Changes

* Being as potency (dýnamis) and [[act]] (enérgeia or entelécheia).

* Being as potency (dýnamis) and [[act]] (enérgeia or entelécheia).

The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.

The first distinction deals with being as an unnecessary [[coincidence]]: for example, John being a [[musician]] and also being tall. It is not [[necessary]] for a tall man to be a musician, or vice versa. Thus, Aristotle explains, something is said to be per accidens when two realities are found within a [[subject]], and it is not necessary for them to be so. Being as true and false corresponds to the [[relation]] between what is [[thought]] and what is real. If I believe a white wall to be red, my [[belief]] does not correspond to [[reality]], and so it is false. For Aristotle, this a peculiar kind of non-being. Being as a substance refers to being as the [[ultimate]] subject of predication. Accidents are always predicated of a substance (musician and tall, for example, are predicates of John). Thus, accidents depend on a substance for their existence. Potency and act, lastly, are said by Aristotle to be a fourth group of concepts that help us understand being but, unlike the other three, these concepts are said of the whole other three groups (V, 7, Bk 1017a). [[Potentiality]] refers to beings that are not yet come to be; actuality refers to beings that have come to be and are now (actually) being.