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''Idealism'' is any system or theory that maintains that the "real" is of the nature of thought or that the object of external perception consists of ideas. It can also be  the tendency to represent things in an ideal form, or as they might or should be rather than as they are, with emphasis on values.

''Idealism'' is any system or theory that maintains that the "real" is of the nature of thought or that the object of external perception consists of ideas. It can also be  the tendency to represent things in an ideal form, or as they might or should be rather than as they are, with emphasis on values.

[[Immanuel Kant]] held that the mind shapes the world as we perceive it to take the form of space-and-time. Kant focused on the idea drawn from British [[empiricism]] (and its philosophers such as [[John Locke|Locke]], [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], and [[David Hume|Hume]]) that all we can know is the mental impressions, or ''[[phenomena]]'', that an outside world, which may or may not exist independently, creates in our minds; our minds can never perceive that outside world directly. Kant emphasized the difference between things as they appear to an observer and things in themselves, "..;that is, things considered without regard to whether and how they may be given to us ... ."''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', A 140   

[[Immanuel Kant]] held that the mind shapes the world as we perceive it to take the form of space-and-time. Kant focused on the idea drawn from British [[empiricism]] (and its philosophers such as [[John Locke|Locke]], [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], and [[David Hume|Hume]]) that all we can know is the mental impressions, or ''[[phenomena]]'', that an outside world, which may or may not exist independently, creates in our minds; our minds can never perceive that outside world directly. Kant emphasized the difference between things as they appear to an observer and things in themselves, "..;that is, things considered without regard to whether and how they may be given to us ... ."''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', A 140   

{{Quotation|... if I remove the thinking subject, the whole material world must at once vanish because it is nothing but a phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of ourselves as a subject, and a manner or species of representation.|''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' A383}}   

:I remove the thinking subject, the whole material world must at once vanish because it is nothing but a phenomenal appearance in the :sensibility of ourselves as a subject, and a manner or species of representation.''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' A383}}   

Kant's postscript to this added that the mind is not a blank slate, tabula rasa, (contra [[John Locke]]), but rather comes equipped with categories for organising our sense impressions. This Kantian sort of idealism opens up a world of abstractions (i.e., the universal categories minds use to understand phenomena) to be explored by reason, but in sharp contrast to Plato's, confirms uncertainties about a (un)knowable world outside our own minds. We cannot approach the ''[[noumenon]]'', the "Thing in Itself" (German: ''Ding an Sich'') outside our own mental world.  (Kant's idealism goes by the counterintuitive name of ''[[transcendental idealism]]''.)

Kant's postscript to this added that the mind is not a blank slate, tabula rasa, (contra [[John Locke]]), but rather comes equipped with categories for organising our sense impressions. This Kantian sort of idealism opens up a world of abstractions (i.e., the universal categories minds use to understand phenomena) to be explored by reason, but in sharp contrast to Plato's, confirms uncertainties about a (un)knowable world outside our own minds. We cannot approach the ''[[noumenon]]'', the "Thing in Itself" (German: ''Ding an Sich'') outside our own mental world.  (Kant's idealism goes by the counterintuitive name of ''[[transcendental idealism]]''.)