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<center>For lessons on the related [[topic]] of '''''[[Thought]]''''', follow [http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Thought '''''this link'''''].</center>
 
      
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Concepts are expected to be useful in dealing with [[reality]]. Generally speaking, concepts are taken (a) to be acquired dispositions to recognize perceived objects as being of a certain [[ontological]] kind, and at the same time (b) to understand what this kind or that kind of object is like, and consequently (c) to perceive a number of perceived particulars as being the same in kind and to discriminate between them and other sensible particulars that are different in kind. In addition, concepts are acquired dispositions to understand what certain kinds of objects are like both (a) when the objects, though perceptible, are not actually perceived, and (b) also when they are not perceptible at all, as is the case with all the conceptual constructs we employ in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. The impetus to have a theory of concepts that is ontologically useful has been so strong that it has pushed forward accounts that understand a concept to have a deep connection with reality.
 
Concepts are expected to be useful in dealing with [[reality]]. Generally speaking, concepts are taken (a) to be acquired dispositions to recognize perceived objects as being of a certain [[ontological]] kind, and at the same time (b) to understand what this kind or that kind of object is like, and consequently (c) to perceive a number of perceived particulars as being the same in kind and to discriminate between them and other sensible particulars that are different in kind. In addition, concepts are acquired dispositions to understand what certain kinds of objects are like both (a) when the objects, though perceptible, are not actually perceived, and (b) also when they are not perceptible at all, as is the case with all the conceptual constructs we employ in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. The impetus to have a theory of concepts that is ontologically useful has been so strong that it has pushed forward accounts that understand a concept to have a deep connection with reality.
  

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