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'''Inquiry''' is any process that has the aim of augmenting [[knowledge]], resolving [[doubt]], or solving a [[problem]].  A theory of inquiry is an account of the various types of inquiry and a treatment of the ways that each type of inquiry achieves its aim.
 
'''Inquiry''' is any process that has the aim of augmenting [[knowledge]], resolving [[doubt]], or solving a [[problem]].  A theory of inquiry is an account of the various types of inquiry and a treatment of the ways that each type of inquiry achieves its aim.
 
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<center>For lessons on the [[topic]] of '''''Inquiry''''', follow [http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Inquiry this link].</center>
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==Classical sources==
 
==Classical sources==
 
===Deduction===
 
===Deduction===
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<blockquote>
   
When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.  By 'middle term' I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.  For if ''A'' is predicated of all ''B'', and ''B'' of all ''C'', ''A'' must necessarily be predicated of all ''C''.  &hellip;  I call this kind of figure the First.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.4).
 
When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.  By 'middle term' I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.  For if ''A'' is predicated of all ''B'', and ''B'' of all ''C'', ''A'' must necessarily be predicated of all ''C''.  &hellip;  I call this kind of figure the First.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.4).
</blockquote>
      
===Induction===
 
===Induction===
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<blockquote>
   
Inductive reasoning consists in establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle term by means of the other extreme; for example, if ''B'' is the middle term of ''A'' and ''C'', in proving by means of ''C'' that ''A'' applies to ''B'';  for this is how we effect inductions.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 2.23).
 
Inductive reasoning consists in establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle term by means of the other extreme; for example, if ''B'' is the middle term of ''A'' and ''C'', in proving by means of ''C'' that ''A'' applies to ''B'';  for this is how we effect inductions.  (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 2.23).
</blockquote>
      
===Abduction===
 
===Abduction===
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The ''locus classicus'' for the study of [[abductive reasoning]] is found in [[Aristotle]]'s ''[[Prior Analytics]]'', Book 2, Chapt. 25.  It begins this way:
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The ''locus classicus'' for the study of [[abductive reasoning]] is found in [[Aristotle]]'s ''[[Prior Analytics]]'', Book 2, Chapt. 25.  It begins this way: " We have Reduction (απαγωγη, [[abductive reasoning|abduction]]):
<blockquote>
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*When it is obvious that the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet is nevertheless more probable or not less probable than the conclusion;
We have Reduction (απαγωγη, [[abductive reasoning|abduction]]):
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*Or if there are not many intermediate terms between the last and the middle;
:# When it is obvious that the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet is nevertheless more probable or not less probable than the conclusion;
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:# Or if there are not many intermediate terms between the last and the middle;
   
For in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.
 
For in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.
</blockquote>
   
By way of explanation, [[Aristotle]] supplies two very instructive examples, one for each of the two varieties of abductive inference steps that he has just described in the abstract:
 
By way of explanation, [[Aristotle]] supplies two very instructive examples, one for each of the two varieties of abductive inference steps that he has just described in the abstract:
<blockquote>
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*For example, let ''A'' stand for "that which can be taught", ''B'' for "knowledge", and ''C'' for "morality". Then that knowledge can be taught is evident;  but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear.  Then if ''BC'' is not less probable or is more probable than ''AC'', we have reduction;  for we are nearer to knowledge for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge that ''AC'' is true.
:# For example, let ''A'' stand for "that which can be taught", ''B'' for "knowledge", and ''C'' for "morality". Then that knowledge can be taught is evident;  but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear.  Then if ''BC'' is not less probable or is more probable than ''AC'', we have reduction;  for we are nearer to knowledge for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge that ''AC'' is true.
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*Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms between ''B'' and ''C'';  for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.  For example, suppose that ''D'' is "to square", ''E'' "rectilinear figure", and ''F'' "circle".  Assuming that between ''E'' and ''F'' there is only one intermediate term — that the  circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of [[lunule]]s — we should approximate to knowledge.
:# Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms between ''B'' and ''C'';  for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.  For example, suppose that ''D'' is "to square", ''E'' "rectilinear figure", and ''F'' "circle".  Assuming that between ''E'' and ''F'' there is only one intermediate term — that the  circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of [[lunule]]s — we should approximate to knowledge.
   
([[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", 2.25, with minor alterations)
 
([[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", 2.25, with minor alterations)
</blockquote>
      
Aristotle's latter variety of abductive reasoning, though it will take some explaining in the sequel, is well worth our contemplation, since it hints already at streams of inquiry that course well beyond the syllogistic source from which they spring, and into regions that Peirce will explore more broadly and deeply.
 
Aristotle's latter variety of abductive reasoning, though it will take some explaining in the sequel, is well worth our contemplation, since it hints already at streams of inquiry that course well beyond the syllogistic source from which they spring, and into regions that Peirce will explore more broadly and deeply.
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Deduction encompasses, of course, the classical [[syllogism]].
 
Deduction encompasses, of course, the classical [[syllogism]].
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====Deduction====
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{{main|Deductive reasoning}}
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====Induction====
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{{main|Inductive reasoning}}
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====Analogy====
 
====Analogy====
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If the observer looks up and does not see dark clouds, or if he runs for shelter but it does not rain, then there is fresh occasion to question the utility or the validity of his knowledge base.  But we must leave our foulweather friend for now and defer the logical analysis of this testing phase to another occasion.
 
If the observer looks up and does not see dark clouds, or if he runs for shelter but it does not rain, then there is fresh occasion to question the utility or the validity of his knowledge base.  But we must leave our foulweather friend for now and defer the logical analysis of this testing phase to another occasion.
 
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==Quote==
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"Animals respond nobly to the urge of life, but only man can attain the [[art of living]], albeit the majority of mankind only [[experience]] the animal urge to live. Animals know only this blind and instinctive urge; man is capable of transcending this urge to natural function. Man may elect to live upon the high plane of [[intelligence|intelligent]] [[art]], even that of [[celestial]] joy and [[spiritual]] [[ecstasy]]. Animals make no '''inquiry''' into the purposes of life; therefore they never worry, neither do they commit suicide. Suicide among men testifies that such beings have emerged from the purely animal stage of existence, and to the further [[fact]] that the exploratory efforts of such [[human being]]s have failed to attain the artistic levels of mortal experience. Animals know not the [[meaning]] of life; man not only possesses capacity for the re[[cognition]] of [[value]]s and the comprehension of [[meaning]]s, but he also is conscious of the meaning of meanings--he is self-conscious of [[insight]]." [http://urantia.org/cgi-bin/webglimpse/mfs/usr/local/www/data/papers?link=http://mercy.urantia.org/papers/paper160.html&file=/usr/local/www/data/papers/paper160.html&line=39#mfs]
 
==References==
 
==References==
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==See also==
 
==See also==
===History===
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[[File:Main_poster.jpg‎|right|frame]]
 
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[http://www.wabash.edu/photo_album/home.cfm?photo_id=10860&photo_album_id=1908 The Art of the Question]
| [[Aristotle]]
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| (384–322 BC)
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|-
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| [[Charles Peirce|Peirce, C.S.]]
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| (1839–1914)
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|-
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| [[William James|James, William]]
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| (1842–1910)
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|-
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| [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]]
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| (1859–1952)
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|}
      
===Topics===
 
===Topics===
* [[Curiosity]]
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* [[Information entropy]]
   
* [[Information theory]]
 
* [[Information theory]]
* [[Logic of information]]
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* [[Philosophy of science]]
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* [[Pragmatic maxim]]
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* [[Pragmatic information]]
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* [[Pragmatic theory of truth]]
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* [[Pragmaticism]]
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* [[Pragmatism]]
   
* [[Scientific method]]
 
* [[Scientific method]]
* [[Semeiotic]]
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* [[Semiosis]]
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* [[Semiotic information]]
   
* [[Semiotics]]
 
* [[Semiotics]]
* [[Sign relation]]
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* [[Uncertainty]]
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'''Related portals'''
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* [[Portal:thinking]]
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* [[Philosophy]]
      
[[Category:General Reference]]
 
[[Category:General Reference]]
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[[Category: Philosophy]]

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