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==Etymology==
==Etymology==
English ''[[:wikt:truth|truth]]'' is from [[Old English]] ''tríewþ, tréowþ, trýwþ'', [[Middle English]] ''trewþe'', cognate to [[Old High German]] ''triuwida'', [[Old Norse]] ''tryggð''. Like ''[[troth]]'', it is a ''[[:wikt:-th|-th]]'' nominalisation of the adjective ''true'' (Old English ''tréowe'').
English ''[[:wikt:truth|truth]]'' is from [[Old English]] ''tríewþ, tréowþ, trýwþ'', [[Middle English]] ''trewþe'', cognate to [[Old High German]] ''triuwida'', [[Old Norse]] ''tryggð''. Like ''[[troth]]'', it is a ''[[:wikt:-th|-th]]'' nominalisation of the adjective ''true'' (Old English ''tréowe'').
Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like ''This sentence is false'', since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the [[Principle of bivalence]]: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.<ref>Kripke, Saul. "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 690-716</ref>
Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like ''This sentence is false'', since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the [[Principle of bivalence]]: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.<ref>Kripke, Saul. "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 690-716</ref>
===Ancient philosophers===
===Ancient philosophers===
Robert Wicks discusses Nietzsche's basic view of truth as follows: <blockquote>Some scholars regard Nietzsche's 1873 unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" ("Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn") as a keystone in his thought. In this essay, Nietzsche rejects the idea of universal constants, and claims that what we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms." His view at this time is that arbitrariness completely prevails within human experience: concepts originate via the very artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images; "truth" is nothing more than the invention of fixed conventions for merely practical purposes, especially those of repose, security and consistence.<ref>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#2</ref></blockquote>
Robert Wicks discusses Nietzsche's basic view of truth as follows: <blockquote>Some scholars regard Nietzsche's 1873 unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" ("Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn") as a keystone in his thought. In this essay, Nietzsche rejects the idea of universal constants, and claims that what we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms." His view at this time is that arbitrariness completely prevails within human experience: concepts originate via the very artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images; "truth" is nothing more than the invention of fixed conventions for merely practical purposes, especially those of repose, security and consistence.<ref>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#2</ref></blockquote>
====Gandhi====
====Gandhi====
====Nishida====
====Nishida====
According to [[Kitaro Nishida]], "[k]nowledge of things in the world begins with the differentiation of unitary consciousness into knower and known and ends with self and things becoming one again. Such unification takes form not only in knowing but in the valuing (of truth) that directs knowing, the willing that directs action, and the feeling or emotive reach that directs sensing."<ref>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Nishida Kitaro" at [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro]</ref>
According to [[Kitaro Nishida]], "[k]nowledge of things in the world begins with the differentiation of unitary consciousness into knower and known and ends with self and things becoming one again. Such unification takes form not only in knowing but in the valuing (of truth) that directs knowing, the willing that directs action, and the feeling or emotive reach that directs sensing."<ref>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Nishida Kitaro" at [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro]</ref>
====Fromm====
====Fromm====
[[Erich Fromm]] finds that trying to discuss truth as "absolute truth" is sterile and that emphasis ought to be placed on "optimal truth". He considers truth as stemming from the survival imperative of grasping one's environment physically and intellectually, whereby young children instinctively seek truth so as to orient themselves in "a strange and powerful world". The accuracy of their perceived approximation of the truth will therefore have direct consequences on their ability to deal with their environment. Fromm can be understood to define truth as a functional approximation of reality. His vision of optimal truth is described partly in "Man from Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics" (1947), from which excerpts are included below.
[[Erich Fromm]] finds that trying to discuss truth as "absolute truth" is sterile and that emphasis ought to be placed on "optimal truth". He considers truth as stemming from the survival imperative of grasping one's environment physically and intellectually, whereby young children instinctively seek truth so as to orient themselves in "a strange and powerful world". The accuracy of their perceived approximation of the truth will therefore have direct consequences on their ability to deal with their environment. Fromm can be understood to define truth as a functional approximation of reality. His vision of optimal truth is described partly in "Man from Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics" (1947), from which excerpts are included below.
