Changes

==Etymology==

==Etymology==

[https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=English#ca._1100-1500_.09THE_MIDDLE_ENGLISH_PERIOD Middle English] diffinicioun, from Anglo-French, from [[Latin]] definition-, definitio, from definire

[https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=English#ca._1100-1500_.09THE_MIDDLE_ENGLISH_PERIOD Middle English] diffinicioun, from Anglo-French, from [[Latin]] definition-, definitio, from definire

*Date: [http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/14th_Century 14th century]

*Date: [https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/14th_Century 14th century]

==Definitions==

==Definitions==

*1 : an [[act]] of determining; specifically : the [[formal]] [[proclamation]] of a Roman Catholic [[dogma]]

*1 : an [[act]] of determining; specifically : the [[formal]] [[proclamation]] of a Roman Catholic [[dogma]]

Stevenson has also noted that some definitions are "[[legal]]" or "[[coercive]]", whose object is to create or alter [[rights]], [[duties]] or [[crimes]].

Stevenson has also noted that some definitions are "[[legal]]" or "[[coercive]]", whose object is to create or alter [[rights]], [[duties]] or [[crimes]].

==Limitations of definition==

==Limitations of definition==

Given that a [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_language natural language] such as [[English]] contains, at any given time, a [[finite]] number of [[words]], any comprehensive list of definitions must either be circular or leave some terms undefined. If every term of every definiens must itself be defined, "where at last should we stop?" A dictionary, for instance, insofar as it is a comprehensive list of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lexical_definition lexical definitions], must resort to [[circularity]].

Given that a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_language natural language] such as [[English]] contains, at any given time, a [[finite]] number of [[words]], any comprehensive list of definitions must either be circular or leave some terms undefined. If every term of every definiens must itself be defined, "where at last should we stop?" A dictionary, for instance, insofar as it is a comprehensive list of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lexical_definition lexical definitions], must resort to [[circularity]].

Many [[philosophers]] have chosen instead to leave some terms undefined. The [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholasticism scholastic philosophers] claimed that the highest genera (the so-called ten generalissima) cannot be defined, since we cannot assign any higher genus under which they may fall. Thus we cannot define [[being]], [[unity]] and similar [[concepts]]. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke Locke] supposes in [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding An Essay Concerning Human Understanding] that the [[names]] of simple [[concepts]] do not admit of any definition. More recently [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell Bertrand Russell] sought to [[develop]] a formal language based on [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_atomism logical atoms]. Other philosophers, notably [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein Wittgenstein], rejected the need for any undefined simples. Wittgenstein pointed out in his [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Investigations Philosophical Investigations] that what counts as a "simple" in one circumstance might not do so in another. He rejected the very [[idea]] that every [[explanation]] of the [[meaning]] of a term needed itself to be explained: "As though an explanation hung in the air unless [[supported]] by another one", claiming instead that explanation of a term is only needed when we need to avoid misunderstanding.

Many [[philosophers]] have chosen instead to leave some terms undefined. The [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholasticism scholastic philosophers] claimed that the highest genera (the so-called ten generalissima) cannot be defined, since we cannot assign any higher genus under which they may fall. Thus we cannot define [[being]], [[unity]] and similar [[concepts]]. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke Locke] supposes in [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding An Essay Concerning Human Understanding] that the [[names]] of simple [[concepts]] do not admit of any definition. More recently [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell Bertrand Russell] sought to [[develop]] a formal language based on [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_atomism logical atoms]. Other philosophers, notably [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein Wittgenstein], rejected the need for any undefined simples. Wittgenstein pointed out in his [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Investigations Philosophical Investigations] that what counts as a "simple" in one circumstance might not do so in another. He rejected the very [[idea]] that every [[explanation]] of the [[meaning]] of a term needed itself to be explained: "As though an explanation hung in the air unless [[supported]] by another one", claiming instead that explanation of a term is only needed when we need to avoid misunderstanding.

Locke and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Stuart_Mill Mill] also [[argued]] that we cannot define [[individuals]]. We learn [[names]] by connecting an [[idea]] with a [[sound]], so that speaker and hearer have the same idea when the same [[word]] is used. This is not possible when no one else is acquainted with the particular [[thing]] that has "fallen under our notice". Russell offered his [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions theory of descriptions] in part as a way of defining a proper name, the definition being given by a definite description that "picks out" exactly one [[individual]]. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke Saul Kripke] pointed to [[difficulties]] with this approach, especially in [[relation]] to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic modality], in his book ''Naming and Necessity''.

Locke and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Stuart_Mill Mill] also [[argued]] that we cannot define [[individuals]]. We learn [[names]] by connecting an [[idea]] with a [[sound]], so that speaker and hearer have the same idea when the same [[word]] is used. This is not possible when no one else is acquainted with the particular [[thing]] that has "fallen under our notice". Russell offered his [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions theory of descriptions] in part as a way of defining a proper name, the definition being given by a definite description that "picks out" exactly one [[individual]]. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke Saul Kripke] pointed to [[difficulties]] with this approach, especially in [[relation]] to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic modality], in his book ''Naming and Necessity''.

There is a presumption in the [[classic]] example of a definition that the definiens can be stated. Wittgenstein argued that for some terms this is not the case. The examples he used include [[game]], [[number]] and [[family]]. In such cases, he [[argued]], there is no fixed boundary that can be used to provide a definition. Rather, the items are grouped together because of a [[family]] resemblance. For terms such as these it is not possible and indeed not [[necessary]] to state a definition; rather, one simply comes to [[understand]] the use of the term.[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition]

There is a presumption in the [[classic]] example of a definition that the definiens can be stated. Wittgenstein argued that for some terms this is not the case. The examples he used include [[game]], [[number]] and [[family]]. In such cases, he [[argued]], there is no fixed boundary that can be used to provide a definition. Rather, the items are grouped together because of a [[family]] resemblance. For terms such as these it is not possible and indeed not [[necessary]] to state a definition; rather, one simply comes to [[understand]] the use of the term.[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition]

[[Category: Languages and Literature]]

[[Category: Languages and Literature]]