standing while actually standing. Aristotle believes this to be [[paradoxical]]. He, therefore, believes: