Changes

'''Rationality''' as a term is related to the idea of reason, a word which following [[Webster's]] may be derived as much from older terms referring to [[thinking]] itself as from giving an account or an explanation. This lends the term a dual aspect. One aspect associates it with comprehension, intelligence, or inference, particularly when an inference is drawn in ordered ways (thus a [[syllogism]] is a rational argument in this sense). The other part associates rationality with explanation, understanding or justification, particularly if it provides a ground or a motive.  'Irrational', therefore, is defined as that which is not endowed with reason or understanding. 

[[Image:lighterstill.jpg]][[Image:rational3.jpg|frame|right]]

==Rationality contra logic==

==Rationality contra logic==

A [[logical argument]] is sometimes described as "rational" if it is [[validity|logically valid]]. However, rationality is a much broader term than logic, as it includes "uncertain but sensible" arguments based on probability, expectation, personal experience and the like, whereas logic deals principally with provable facts and demonstrably valid relations between them. For example, [[ad hominem]] arguments are ''logically'' unsound, but in many cases they may be ''rational''. A simple philosophical definition of rationality refers to one's use of a "practical syllogism". For example,  

A [[logic]]al argument is sometimes described as "rational" if it is logically valid. However, rationality is a much broader term than logic, as it includes "uncertain but sensible" arguments based on probability, expectation, personal [[experience]] and the like, whereas logic deals principally with provable [[fact]]s and demonstrably valid relations between them. For example, [[ad hominem]] arguments are ''logically'' unsound, but in many cases they may be ''rational''. A simple philosophical definition of rationality refers to one's use of a "practical syllogism". For example,  

:I am cold

:I am cold

The advantage in this interpretation is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that a ground or motive can be given – for religious or affect reasons, for example — that may meet the criterion of explanation or justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the ''Zweckrational'' orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are ''''Wertrational''''.

The advantage in this interpretation is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that a ground or motive can be given – for religious or affect reasons, for example — that may meet the criterion of explanation or justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the ''Zweckrational'' orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are ''''Wertrational''''.

Based on the premise that 'feelings of worthlessness' are a maladaptive byproduct of the evolution of rationality, Phil Roberts, Jr. has proposed a theory in which the rationality of an end is presumed to correlate with the comprehensiveness of its underlying considerations, and in which no concrete objective is presumed to be rational in any but a relative sense of the term. In addition to its ability to explain what morality is (a shared subconscious theory of rationality), Roberts has also demonstrated how his theory can be employed to address a number of rationality paradoxes, including the paradox of rational irrationality, cognitive versus practical rationality conflict, the "rationality debate" (Cohen vs. Kahneman and Tversky) and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma.[http://www.rationology.net]

Based on the premise that 'feelings of worthlessness' are a maladaptive byproduct of the evolution of rationality, Phil Roberts, Jr. has proposed a theory in which the rationality of an end is presumed to correlate with the comprehensiveness of its underlying considerations, and in which no concrete objective is presumed to be rational in any but a relative sense of the term. In addition to its ability to explain what morality is (a shared subconscious theory of rationality), Roberts has also demonstrated how his theory can be employed to address a number of rationality paradoxes, including the paradox of rational irrationality, cognitive versus practical rationality conflict, the "rationality debate" (Cohen vs. Kahneman and Tversky) and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma.[https://www.rationology.net]

== Use of the term ''rational'' ==

== Use of the term ''rational'' ==

* not foolish

* not foolish

* coherent

* coherent

== External links and references ==

== External links and references ==

*[http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/whatispower.php What is rationality?]

*[https://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/whatispower.php What is rationality?]

* [http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/Reason/ReasonRationality.htm Reason and Rationality], by Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, Luc Faucher on the broad field of reason and rationality from descriptive, normative, and evaluative points of view

* [https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/Reason/ReasonRationality.htm Reason and Rationality], by Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, Luc Faucher on the broad field of reason and rationality from descriptive, normative, and evaluative points of view

* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Historicist Theories of Rationality]

* [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Historicist Theories of Rationality]

* [http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/leglreas.htm Legal Reasoning After Post-Modern Critiques of Reason], by Peter Suber

* [https://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/leglreas.htm Legal Reasoning After Post-Modern Critiques of Reason], by Peter Suber

* Spohn, W. (2002). [http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/Philo/Philosophie/Mitarbeiter/spohn_files/wspohn45.pdf The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality]. ''Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2'': 247-262.

* Spohn, W. (2002). [https://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/Philo/Philosophie/Mitarbeiter/spohn_files/wspohn45.pdf The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality]. ''Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2'': 247-262.

* Anand, P (1993). ''Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk'', Oxford, Oxford University Press

* Anand, P (1993). ''Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk'', Oxford, Oxford University Press

* Nozick, Robert (1993). ''The Nature of Rationality

* Nozick, Robert (1993). ''The Nature of Rationality

[[Category: General Reference]]

[[Category: General Reference]]