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The Metaphysics of Creativity:  

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Paul Ashton and Claire Rafferty

Paul Ashton and Claire Rafferty

 

There are numerous investigations into the relationship between Whitehead and Hegel, and for good reason, as there are many parallels in their work. However, Hegel is not an isolated thinker that exists in a cultural vacuum, rather he is perhaps the last and most famous philosopher in the German romantic and idealistic tradition, and not surprisingly we believe these parallels are consistent across this movement as a whole. To be sure, the focus on Hegel in this area has in some ways obscured some of the true insights and the genuinely processual nature of philosophical thought in this revolutionary period as a whole. With this said, the goal of this paper is not a thoroughgoing examination of the similarity of positions of the two fields or the direct links between the two; our goal is the more modest one of merely showing how this unique period of philosophy after and including Kant responded to the modern problematic of dualism. Kant is especially important here as his philosophy is the doorway through which the spirit of the new mode of philosophical thinking has come whilst paradoxically representing the height of dichotomous thought.   

There are numerous investigations into the relationship between Whitehead and Hegel, and for good reason, as there are many parallels in their work. However, Hegel is not an isolated thinker that exists in a cultural vacuum, rather he is perhaps the last and most famous philosopher in the German romantic and idealistic tradition, and not surprisingly we believe these parallels are consistent across this movement as a whole. To be sure, the focus on Hegel in this area has in some ways obscured some of the true insights and the genuinely processual nature of philosophical thought in this revolutionary period as a whole. With this said, the goal of this paper is not a thoroughgoing examination of the similarity of positions of the two fields or the direct links between the two; our goal is the more modest one of merely showing how this unique period of philosophy after and including Kant responded to the modern problematic of dualism. Kant is especially important here as his philosophy is the doorway through which the spirit of the new mode of philosophical thinking has come whilst paradoxically representing the height of dichotomous thought.   

To begin our exposition we must return to the Enlightenment which begins by breaking down the older forms of knowledge characterized by the age old metaphysical systems. Truth was now to be found not in the word of God but in his work—nature—and for this task words no longer provided the transparency or accuracy required; now ‘the only suitable expression lies in mathematical constructions, figures and numbers… in these symbols nature presents itself in perfect form and clarity.’  Nature was a product of immutable physical laws which, while lying hidden in the darkness of myth and superstition, the human mind could reveal by harnessing the illuminating power of scientific reason. However, once these scientific and mathematical principles had been objectified they could encompass all of reality, and it was against this consequence that Kant aimed his philosophy.  

To begin our exposition we must return to the Enlightenment which begins by breaking down the older forms of knowledge characterized by the age old metaphysical systems. Truth was now to be found not in the word of God but in his work—nature—and for this task words no longer provided the transparency or accuracy required; now ‘the only suitable expression lies in mathematical constructions, figures and numbers… in these symbols nature presents itself in perfect form and clarity.’  Nature was a product of immutable physical laws which, while lying hidden in the darkness of myth and superstition, the human mind could reveal by harnessing the illuminating power of scientific reason. However, once these scientific and mathematical principles had been objectified they could encompass all of reality, and it was against this consequence that Kant aimed his philosophy.  

 

==The System of Critical Philosophy==

 

The System of Critical Philosophy  

The Critique of Pure Reason (first published 1781, and extensively revised 1787),  is an investigation of the principles essential to theoretical knowledge, and through this investigation sets out to discover what makes the disciplines of science and mathematics possible. However, Kant turns to an analysis of human subjectivity, investigating the cognitive capacities of the human subject, as the ground of any possible experience or knowledge.  He never treats an object as a thing existing independently of the human mind, he asks: How do we come to know it?  What emerges however is that since all our knowledge of the world comes to us in the form of empirical intuitions, or representations of phenomenal reality, which are apprehended and then brought under concepts through the thinking of the understanding, it follows that the only knowledge we can have of objects is that which is based on them as objects of sense, as phenomenon, and not as they exist in themselves.  There can be no knowledge beyond the boundaries of possible experience.  

The Critique of Pure Reason (first published 1781, and extensively revised 1787),  is an investigation of the principles essential to theoretical knowledge, and through this investigation sets out to discover what makes the disciplines of science and mathematics possible. However, Kant turns to an analysis of human subjectivity, investigating the cognitive capacities of the human subject, as the ground of any possible experience or knowledge.  He never treats an object as a thing existing independently of the human mind, he asks: How do we come to know it?  What emerges however is that since all our knowledge of the world comes to us in the form of empirical intuitions, or representations of phenomenal reality, which are apprehended and then brought under concepts through the thinking of the understanding, it follows that the only knowledge we can have of objects is that which is based on them as objects of sense, as phenomenon, and not as they exist in themselves.  There can be no knowledge beyond the boundaries of possible experience.  

It is this same division—whether it be articulated as that between essence and existence, being and beings, freedom and necessity—which becomes the central issue of modern philosophy, or perhaps the philosophical problem itself. But this pre-occupation with division coincides with its inverse: the quest for wholeness. The recognition of the divisions that threaten and undermine modern life are a counterpart to the longing for reconciliation and the ambition towards wholeness which permeates philosophy, particularly in Germany. As Schlegel suggests, ‘in the mental domain of thought and poetry, inaccessible to worldly power, the Germans, who are separated in so many ways from each other, still feel their unity’  And it is in the questions posed to philosophy by the realms of art and nature, that it seeks a key to the potential reconciliation of the divide that underlies the continual striving of philosophical knowledge.

It is this same division—whether it be articulated as that between essence and existence, being and beings, freedom and necessity—which becomes the central issue of modern philosophy, or perhaps the philosophical problem itself. But this pre-occupation with division coincides with its inverse: the quest for wholeness. The recognition of the divisions that threaten and undermine modern life are a counterpart to the longing for reconciliation and the ambition towards wholeness which permeates philosophy, particularly in Germany. As Schlegel suggests, ‘in the mental domain of thought and poetry, inaccessible to worldly power, the Germans, who are separated in so many ways from each other, still feel their unity’  And it is in the questions posed to philosophy by the realms of art and nature, that it seeks a key to the potential reconciliation of the divide that underlies the continual striving of philosophical knowledge.

 

==The Third Critique==

The Third Critique

In the introduction to his third critique, the Critique of Judgement (1790) , Kant observes that an ‘immeasurable gulf’ lies between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom (CJ 12). Kant therefore seeks a ‘ground’ that could somehow unite the two realms and make possible the transition from the mode of thought of one to the other (CJ 12). The third Critique attempts to bridge this divide and secure that ‘ground’. In his quest to find a principle capable of mediating between the theoretical order of science and the practical order of freedom as elaborated in his critiques of pure and practical reason respectively, Kant argues that while we cannot explicitly know the purposive accord between ourselves and the world, we think and act as if this were the case when we make reflective judgements. Two kinds of reflection, reflections on the beautiful and reflections on nature are based on this principle. Hence, the third Critique is divided into the critiques of aesthetical and teleological judgement, the explication of aesthetical judgement being essential as it contains the principle placed by judgement at the basis of its reflection upon nature (CJ 30).  For Kant the principle that grounds judgements about both nature and beauty is the principle of purposiveness—it forms the ground or the principle of all judgement and the origin of this concept is found solely in the reflective judgement.  

In the introduction to his third critique, the Critique of Judgement (1790) , Kant observes that an ‘immeasurable gulf’ lies between the sensible realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of freedom (CJ 12). Kant therefore seeks a ‘ground’ that could somehow unite the two realms and make possible the transition from the mode of thought of one to the other (CJ 12). The third Critique attempts to bridge this divide and secure that ‘ground’. In his quest to find a principle capable of mediating between the theoretical order of science and the practical order of freedom as elaborated in his critiques of pure and practical reason respectively, Kant argues that while we cannot explicitly know the purposive accord between ourselves and the world, we think and act as if this were the case when we make reflective judgements. Two kinds of reflection, reflections on the beautiful and reflections on nature are based on this principle. Hence, the third Critique is divided into the critiques of aesthetical and teleological judgement, the explication of aesthetical judgement being essential as it contains the principle placed by judgement at the basis of its reflection upon nature (CJ 30).  For Kant the principle that grounds judgements about both nature and beauty is the principle of purposiveness—it forms the ground or the principle of all judgement and the origin of this concept is found solely in the reflective judgement.  

Kant illustrates this principle with the example of a watch:

==Kant illustrates this principle with the example of a watch:==

In a watch, one part is the instrument for moving the other parts, but the wheel is not the effective cause of the others, it does not exist by their means. In this case the producing cause of the parts and of their form is not contained in the nature (of the material), but is external to it in a being which can produce effects according to ideas of a whole possible by means of its causality. Hence a watch wheel does not produce other wheels; still less does one watch produce other watches, utilizing (organizing) foreign material for that purpose; hence it does not replace of itself parts of which it has been deprived, nor does it make good what is lacking in a first formation by the addition of the missing parts, nor if it has gone out of order does it repair itself—all of which, on the contrary, we may expect from organized nature. An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely moving power, but it possesses in itself formative power of  a self-propagating kind which it communicates to its materials though they have it not of themselves; it organizes them, in fact, and this cannot be explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion (CJ 221).

In a watch, one part is the instrument for moving the other parts, but the wheel is not the effective cause of the others, it does not exist by their means. In this case the producing cause of the parts and of their form is not contained in the nature (of the material), but is external to it in a being which can produce effects according to ideas of a whole possible by means of its causality. Hence a watch wheel does not produce other wheels; still less does one watch produce other watches, utilizing (organizing) foreign material for that purpose; hence it does not replace of itself parts of which it has been deprived, nor does it make good what is lacking in a first formation by the addition of the missing parts, nor if it has gone out of order does it repair itself—all of which, on the contrary, we may expect from organized nature. An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely moving power, but it possesses in itself formative power of  a self-propagating kind which it communicates to its materials though they have it not of themselves; it organizes them, in fact, and this cannot be explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion (CJ 221).

The Significance of the Third Critique

==The Significance of the Third Critique==

Kant’s articulation of the purposive harmony in the forms of art and nature and their relation to the subject attempts to construct a new model for our understanding of nature and aesthetic experience. Many of Kant’s immediate followers saw the third Critique as a crucial philosophical development that created an opening for their subsequent attempts to solve the problems posed by Kant’s own philosophy.  They saw in it the ‘shadowy outlines of a philosophy premised upon the sublation of those legislative divisions’, the potential to overcome the categorical divisions of the critical system that corresponded to the divisions of the modern world, and to clear the way for a redefinition of both reason and creativity.  And in overcoming Kant’s philosophy they would be attempting to overcome modernity itself.

Kant’s articulation of the purposive harmony in the forms of art and nature and their relation to the subject attempts to construct a new model for our understanding of nature and aesthetic experience. Many of Kant’s immediate followers saw the third Critique as a crucial philosophical development that created an opening for their subsequent attempts to solve the problems posed by Kant’s own philosophy.  They saw in it the ‘shadowy outlines of a philosophy premised upon the sublation of those legislative divisions’, the potential to overcome the categorical divisions of the critical system that corresponded to the divisions of the modern world, and to clear the way for a redefinition of both reason and creativity.  And in overcoming Kant’s philosophy they would be attempting to overcome modernity itself.

Thus, modern philosophy is transformed when enlightenment turns to itself, when it begins to reflect on its own foundations and finds in them also, an object of critique. We have argued that Kant’s philosophy represents both the height of enlightenment thinking and the turning point of its historical transformation.  It is with his thought that the critical and self-liberating spirit of enlightenment is grasped and the goal of human knowledge takes the crucial modern step, as Kant proclaimed, ‘reason should take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge.’  The emphasis of enlightenment shifts from the external world to the world within, from progress to self-realisation and it is precisely this movement, which we have introduced above, that brings forth what we consider the concepts that could underlie a process inspired view of the world. However, the essence of the processual nature of post Kantian thought is not merely the overcoming of dualism, rather it lies in the key concepts of self-organization, creativity, inner necessity, purposiveness and organism. To be sure, there was unity in past ages, but what is different here is that nature, which includes its cognitive element in humanity, is a self determining creative process which incorporates its own differentiation. To develop a philosophy that embraces both the spiritual and natural world, that apprehends the full concreteness of life from the tiniest cell to the most complex community is the same project that continues to face us today. And while we may fail to bring this task to its completion, we cannot however fail to accept its challenge.

Thus, modern philosophy is transformed when enlightenment turns to itself, when it begins to reflect on its own foundations and finds in them also, an object of critique. We have argued that Kant’s philosophy represents both the height of enlightenment thinking and the turning point of its historical transformation.  It is with his thought that the critical and self-liberating spirit of enlightenment is grasped and the goal of human knowledge takes the crucial modern step, as Kant proclaimed, ‘reason should take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge.’  The emphasis of enlightenment shifts from the external world to the world within, from progress to self-realisation and it is precisely this movement, which we have introduced above, that brings forth what we consider the concepts that could underlie a process inspired view of the world. However, the essence of the processual nature of post Kantian thought is not merely the overcoming of dualism, rather it lies in the key concepts of self-organization, creativity, inner necessity, purposiveness and organism. To be sure, there was unity in past ages, but what is different here is that nature, which includes its cognitive element in humanity, is a self determining creative process which incorporates its own differentiation. To develop a philosophy that embraces both the spiritual and natural world, that apprehends the full concreteness of life from the tiniest cell to the most complex community is the same project that continues to face us today. And while we may fail to bring this task to its completion, we cannot however fail to accept its challenge.

   

   

Bibliography

==Bibliography==

Beiser, Frederick C., The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte, Cambridge, Mas., Harvard University Press, 1987.

Beiser, Frederick C., The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte, Cambridge, Mas., Harvard University Press, 1987.

Vierhaus, Rudolph, 'Progress: Ideas, Skepticism, Critique-The Heritage of the Enlightenment', In James Schmidt (ed.), What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, pp. 330-341.

Vierhaus, Rudolph, 'Progress: Ideas, Skepticism, Critique-The Heritage of the Enlightenment', In James Schmidt (ed.), What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, pp. 330-341.