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'''Inquiry''' is any process that has the aim of augmenting [[knowledge]], resolving [[doubt]], or solving a [[problem]].  A theory of inquiry is an account of the various types of inquiry and a treatment of the ways that each type of inquiry achieves its aim.

'''Inquiry''' is any process that has the aim of augmenting [[knowledge]], resolving [[doubt]], or solving a [[problem]].  A theory of inquiry is an account of the various types of inquiry and a treatment of the ways that each type of inquiry achieves its aim.

 

<center>For lessons on the [[topic]] of '''''Inquiry''''', follow [https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Inquiry this link].</center>

[[Image:lighterstill.jpg]]

 

==Classical sources==

==Classical sources==

===Deduction===

===Deduction===

When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.  By 'middle term' I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.  For if ''A'' is predicated of all ''B'', and ''B'' of all ''C'', ''A'' must necessarily be predicated of all ''C''.  &hellip;  I call this kind of figure the First.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.4).

When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.  By 'middle term' I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.  For if ''A'' is predicated of all ''B'', and ''B'' of all ''C'', ''A'' must necessarily be predicated of all ''C''.  &hellip;  I call this kind of figure the First.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.4).

===Induction===

===Induction===

Inductive reasoning consists in establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle term by means of the other extreme; for example, if ''B'' is the middle term of ''A'' and ''C'', in proving by means of ''C'' that ''A'' applies to ''B'';  for this is how we effect inductions.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 2.23).

Inductive reasoning consists in establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle term by means of the other extreme; for example, if ''B'' is the middle term of ''A'' and ''C'', in proving by means of ''C'' that ''A'' applies to ''B'';  for this is how we effect inductions.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 2.23).

===Abduction===

===Abduction===

The ''locus classicus'' for the study of [[abductive reasoning]] is found in [[Aristotle]]'s ''[[Prior Analytics]]'', Book 2, Chapt. 25.  It begins this way:

The ''locus classicus'' for the study of [[abductive reasoning]] is found in [[Aristotle]]'s ''[[Prior Analytics]]'', Book 2, Chapt. 25.  It begins this way: " We have Reduction (απαγωγη, [[abductive reasoning|abduction]]):

*When it is obvious that the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet is nevertheless more probable or not less probable than the conclusion;

We have Reduction (απαγωγη, [[abductive reasoning|abduction]]):

*Or if there are not many intermediate terms between the last and the middle;

:# When it is obvious that the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet is nevertheless more probable or not less probable than the conclusion;

:# Or if there are not many intermediate terms between the last and the middle;

For in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.

For in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.

By way of explanation, [[Aristotle]] supplies two very instructive examples, one for each of the two varieties of abductive inference steps that he has just described in the abstract:

By way of explanation, [[Aristotle]] supplies two very instructive examples, one for each of the two varieties of abductive inference steps that he has just described in the abstract:

*For example, let ''A'' stand for "that which can be taught", ''B'' for "knowledge", and ''C'' for "morality". Then that knowledge can be taught is evident;  but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear.  Then if ''BC'' is not less probable or is more probable than ''AC'', we have reduction;  for we are nearer to knowledge for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge that ''AC'' is true.

:# For example, let ''A'' stand for "that which can be taught", ''B'' for "knowledge", and ''C'' for "morality". Then that knowledge can be taught is evident;  but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear.  Then if ''BC'' is not less probable or is more probable than ''AC'', we have reduction;  for we are nearer to knowledge for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge that ''AC'' is true.

*Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms between ''B'' and ''C'';  for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.  For example, suppose that ''D'' is "to square", ''E'' "rectilinear figure", and ''F'' "circle".  Assuming that between ''E'' and ''F'' there is only one intermediate term — that the  circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of [[lunule]]s — we should approximate to knowledge.

:# Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms between ''B'' and ''C'';  for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.  For example, suppose that ''D'' is "to square", ''E'' "rectilinear figure", and ''F'' "circle".  Assuming that between ''E'' and ''F'' there is only one intermediate term — that the  circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of [[lunule]]s — we should approximate to knowledge.

([[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", 2.25, with minor alterations)

([[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", 2.25, with minor alterations)

Aristotle's latter variety of abductive reasoning, though it will take some explaining in the sequel, is well worth our contemplation, since it hints already at streams of inquiry that course well beyond the syllogistic source from which they spring, and into regions that Peirce will explore more broadly and deeply.

Aristotle's latter variety of abductive reasoning, though it will take some explaining in the sequel, is well worth our contemplation, since it hints already at streams of inquiry that course well beyond the syllogistic source from which they spring, and into regions that Peirce will explore more broadly and deeply.

Deduction encompasses, of course, the classical [[syllogism]].

Deduction encompasses, of course, the classical [[syllogism]].

 

 

====Analogy====

====Analogy====

This is nowhere near a complete analysis of the Rainy Day inquiry, even insofar as it might be carried out within the constraints of the syllogistic framework, and it covers only the first two steps of the relevant inquiry process, but maybe it will do for a start.

This is nowhere near a complete analysis of the Rainy Day inquiry, even insofar as it might be carried out within the constraints of the syllogistic framework, and it covers only the first two steps of the relevant inquiry process, but maybe it will do for a start.

One other thing needs to be noticed here, the formal [[duality]] between this expansion phase of inquiry and the argument from [[analogy]].  This can be seen most clearly in the propositional [[lattice]] diagrams shown in Figures 3 and 4, where analogy exhibits a rough "A" shape and the first two steps of inquiry exhibit a rough "V" shape, respectively.  Since we find ourselves repeatedly referring to this expansion phase of inquiry as a unit, let's give it a name that suggests its duality with [[analogical reasoning|analogy]] — '[[catalogical reasoning|catalogy]]' will do for the moment.  This usage is apt enough if one thinks of a catalogue entry for an item as a text that lists its salient features.  Notice that [[analogical reasoning|analogy]] has to do with the examples of a given quality, while [[catalogical reasoning|catalogy]] has to do with the qualities of a given example.  Peirce noted similar forms of duality in many of his early writings, leading to the consummate treatment in his 1867 paper [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm "On a New List of Categories"] (CP 1.545-559, W 2, 49-59).

One other thing needs to be noticed here, the formal [[duality]] between this expansion phase of inquiry and the argument from [[analogy]].  This can be seen most clearly in the propositional [[lattice]] diagrams shown in Figures 3 and 4, where analogy exhibits a rough "A" shape and the first two steps of inquiry exhibit a rough "V" shape, respectively.  Since we find ourselves repeatedly referring to this expansion phase of inquiry as a unit, let's give it a name that suggests its duality with [[analogical reasoning|analogy]] — '[[catalogical reasoning|catalogy]]' will do for the moment.  This usage is apt enough if one thinks of a catalogue entry for an item as a text that lists its salient features.  Notice that [[analogical reasoning|analogy]] has to do with the examples of a given quality, while [[catalogical reasoning|catalogy]] has to do with the qualities of a given example.  Peirce noted similar forms of duality in many of his early writings, leading to the consummate treatment in his 1867 paper [https://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm "On a New List of Categories"] (CP 1.545-559, W 2, 49-59).

====Weeding hypotheses====

====Weeding hypotheses====

If the observer looks up and does not see dark clouds, or if he runs for shelter but it does not rain, then there is fresh occasion to question the utility or the validity of his knowledge base.  But we must leave our foulweather friend for now and defer the logical analysis of this testing phase to another occasion.

If the observer looks up and does not see dark clouds, or if he runs for shelter but it does not rain, then there is fresh occasion to question the utility or the validity of his knowledge base.  But we must leave our foulweather friend for now and defer the logical analysis of this testing phase to another occasion.

 

==References==

==References==

* [[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", [[Hugh Tredennick]] (trans.), pp. 181–531 in ''Aristotle, Volume 1'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], [[Heinemann (book publisher)|William Heinemann]], London, UK, 1938.

* [[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", [[Hugh Tredennick]] (trans.), pp. 181–531 in ''Aristotle, Volume 1'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], [[Heinemann (book publisher)|William Heinemann]], London, UK, 1938.

* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), "Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry", ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'' 15, 40–52.  [http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Eprint].

* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), "Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry", ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'' 15, 40–52.  [https://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Eprint].

* [[Cornelius F. Delaney|Delaney, C.F.]] (1993), ''Science, Knowledge, and Mind:  A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce'', University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.

* [[Cornelius F. Delaney|Delaney, C.F.]] (1993), ''Science, Knowledge, and Mind:  A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce'', University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN.

==See also==

==See also==

[[File:Main_poster.jpg‎|right|frame]]

 

[https://www.wabash.edu/photo_album/home.cfm?photo_id=10860&photo_album_id=1908 The Art of the Question]

| [[Charles Peirce|Peirce, C.S.]]

| (1839–1914)

| [[William James|James, William]]

| [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]]

===Topics===

===Topics===

* [[Information theory]]

* [[Information theory]]

* [[Scientific method]]

* [[Scientific method]]

* [[Semiotics]]

* [[Semiotics]]

[[Category:General Reference]]

[[Category:General Reference]]