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# Does free will exist?

# Does free will exist?

[[Determinism]] is roughly defined as the view that all current and future events are necessitated by past events combined with the laws of nature. According to McKenna (2004), neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the debate about free will.("Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/])

[[Determinism]] is roughly defined as the view that all current and future events are necessitated by past events combined with the laws of nature. According to McKenna (2004), neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the debate about free will.("Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/])

[[Compatibilism]] is the view that the existence of free will and the truth of determinism are compatible with each other; this is opposed to [[incompatibilism]] which is the view that there is no way to reconcile a belief in a deterministic universe with a belief in free will.<ref>Ginet, C. 1983. "In Defense of Incompatibilism" in ''Philosophical Studies'' 44, pp. 391–400</ref> [[Hard determinism]] is the version of incompatibilism that accepts the truth of determinism and rejects the idea that humans have any free will.<ref>Koons, J.R. "Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?" in ''The Philosophical Forum''. 33:1</ref> [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarianism]] topically agrees with hard determinism only in rejecting compatibilism. Because libertarians accept the existence of free will, they must reject determinism and argue for some version of indeterminism that is compatible with freedom. [http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014]

[[Compatibilism]] is the view that the existence of free will and the truth of determinism are compatible with each other; this is opposed to [[incompatibilism]] which is the view that there is no way to reconcile a belief in a deterministic universe with a belief in free will.<ref>Ginet, C. 1983. "In Defense of Incompatibilism" in ''Philosophical Studies'' 44, pp. 391–400</ref> [[Hard determinism]] is the version of incompatibilism that accepts the truth of determinism and rejects the idea that humans have any free will.<ref>Koons, J.R. "Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?" in ''The Philosophical Forum''. 33:1</ref> [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarianism]] topically agrees with hard determinism only in rejecting compatibilism. Because libertarians accept the existence of free will, they must reject determinism and argue for some version of indeterminism that is compatible with freedom. [https://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014]

===Determinism ===

===Determinism ===

[[Determinism]] is a broad term with a variety of meanings. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem of free will.[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/]  

[[Determinism]] is a broad term with a variety of meanings. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem of free will.[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/]  

''Causal'' (or ''nomological'') determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]]. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. Such an entity may be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.

''Causal'' (or ''nomological'') determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]]. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. Such an entity may be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into supernatural theories and scientific or naturalistic theories. Supernatural theories hold that a non-physical [[mind]] or [[soul]] overrides physical causality, so that physical events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation. This approach is allied to mind-body [[dualism]], and sometimes has a [[theological]] motivation.  

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into supernatural theories and scientific or naturalistic theories. Supernatural theories hold that a non-physical [[mind]] or [[soul]] overrides physical causality, so that physical events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation. This approach is allied to mind-body [[dualism]], and sometimes has a [[theological]] motivation.  

Scientific explanations of libertarianism (described as "naturalistic") sometimes involve invoking [[panpsychism]], the theory that a quality of [[mind]] is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both sentient and non-sentient entities. [http://cms.brookes.ac.uk/staff/PeterElls/FreeWill/NaturalisticFreeWill.rtf]. Other naturalistic approaches do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe; ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" believed to be necessary by libertarians. Free [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism. An example of this kind of approach has been developed by [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]].

Scientific explanations of libertarianism (described as "naturalistic") sometimes involve invoking [[panpsychism]], the theory that a quality of [[mind]] is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both sentient and non-sentient entities. [https://cms.brookes.ac.uk/staff/PeterElls/FreeWill/NaturalisticFreeWill.rtf]. Other naturalistic approaches do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe; ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" believed to be necessary by libertarians. Free [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism. An example of this kind of approach has been developed by [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]].

===Other views===

===Other views===

In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."

In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."

[[Rudolf Steiner]], who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work (http://www.pitt.edu/~kafka/k_s_bibII.html], wrote The [[Philosophy of Freedom]], which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: freedom of thought and freedom of action. He argues that inner freedom is achieved when we bridge the gap between our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, and our thoughts, which give us access to the inner nature of the world. Outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with ''moral imagination''. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united. [http://www.rsarchive.org/Books/GA004/]

[[Rudolf Steiner]], who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work (https://www.pitt.edu/~kafka/k_s_bibII.html], wrote The [[Philosophy of Freedom]], which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: freedom of thought and freedom of action. He argues that inner freedom is achieved when we bridge the gap between our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, and our thoughts, which give us access to the inner nature of the world. Outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with ''moral imagination''. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united. [https://www.rsarchive.org/Books/GA004/]

The contemporary philosopher [[Galen Strawson]] agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the

The contemporary philosopher [[Galen Strawson]] agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the

Many, but not all, arguments for or against free will make an assumption about the truth or falsehood of determinism. The scientific method holds out the promise of being able to turn such assumptions into fact. However, such facts would still need to be combined with philosophical considerations in order to amount to an argument for or against free will. For instance, if [[compatibilism]] is true, the truth of determinism would have no effect on the question of the existence of free will. On the other hand, a proof of determinism in conjunction with an argument for incompatibilism would add up to an argument against free will.

Many, but not all, arguments for or against free will make an assumption about the truth or falsehood of determinism. The scientific method holds out the promise of being able to turn such assumptions into fact. However, such facts would still need to be combined with philosophical considerations in order to amount to an argument for or against free will. For instance, if [[compatibilism]] is true, the truth of determinism would have no effect on the question of the existence of free will. On the other hand, a proof of determinism in conjunction with an argument for incompatibilism would add up to an argument against free will.

Early scientific thought often portrayed the [[universe]] as deterministic,<ref> for example in the thought of [[Democritus]] or the [[Cārvāka]]ns</ref> and some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient [[physical information|information]] would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy. Modern science, on the other hand,  is a mixture of deterministic and [[stochastic]] theories.<ref>Boniolo, G. and Vidali, P. (1999) ''Filosofia della Scienza'', Milan: Mondadori. ISBN 88-424-9359-7</ref> [[Quantum mechanics]] predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all. The possibility that the universe at the macroscopic level may be governed by indeterministic laws, as it is generally accepted to be at the quantum level, has revived interest in free will among physicists.<ref>[http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/freeuni.html Davies, P. ''Chaos Frees the Universe'']</ref> However, there are a number of objections.

Early scientific thought often portrayed the [[universe]] as deterministic,<ref> for example in the thought of [[Democritus]] or the [[Cārvāka]]ns</ref> and some thinkers claimed that the simple process of gathering sufficient [[physical information|information]] would allow them to predict future events with perfect accuracy. Modern science, on the other hand,  is a mixture of deterministic and [[stochastic]] theories.<ref>Boniolo, G. and Vidali, P. (1999) ''Filosofia della Scienza'', Milan: Mondadori. ISBN 88-424-9359-7</ref> [[Quantum mechanics]] predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all. The possibility that the universe at the macroscopic level may be governed by indeterministic laws, as it is generally accepted to be at the quantum level, has revived interest in free will among physicists.<ref>[https://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/freeuni.html Davies, P. ''Chaos Frees the Universe'']</ref> However, there are a number of objections.

It is claimed by some that quantum indeterminism is confined to microscopic phenomena.<ref>[http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousHonderichKanebook.htm Honderich, E. ''Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem'']</ref> The claim that  ''events'' at the atomic or particulate level are unknowable can be challenged experimentally and even technologically: for instance, some [[hardware random number generator]]s work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals.  However, this only amounts to macroscopic ''indeterminism'' if it can be shown that microscopic events really are indeterministic.

It is claimed by some that quantum indeterminism is confined to microscopic phenomena.<ref>[https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousHonderichKanebook.htm Honderich, E. ''Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem'']</ref> The claim that  ''events'' at the atomic or particulate level are unknowable can be challenged experimentally and even technologically: for instance, some [[hardware random number generator]]s work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals.  However, this only amounts to macroscopic ''indeterminism'' if it can be shown that microscopic events really are indeterministic.

This consideration leads to the criticism of indeterminism-based free will on the basis that quantum mechanics is not really random, but merely unpredictable. Some scientific determinists, following [[Albert Einstein]], believe in so-called "[[hidden variable theory|hidden variable theories]]" according to which the unpredictability of quantum mechanics is due to ignorance of an additional set of physical variables not explicitly included in the standard theory (see the [[Bohm interpretation]] and the [[EPR paradox]]).<ref name="GG">Ghirardi, G. (1997) ''Un' Occhiata alle Carte di Dio''. Milan:Il Saggiatore. ISBN 88-428-0947-0</ref>   

This consideration leads to the criticism of indeterminism-based free will on the basis that quantum mechanics is not really random, but merely unpredictable. Some scientific determinists, following [[Albert Einstein]], believe in so-called "[[hidden variable theory|hidden variable theories]]" according to which the unpredictability of quantum mechanics is due to ignorance of an additional set of physical variables not explicitly included in the standard theory (see the [[Bohm interpretation]] and the [[EPR paradox]]).<ref name="GG">Ghirardi, G. (1997) ''Un' Occhiata alle Carte di Dio''. Milan:Il Saggiatore. ISBN 88-428-0947-0</ref>   

There is also a further, more philosophical, objection. It has been argued that if an action is taken due to quantum randomness, this in itself means that free will is absent, since such action cannot be controllable by someone claiming to possess such free will.<ref>[http://www.reason.com/news/show/34767.html Reason Online. ''Freedom Evolves'']</ref> If this argument is conjoined with incompatibilism, then it would follow that free will is impossible, since it would be incompatible with ''both'' determinism and indeterminism, and these are the only options. If it is conjoined with compatibilism, on the other hand, it would mean that free will is only possible in a deterministic universe.  

There is also a further, more philosophical, objection. It has been argued that if an action is taken due to quantum randomness, this in itself means that free will is absent, since such action cannot be controllable by someone claiming to possess such free will.<ref>[https://www.reason.com/news/show/34767.html Reason Online. ''Freedom Evolves'']</ref> If this argument is conjoined with incompatibilism, then it would follow that free will is impossible, since it would be incompatible with ''both'' determinism and indeterminism, and these are the only options. If it is conjoined with compatibilism, on the other hand, it would mean that free will is only possible in a deterministic universe.  

[[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]] has capitalized on the success of quantum mechanics and [[chaos theory]] in order to defend incompatibilist freedom in his ''The Significance of Free Will'' and other writings.<ref>Kane, Robert. 1996b. ''The Significance of Free Will''. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512656-4</ref>

[[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]] has capitalized on the success of quantum mechanics and [[chaos theory]] in order to defend incompatibilist freedom in his ''The Significance of Free Will'' and other writings.<ref>Kane, Robert. 1996b. ''The Significance of Free Will''. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512656-4</ref>

There are several brain-related conditions in which an individual's actions are not felt to be entirely under his or her control. Although the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will, the study of such conditions, like the neuroscientific studies above, is valuable in developing models of how the brain may construct our experience of free will.

There are several brain-related conditions in which an individual's actions are not felt to be entirely under his or her control. Although the existence of such conditions does not directly refute the existence of free will, the study of such conditions, like the neuroscientific studies above, is valuable in developing models of how the brain may construct our experience of free will.

For example, people with [[Tourette syndrome]] and related [[tic disorder]]s make involuntary movements and utterances, called [[tic]]s, despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or ''"unvoluntary",''<ref name=TSADef>Tourette Syndrome Association. [http://web.archive.org/web/20050322170245/http://www.tsa-usa.org/research/definitions.html Definitions and Classification of Tic Disorders.] Accessed 19 Aug 2006.</ref> because they are not strictly ''involuntary'':  they may be experienced as a ''voluntary'' response to an unwanted, premonitory urge.  Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed.<ref name=TSADef/>  People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics to some extent for limited periods, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward.  The control which can be exerted (from seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.<ref name=Zinner>Zinner S.H. (2000) Tourette disorder. ''Pediatric Review'', 21(11):372. PMID 11077021</ref>  

For example, people with [[Tourette syndrome]] and related [[tic disorder]]s make involuntary movements and utterances, called [[tic]]s, despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or ''"unvoluntary",''<ref name=TSADef>Tourette Syndrome Association. [https://web.archive.org/web/20050322170245/https://www.tsa-usa.org/research/definitions.html Definitions and Classification of Tic Disorders.] Accessed 19 Aug 2006.</ref> because they are not strictly ''involuntary'':  they may be experienced as a ''voluntary'' response to an unwanted, premonitory urge.  Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed.<ref name=TSADef/>  People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics to some extent for limited periods, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward.  The control which can be exerted (from seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.<ref name=Zinner>Zinner S.H. (2000) Tourette disorder. ''Pediatric Review'', 21(11):372. PMID 11077021</ref>  

    

    

In [[alien hand syndrome]], the afflicted individual's limb will produce meaningful behaviours without the intention of the subject.  The clinical definition requires "feeling that one limb is foreign or has a ''will of its own,'' together with observable involuntary motor activity" (emphasis in original).<ref name=Doody>Doody RS, Jankovic J. (1992). The alien hand and related signs. ''Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry'', 55:806–810. PMID 1402972</ref> This syndrome is often a result of damage to the [[corpus callosum]], either when it is severed to treat intractable [[epilepsy]] or due to a [[stroke]]. The standard neurological explanation is that the felt will reported by the speaking left hemisphere does not correspond with the actions performed by the non-speaking right hemisphere, thus suggesting that the two hemispheres may have independent senses of will.<ref name=Scepkowski>Scepkowski, L.A., & Cronin-Golomb, A. (2003). The alien hand: cases, categorizations, and anatomical correlates. ''Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews'', 2(4):261–277. PMID 15006289</ref><ref name=Bundick>Bundick, T., Spinella, M. (2000). Subjective experience, involuntary movement, and posterior alien hand syndrome. ''Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry'', 68:83–85 PMID 10601408</ref>   

In [[alien hand syndrome]], the afflicted individual's limb will produce meaningful behaviours without the intention of the subject.  The clinical definition requires "feeling that one limb is foreign or has a ''will of its own,'' together with observable involuntary motor activity" (emphasis in original).<ref name=Doody>Doody RS, Jankovic J. (1992). The alien hand and related signs. ''Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry'', 55:806–810. PMID 1402972</ref> This syndrome is often a result of damage to the [[corpus callosum]], either when it is severed to treat intractable [[epilepsy]] or due to a [[stroke]]. The standard neurological explanation is that the felt will reported by the speaking left hemisphere does not correspond with the actions performed by the non-speaking right hemisphere, thus suggesting that the two hemispheres may have independent senses of will.<ref name=Scepkowski>Scepkowski, L.A., & Cronin-Golomb, A. (2003). The alien hand: cases, categorizations, and anatomical correlates. ''Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews'', 2(4):261–277. PMID 15006289</ref><ref name=Bundick>Bundick, T., Spinella, M. (2000). Subjective experience, involuntary movement, and posterior alien hand syndrome. ''Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry'', 68:83–85 PMID 10601408</ref>   

A quotation from [[Swami Vivekananda]], a [[Vedanta|Vedantist]], offers a good example of the worry about free will in the Hindu tradition.

A quotation from [[Swami Vivekananda]], a [[Vedanta|Vedantist]], offers a good example of the worry about free will in the Hindu tradition.

{{bquote|Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as free-will; the very words are a contradiction, because will is what we know, and everything that we know is within our universe, and everything within our universe is moulded by conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire freedom we have to get beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be found here.<ref name = "viveka">[[Swami Vivekananda]] (1907) "Freedom" from ''[http://www.ramakrishnavivekananda.info/vivekananda/vol_1 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. vol. 1.]''</ref>}}

{{bquote|Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as free-will; the very words are a contradiction, because will is what we know, and everything that we know is within our universe, and everything within our universe is moulded by conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire freedom we have to get beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be found here.<ref name = "viveka">[[Swami Vivekananda]] (1907) "Freedom" from ''[https://www.ramakrishnavivekananda.info/vivekananda/vol_1 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. vol. 1.]''</ref>}}

However, the preceding quote has often been misinterpreted as Vivekananda implying that everything is predetermined. What Vivekananda actually meant by lack of free will was that the will was not "free" because it was heavily influenced by the law of cause and effect – "The will is not free, it is a phenomenon bound by cause and effect, but there is something behind the will which is free."<ref name = "viveka"/> However, Vivekananda never said that it was absolutely determined and placed emphasis on the power of conscious choice to alter one's past Karma: "It is the coward and the fool who says this is his fate. But it is the strong man who stands up and says I will make my own fate."<ref name = "viveka"/>

However, the preceding quote has often been misinterpreted as Vivekananda implying that everything is predetermined. What Vivekananda actually meant by lack of free will was that the will was not "free" because it was heavily influenced by the law of cause and effect – "The will is not free, it is a phenomenon bound by cause and effect, but there is something behind the will which is free."<ref name = "viveka"/> However, Vivekananda never said that it was absolutely determined and placed emphasis on the power of conscious choice to alter one's past Karma: "It is the coward and the fool who says this is his fate. But it is the strong man who stands up and says I will make my own fate."<ref name = "viveka"/>

However, some philosophers follow [[William of Ockham]] in holding that necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary from the perspective of an omniscient.<ref name="ockham"> Ockham, William. Predestination, God's Knowledge, and Future Contingents, early 14th century, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann 1982, Hackett, esp p. 46–7</ref> Some philosophers follow [[Philo of Alexandria]] in holding that free will is a feature of a human's [[soul]], and thus that non-human [[animal]]s lack free will.<ref>[[H. A. Wolfson]], ''Philo'', 1947 Harvard University Press; Religious Philosophy, 1961 Harvard University Press; and "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy" in Religious Philosophy </ref>

However, some philosophers follow [[William of Ockham]] in holding that necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary from the perspective of an omniscient.<ref name="ockham"> Ockham, William. Predestination, God's Knowledge, and Future Contingents, early 14th century, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann 1982, Hackett, esp p. 46–7</ref> Some philosophers follow [[Philo of Alexandria]] in holding that free will is a feature of a human's [[soul]], and thus that non-human [[animal]]s lack free will.<ref>[[H. A. Wolfson]], ''Philo'', 1947 Harvard University Press; Religious Philosophy, 1961 Harvard University Press; and "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy" in Religious Philosophy </ref>

[[Judaism|Jewish]] [[Jewish philosophy|philosophy]] stresses that free will is a product of the intrinsic human soul, using the word ''neshama'' (from the [[Hebrew language|Hebrew root]] ''n.sh.m.'' or .נ.ש.מ meaning "breath"), but the ability to make a free choice is through ''Yechida'' (from Hebrew word "yachid", יחיד, singular), the part of the soul which is united with God, the only being that is not hindered by or dependent on cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does not belong to the realm of the physical reality, and inability of natural philosophy to account for it is expected).  In [[Islam]] the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's ''jabr'', or divine commanding power.  [[Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari|al-Ash'ari]] developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine ''jabr'' were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant [[Ash'ari]] position.<ref>Watt, Montgomery.  Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam. Luzac & Co.: London 1948; Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of Kalam, Harvard University Press 1976 and [http://umcc.ais.org/~maftab/ip/pdf/bktxt/kalam.pdf]{{Dead link|date=June 2008}}</ref>  In [[Shia]] Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward [[predestination]] is challenged by most theologists<ref>[http://www.al-islam.org/mananddestiny/3.htm Man and His Destiny]</ref> .  Free will, according to Shia Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life.  All actions taken by man's free will are said to be counted on the [[Day of Judgement]] because they are his/her own and not God's.

[[Judaism|Jewish]] [[Jewish philosophy|philosophy]] stresses that free will is a product of the intrinsic human soul, using the word ''neshama'' (from the [[Hebrew language|Hebrew root]] ''n.sh.m.'' or .נ.ש.מ meaning "breath"), but the ability to make a free choice is through ''Yechida'' (from Hebrew word "yachid", יחיד, singular), the part of the soul which is united with God, the only being that is not hindered by or dependent on cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does not belong to the realm of the physical reality, and inability of natural philosophy to account for it is expected).  In [[Islam]] the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's ''jabr'', or divine commanding power.  [[Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari|al-Ash'ari]] developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine ''jabr'' were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant [[Ash'ari]] position.<ref>Watt, Montgomery.  Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam. Luzac & Co.: London 1948; Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of Kalam, Harvard University Press 1976 and [https://umcc.ais.org/~maftab/ip/pdf/bktxt/kalam.pdf]{{Dead link|date=June 2008}}</ref>  In [[Shia]] Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward [[predestination]] is challenged by most theologists<ref>[https://www.al-islam.org/mananddestiny/3.htm Man and His Destiny]</ref> .  Free will, according to Shia Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life.  All actions taken by man's free will are said to be counted on the [[Day of Judgement]] because they are his/her own and not God's.

The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212.

The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212.

== References ==

== References ==

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#McKenna, Michael, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),((online))

#McKenna, Michael, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),((online))

#Ginet, C. 1983. "In Defense of Incompatibilism" in Philosophical Studies 44, pp. 391–400

#Ginet, C. 1983. "In Defense of Incompatibilism" in Philosophical Studies 44, pp. 391–400

* Libet, Benjamin; Anthony Freeman; and Keith Sutherland, eds. (1999).  ''The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will''. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. Collected essays by scientists and philosophers.

* Libet, Benjamin; Anthony Freeman; and Keith Sutherland, eds. (1999).  ''The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will''. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. Collected essays by scientists and philosophers.

* Morris, Tom ''Philosophy for Dummies.'' IDG Books ISBN 0-7645-5153-1.

* Morris, Tom ''Philosophy for Dummies.'' IDG Books ISBN 0-7645-5153-1.

* Muhm, Myriam (2004). Abolito il libero arbitrio - Colloquio con Wolf Singer. ''L'Espresso'' 19.08.2004 http://www.larchivio.org/xoom/myriam-singer.htm

* Muhm, Myriam (2004). Abolito il libero arbitrio - Colloquio con Wolf Singer. ''L'Espresso'' 19.08.2004 https://www.larchivio.org/xoom/myriam-singer.htm

* Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W. (2000). Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure. ''Psychological Review.'' 107  

* Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W. (2000). Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure. ''Psychological Review.'' 107  

* [[Schopenhauer]], Arthur (1839). ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]].'', Oxford: Basil Blackwell ISBN 0-631-14552-4.

* [[Schopenhauer]], Arthur (1839). ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]].'', Oxford: Basil Blackwell ISBN 0-631-14552-4.

== External links ==

== External links ==

*[http://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] entries:

*[https://plato.stanford.edu/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] entries:

** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ "Free Will"]

** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ "Free Will"]

** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/ "Incompatibilism"]

** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/ "Incompatibilism"]

** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/ "Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will"]

** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/ "Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will"]

* [http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014 "Free Will" by Galen Strawson in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

* [https://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014 "Free Will" by Galen Strawson in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

* [http://www.nariphaltan.org/freewill.htm  Free will, evolution and chaos theory]

* [https://www.nariphaltan.org/freewill.htm  Free will, evolution and chaos theory]

* [http://www.optimal.org/peter/freewill.htm The Nature of Free Will by Peter Voss]

* [https://www.optimal.org/peter/freewill.htm The Nature of Free Will by Peter Voss]

* [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm Article at Roman Catholic Encyclopedia]

* [https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06259a.htm Article at Roman Catholic Encyclopedia]

* [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted12.htm Article at Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website]

* [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted12.htm Article at Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website]

* [http://www.galilean-library.org/int13.html An Introduction to Free Will and Determinism] by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.

* [https://www.galilean-library.org/int13.html An Introduction to Free Will and Determinism] by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.

* [http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/HowThinkFW.doc "How to think about the problem of free will" by Peter van Inwagen ]  

* [https://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/HowThinkFW.doc "How to think about the problem of free will" by Peter van Inwagen ]  

* [http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/ The Garden of Forking Paths--a blog on free will and action theory written by top experts]

* [https://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/ The Garden of Forking Paths--a blog on free will and action theory written by top experts]

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[[Category: Psychology]]