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Schopenhauer's history is an account of the [[concept]] of the "ideal" in its meaning as "ideas in a subject's mind." In this sense, "ideal" means "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image." He does not refer to the other meaning of "ideal" as being qualities of the highest perfection and excellence. In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer noted the ambiguity of the word "idealism" by calling it a "term with multiple meanings."

Schopenhauer's history is an account of the [[concept]] of the "ideal" in its meaning as "ideas in a subject's mind." In this sense, "ideal" means "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image." He does not refer to the other meaning of "ideal" as being qualities of the highest perfection and excellence. In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer noted the ambiguity of the word "idealism" by calling it a "term with multiple meanings."

{{Quotation|[T]rue philosophy must at all costs be ''idealistic''; indeed, it must be so merely to be honest. For nothing is more certain than that no one ever came out of himself in order to identify himself immediately with things different from him; but everything of which he has certain, sure, and therefore immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, therefore, there can be no ''immediate'' certainty ... .

:True philosophy must at all costs be ''idealistic''; indeed, it must be so merely to be honest. For nothing is more certain than that no one ever came :out of himself in order to identify himself immediately with things different from him; but everything of which he has certain, sure, and therefore :immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, therefore, there can be no ''immediate'' certainty ... .

There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective, as such, always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the subject's representation, and consequently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject's forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object.|''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. II, Ch. 1}}

:There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective, :as such, always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the subject's representation, and consequently is :conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject's forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object.|''[[The World :as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. II, Ch. 1}}

It is evident that Schopenhauer's "idealism" is based primarily on considerations having to do with the relation between our ideas and external reality, rather than being based (like Plato's, Plotinus's, or Hegel's "idealism") on considerations having to do with the nature of reality as such.

It is evident that Schopenhauer's "idealism" is based primarily on considerations having to do with the relation between our ideas and external reality, rather than being based (like Plato's, Plotinus's, or Hegel's "idealism") on considerations having to do with the nature of reality as such.