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'''Affection''' is a "disposition or state of mind or body"[http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=affection] that is often associated with a feeling or type of love. It has given rise to a number of branches of meaning concerning: emotion (popularly: love, devotion etc); disease; influence; state of being (philosophy)[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD7Hutcheson.html] and state of mind (psychology).

'''Affection''' is a "disposition or state of [[mind]] or [[body]]"[https://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=affection] that is often associated with a feeling or type of [[love]]. It has given rise to a number of branches of [[meaning]] concerning: emotion (popularly: love, devotion etc); disease; influence; state of [[being]] (philosophy)[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD7Hutcheson.html] and state of mind (psychology).

==Usage==

==Usage==

"Affection" is popularly used to denote a feeling or type of love, amounting to more than goodwill or friendship. Writers on [[ethics]] generally use the word to refer to distinct states of feeling, both lasting and spasmodic. Some contrast it with ''passion'' as being free from the distinctively sensual element. More specifically the word has been restricted to emotional states the object of which is a person.  In the former sense, it is the Greek "[[pathos]]" and as such it appears in the writings of French philosopher [[René Descartes]], Dutch philosopher [[Baruch Spinoza]], and most of the writings of early British ethicists.  However, on various grounds (e.g., that it does not involve anxiety or excitement and that it is comparatively inert and compatible with the entire absence of the sensuous element), it is generally and usefully distinguished from passion.  In this narrower sense the word has played a great part in ethical systems, which have spoken of the social or parental ''affections'' as in some sense a part of moral obligation.  For a consideration of these and similar problems, which depend ultimately on the degree in which the affections are regarded as voluntary. (see [[Henry Sidgwick|H. Sidgwick]], ''Methods of Ethics'' pp. 345–349)

"Affection" is popularly used to denote a feeling or type of love, amounting to more than goodwill or friendship. Writers on [[ethics]] generally use the word to refer to distinct states of feeling, both lasting and spasmodic. Some contrast it with ''passion'' as being free from the distinctively sensual element. More specifically the word has been restricted to emotional states the object of which is a person.  In the former sense, it is the Greek "[[pathos]]" and as such it appears in the writings of French philosopher [[René Descartes]], Dutch philosopher [[Baruch Spinoza]], and most of the writings of early British ethicists.  However, on various grounds (e.g., that it does not involve anxiety or excitement and that it is comparatively inert and compatible with the entire absence of the sensuous element), it is generally and usefully distinguished from passion.  In this narrower sense the word has played a great part in ethical systems, which have spoken of the social or parental ''affections'' as in some sense a part of moral obligation.  For a consideration of these and similar problems, which depend ultimately on the degree in which the affections are regarded as voluntary. (see [[Henry Sidgwick|H. Sidgwick]], ''Methods of Ethics'' pp. 345–349)

==Affectionate behavior==

==Affectionate behavior==

==Psychology==

==Psychology==

In psychology the terms ''affection'' and ''affective'' are of great importance. As all [[intellectual]] phenomena have by [[experimen]]talists been reduced to sensation, so all emotion has been and is regarded as reducible to simple mental affection, the element of which all emotional manifestations are ultimately composed.  The [[nature]] of this element is a problem which has been provisionally, but not conclusively, solved by many psychologists; the method is necessarily experimental, and all experiments on feeling are peculiarly difficult.  The solutions proposed are two.  In the first, all affection [[phenomena]] are primarily divisible into those which are pleasurable and those which are the reverse.  The main objections to this are that it does not explain the [[infinite]] variety of phenomena, and that it disregards the distinction which most philosophers admit between higher and lower pleasures.  The second solution is that every sensation has its specific affective quality, though by reason of the poverty of [[language]] many of these have no name.  W. Wundt, ''Outlines of [[Psychology]]'' (trans.  C. H. Judd, [[Leipzig]], 1897), maintains that we may group under three main affective directions, each with its negative, all the infinite varieties in question; these are (a) pleasure, or rather pleasantness, and displeasure, (b) tension and relaxation, (c) excitement and depression.  These two views are antithetic and no solution has been discovered.  

In psychology the terms ''affection'' and ''affective'' are of great importance. As all [[intellectual]] phenomena have by [[experiment]]alists been reduced to sensation, so all emotion has been and is regarded as reducible to simple mental affection, the element of which all emotional manifestations are ultimately composed.  The [[nature]] of this element is a problem which has been provisionally, but not conclusively, solved by many psychologists; the method is necessarily experimental, and all experiments on feeling are peculiarly difficult.  The solutions proposed are two.  In the first, all affection [[phenomena]] are primarily divisible into those which are pleasurable and those which are the reverse.  The main objections to this are that it does not explain the [[infinite]] variety of phenomena, and that it disregards the distinction which most philosophers admit between higher and lower pleasures.  The second solution is that every sensation has its specific affective quality, though by reason of the poverty of [[language]] many of these have no name.  W. Wundt, ''Outlines of [[Psychology]]'' (trans.  C. H. Judd, [[Leipzig]], 1897), maintains that we may group under three main affective directions, each with its negative, all the infinite varieties in question; these are (a) pleasure, or rather pleasantness, and displeasure, (b) tension and relaxation, (c) excitement and depression.  These two views are antithetic and no solution has been discovered.  

American psychologist [[Henry Murray]] (1893–1988) developed a theory of [[personality]] that was organized in terms of motives, presses, and needs.  According to Murray, these psychogenic needs function mostly on the unconscious level, but play a major role in our personality. Murray classified five affection needs:

American psychologist [[Henry Murray]] (1893–1988) developed a theory of [[personality]] that was organized in terms of motives, presses, and needs.  According to Murray, these psychogenic needs function mostly on the unconscious level, but play a major role in our personality. Murray classified five affection needs:

Mention should also be made of a third method which has hardly yet been tried, namely, that of endeavouring to isolate one of the three ''directions'' by the method of suggestion or even hypnotic trance observations.

Mention should also be made of a third method which has hardly yet been tried, namely, that of endeavouring to isolate one of the three ''directions'' by the method of suggestion or even hypnotic trance observations.

==Further reading==

==Further reading==