| The [[philosophy]] of '''materialism''' holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to [[existence|exist]] is [[matter]], and is considered a form of physicalism. Fundamentally, all [[things]] are composed of ''material'' and all [[phenomena]] (including [[consciousness]]) are the result of material interactions; therefore, [[matter]] is the only substance. As a theory, materialism belongs to the class of [[Monist|monist]] ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on [[dualism]] or [[pluralism]]. For singular explanations of the phenomenal [[reality]], materialism would be in contrast to [[idealism]]. | | The [[philosophy]] of '''materialism''' holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to [[existence|exist]] is [[matter]], and is considered a form of physicalism. Fundamentally, all [[things]] are composed of ''material'' and all [[phenomena]] (including [[consciousness]]) are the result of material interactions; therefore, [[matter]] is the only substance. As a theory, materialism belongs to the class of [[Monist|monist]] ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on [[dualism]] or [[pluralism]]. For singular explanations of the phenomenal [[reality]], materialism would be in contrast to [[idealism]]. |
| The view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, famously by [[René Descartes]]. However, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice it is frequently assimilated to one variety of physicalism or another. | | The view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, famously by [[René Descartes]]. However, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice it is frequently assimilated to one variety of physicalism or another. |
− | The very claim of materialism implies a supermaterial [[consciousness]] of the [[mind]] which presumes to assert such dogmas. A mechanism might deteriorate, but it could never progress. Machines do not think, create, [[dream]], aspire, idealize, hunger for [[truth]], or thirst for righteousness. They do not motivate their lives with the passion to serve other machines and to choose as their goal of eternal progression the sublime task of finding [[God]] and striving to be like him. Machines are never [[intellectual]], [[emotion]]al, aesthetic, ethical, moral, or [[spiritual]].[http://urantia.org/cgi-bin/webglimpse/mfs/usr/local/www/data/papers?link=http://mercy.urantia.org/papers/paper195.html&file=/usr/local/www/data/papers/paper195.html&line=187#mfs] | + | The very claim of materialism implies a supermaterial [[consciousness]] of the [[mind]] which presumes to assert such dogmas. A mechanism might deteriorate, but it could never progress. Machines do not [[idea|think]], [[creativity|create]], [[dream]], aspire, [[ideal]]ize, hunger for [[truth]], or thirst for [[justice|righteousness]]. They do not motivate their lives with the passion to serve other machines and to choose as their goal of [[eternal]] progression the sublime task of finding [[God]] and striving to be like him. Machines are never [[intellectual]], [[emotion]]al, [[beauty|aesthetic]], [[Ethics|ethical]], moral, or [[spiritual]].[http://urantia.org/cgi-bin/webglimpse/mfs/usr/local/www/data/papers?link=http://mercy.urantia.org/papers/paper195.html&file=/usr/local/www/data/papers/paper195.html&line=187#mfs] |