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History of the Concept of Mind, v.1-Chap.4 (view source)
Revision as of 20:24, 2 March 2009
, 20:24, 2 March 2009→Theological summation: Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas
According to Ducharme’s summary:
According to Ducharme’s summary:
<blockquote>Within an individual being, form is the principle of unity and cohesion and identity, and
it gives the being to be what it is, sealing in perfection, so to speak, a separation which,
it gives the being to be what it is, sealing in perfection, so to speak, a separation which,
of itself, it would not have produced. The division (divisio) is a result of matter, but the
of itself, it would not have produced. The division (divisio) is a result of matter, but the
part of them and gives them unity, just as it gives them esse [essence] and ratio [reason]
part of them and gives them unity, just as it gives them esse [essence] and ratio [reason]
… Even if that form is submitted to the laws of matter, it assumes them and elevates
… Even if that form is submitted to the laws of matter, it assumes them and elevates
them to perfection. Nothing is, but the individual, and it truly is, thanks to its form.
them to perfection. Nothing is, but the individual, and it truly is, thanks to its form.</blockquote>
In his Commentary on the Sentences, Albert compares the composition of human
In his Commentary on the Sentences, Albert compares the composition of human
form and total form:
form and total form:
<blockquote>The first composition, properly called, is that of soul and body; soul which is said to be
the act of an organic physical body, having life in potency. And to that composition
the act of an organic physical body, having life in potency. And to that composition
follows the total form, which is ‘human’ or ‘humanity’, if one may speak about it in
follows the total form, which is ‘human’ or ‘humanity’, if one may speak about it in
in a human. There is another form, which is the reason of the thing, and its whole
in a human. There is another form, which is the reason of the thing, and its whole
essence according to its reason; that form follows the composition of the natural form
essence according to its reason; that form follows the composition of the natural form
and of natural potency, which is matter. [III Sent., d.2, art. 5, sol.]
and of natural potency, which is matter. [III Sent., d.2, art. 5, sol.]</blockquote>
The first composition of natural matter and natural form gives an existent being its
The first composition of natural matter and natural form gives an existent being its
himself explains:
himself explains:
<blockquote>The soul is completely subject to suffering in the body … But one must understand that
two points are to be considered about the soul, namely that it is the nature of human, and
two points are to be considered about the soul, namely that it is the nature of human, and
the principle of human activities. From this point of view it can be considered in three
the principle of human activities. From this point of view it can be considered in three
human body amongst the various elements is superior to the balance obtained in other
human body amongst the various elements is superior to the balance obtained in other
bodies due to their forms; in this respect the human body resembles celestial bodies.
bodies due to their forms; in this respect the human body resembles celestial bodies.
Therefore the reason of form and act in it is the most noble of all.
Therefore the reason of form and act in it is the most noble of all.</blockquote>
This superior balance is closely tied to the goodness (nobility) intrinsic to the
This superior balance is closely tied to the goodness (nobility) intrinsic to the
perfect state it aspires to attain:
perfect state it aspires to attain:
<blockquote>As the soul, it is the act of a body, which is not only the result of such a balanced
composition, but also as having life; it is found in all organic things, and thus it belongs
composition, but also as having life; it is found in all organic things, and thus it belongs
to the soul to radiate various powers in various parts of the body; the human soul
to the soul to radiate various powers in various parts of the body; the human soul
nature gives human being the essence and reason of human. And thus, the rational soul,
nature gives human being the essence and reason of human. And thus, the rational soul,
considered as the nature of human, must have something more than a mere form, and
considered as the nature of human, must have something more than a mere form, and
more than a mere soul.
more than a mere soul.</blockquote>
The essence and reason of the noble or ruling ‘part’ partakes of both a nature
The essence and reason of the noble or ruling ‘part’ partakes of both a nature
dependent on a living body and a nature independent of any living body:
dependent on a living body and a nature independent of any living body:
<blockquote>It must have, flowing from it, some powers that are linked to organs, because it is a form
giving essence as a nature does, and other powers that are not linked to organs; these are
giving essence as a nature does, and other powers that are not linked to organs; these are
related to powers that are linked, inasmuch as they receive their [sensible] species from
related to powers that are linked, inasmuch as they receive their [sensible] species from
totality the body’s sufferings, because some of its powers may be taken up with the
totality the body’s sufferings, because some of its powers may be taken up with the
contemplation of eternal things, and some others submitted to passivities proper to
contemplation of eternal things, and some others submitted to passivities proper to
bodies. [III Sent., d. 15, art. 3, sol.]
bodies. [III Sent., d. 15, art. 3, sol.]</blockquote>
Albert sums up his whole philosophy of the human soul in these terms: soul is a
Albert sums up his whole philosophy of the human soul in these terms: soul is a
operations of the intellect. Gilson’s astute comment here is that
operations of the intellect. Gilson’s astute comment here is that
<blockquote>Albert’s approach to the problem of the intellect is typical of his general attitude.
Naturally, he has first exhausted all the literature available on the subject … But he also
Naturally, he has first exhausted all the literature available on the subject … But he also
realized, with great acumen, that they did not all apply to the same problem. For
realized, with great acumen, that they did not all apply to the same problem. For
division of Averroes, which is taken from the degrees of perfection of the intellect. These
division of Averroes, which is taken from the degrees of perfection of the intellect. These
penetrating remarks justify the extensive use which he himself occasionally makes of
penetrating remarks justify the extensive use which he himself occasionally makes of
several different divisions and classifications of the human modes of intellection.
several different divisions and classifications of the human modes of intellection.</blockquote>
Albert makes his own position quite clear: the agent intellect and the possible
Albert makes his own position quite clear: the agent intellect and the possible
no body considered solely as a body has life as its essence:
no body considered solely as a body has life as its essence:
<blockquote>But a first intrinsic principle of life (which imbues everything else in an animate body
with life) must have life essentially. If it did not, its having life would be explained on
with life) must have life essentially. If it did not, its having life would be explained on
the basis of something else intrinsic to that living body, and it would not be that body’s
the basis of something else intrinsic to that living body, and it would not be that body’s
first principle of life. Therefore, no soul, no first principle of life, is a body. If a soul is in
first principle of life. Therefore, no soul, no first principle of life, is a body. If a soul is in
any respect corporeal … it will not be in virtue of its corporeality that it animates the
any respect corporeal … it will not be in virtue of its corporeality that it animates the
thing whose soul it is. [original emphases]
thing whose soul it is. [original emphases]</blockquote>
He accounts for the fact that only some specifically organized bodies have the
He accounts for the fact that only some specifically organized bodies have the
its own in the natural order of things. In Kretzmann’s concise words:
its own in the natural order of things. In Kretzmann’s concise words:
<blockquote>The human soul is in the human being, not as heat is in coal, but as a part is in a whole,
such that it is capable of subsisting on its own. Moreover, the human soul as the form of
such that it is capable of subsisting on its own. Moreover, the human soul as the form of
its own body has the role of fulfilling or completing the human species, that is, the soul
its own body has the role of fulfilling or completing the human species, that is, the soul
is what gives the human being its unique place in that system, what enables that human
is what gives the human being its unique place in that system, what enables that human
being to satisfy [the criterion], and so it is more nearly a hoc aliquid than any bodily part
being to satisfy [the criterion], and so it is more nearly a hoc aliquid than any bodily part
could be.
could be.</blockquote>
Kenneth Schmitz has argued74 that Thomas formulated one of the strongest arguments
Kenneth Schmitz has argued74 that Thomas formulated one of the strongest arguments
points of view. Schmitz says that:
points of view. Schmitz says that:
<blockquote>The farthest he can go as a philosopher in parting the mysterious veil that lies at the
boundary of our present life, however, is expressed in his formula: the human soul, by
boundary of our present life, however, is expressed in his formula: the human soul, by
virtue of its intellectual nature, is both a substance in its own right and yet the spiritual
virtue of its intellectual nature, is both a substance in its own right and yet the spiritual
incomplete being, since it is by nature meant to inform, structure and vivify its human
incomplete being, since it is by nature meant to inform, structure and vivify its human
body. In the end, then, St. Thomas’ proof delivers to us something not unlike a Greek
body. In the end, then, St. Thomas’ proof delivers to us something not unlike a Greek
shade.
shade.</blockquote>
And with this discursive end to Thomas’ incongruous demonstration, one could
And with this discursive end to Thomas’ incongruous demonstration, one could
Thomas rejects any idea that matter as such is evil or deficient or imperfect:
Thomas rejects any idea that matter as such is evil or deficient or imperfect:
<blockquote>It would be completely foreign to the Thomistic perspective to regard the material
universe as the result of some calamity and the union of soul and body as the
universe as the result of some calamity and the union of soul and body as the
consequence of a fall. A radical optimism runs through this doctrine because it presents
consequence of a fall. A radical optimism runs through this doctrine because it presents
and instrument placed in its service by Almighty God. The union of soul and body is
and instrument placed in its service by Almighty God. The union of soul and body is
no chastisement of the soul but a salutary bond through which the human soul will
no chastisement of the soul but a salutary bond through which the human soul will
reach its full perfection.
reach its full perfection.</blockquote>
Since it is in the concept of the good that sufficient and final ‘causes’ must reside,
Since it is in the concept of the good that sufficient and final ‘causes’ must reside,