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We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident — witness both those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it, since the former merely imagine themselves to be, while the latter are also actually, in the condition described. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.|[[Aristotle]]|''[[Posterior Analytics]]'' (Book 1 Part 2)

We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident — witness both those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it, since the former merely imagine themselves to be, while the latter are also actually, in the condition described. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.|[[Aristotle]]|''[[Posterior Analytics]]'' (Book 1 Part 2)

The definition of knowledge is a matter of on-going [[debate]] among [[philosopher]]s. The classical definition is found in, but not ultimately endorsed by, [[Plato]].<ref>In Plato's ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]'', Socrates and Theaetetus discuss three definitions of ''knowledge'': knowledge as nothing but perception, knowledge as true judgment, and, finally, knowledge as a true judgment with an account. Each of these definitions are shown to be unsatisfactory.</ref>, has it that in order for there to be knowledge ''at least'' three [[criteria]] must be fulfilled; that in order to count as knowledge, a [[statement]] must be [[theory of justification|justified]], [[truth|true]], and [[belief|believed]]. Some claim that these conditions are not sufficient, as [[Gettier case]] examples allegedly demonstrate. There are a number of alternatives proposed, including [[Robert Nozick]]'s arguments for a requirement that knowledge 'tracks the truth' and [[Simon Blackburn|Simon Blackburn's]] additional requirement that we do not want to say that those who meet any of these conditions 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' have knowledge. [[Richard Kirkham]] suggests that our definition of knowledge requires that the believer's evidence is such that it [[logic]]ally necessitates the truth of the belief.

The definition of knowledge is a matter of on-going [[debate]] among [[philosopher]]s. The classical definition is found in, but not ultimately endorsed by, [[Plato]]. In Plato's ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]'', Socrates and Theaetetus discuss three definitions of ''knowledge'': knowledge as nothing but perception, knowledge as true judgment, and, finally, knowledge as a true judgment with an account. Each of these definitions are shown to be unsatisfactory, has it that in order for there to be knowledge ''at least'' three [[criteria]] must be fulfilled; that in order to count as knowledge, a [[statement]] must be [[theory of justification|justified]], [[truth|true]], and [[belief|believed]]. Some claim that these conditions are not sufficient, as [[Gettier case]] examples allegedly demonstrate. There are a number of alternatives proposed, including [[Robert Nozick]]'s arguments for a requirement that knowledge 'tracks the truth' and [[Simon Blackburn|Simon Blackburn's]] additional requirement that we do not want to say that those who meet any of these conditions 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' have knowledge. [[Richard Kirkham]] suggests that our definition of knowledge requires that the believer's evidence is such that it [[logic]]ally necessitates the truth of the belief.

In contrast to this approach, [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]] observed, following [[Moore's paradox]], that one can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it isn't so". <ref>Ludwig Wittgenstein, ''On Certainty'', remark 42</ref> He goes on to argue that these do not correspond to distinct mental states, but rather to distinct ways of talking about conviction. What is different here is not the mental state of the speaker, but the activity in which they are engaged. For example, on this account, to ''know'' that the kettle is boiling is not to be in a particular state of mind, but to perform a particular task with the statement that the kettle is boiling. Wittgenstein sought to bypass the difficulty of definition by looking to the way "knowledge" is used in natural languages. He saw knowledge as a case of a [[family resemblance]].

In contrast to this approach, [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]] observed, following [[Moore's paradox]], that one can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it isn't so". Ludwig Wittgenstein, ''On Certainty'', remark 42 He goes on to argue that these do not correspond to distinct mental states, but rather to distinct ways of talking about conviction. What is different here is not the mental state of the speaker, but the activity in which they are engaged. For example, on this account, to ''know'' that the kettle is boiling is not to be in a particular state of mind, but to perform a particular task with the statement that the kettle is boiling. Wittgenstein sought to bypass the difficulty of definition by looking to the way "knowledge" is used in natural languages. He saw knowledge as a case of a [[family resemblance]].

==Reliable knowledge==

==Reliable knowledge==