| The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212. | | The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212. |
| + | All [[volition]] is [[relative]]. In the originating sense, only the Father-I AM possesses finality of volition; in the absolute sense, only the Father, the Son, and the Spirit exhibit the prerogatives of volition unconditioned by time and unlimited by [[space]]. Mortal man is endowed with free will, the [[power]] of choice, and though such choosing is not [[absolute]], nevertheless, it is relatively final on the [[finite]] level and concerning the [[destiny]] of the choosing personality. |
| + | In the mortal life, paths of differential conduct are continually opening and closing, and during the times when choice is possible the human personality is constantly deciding between these many courses of action. [[Temporal]] volition is linked to time, and it must await the passing of time to find opportunity for expression. [[Spiritual]] volition has begun to taste liberation from the fetters of time, having achieved partial escape from time sequence, and that is because spiritual volition is self-identifying with the will of God. |
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