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The term '''intentionality''' is often simplistically summarised as "aboutness".  According to the [[Oxford English Dictionary]], it is "the distinguishing property of [[mind]] of being necessarily directed upon an object, whether real or imaginary". Originally intentionality was a concept from scholastic philosophy. The concept of intentionality was reintroduced in 19th century [[philosophy]] by [[Franz Brentano]] in his work ''Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint''.  Brentano defined intentionality as one characteristic of "mental phenomena", by which they could be distinguished from "physical phenomena" (''physische Phänomene''), using such phrases as "reference to a content", the "direction towards an object" and "the immanent objectivity".

The term '''intentionality''' according to the [[Oxford English Dictionary]], is "the distinguishing property of [[mind]] of being necessarily directed upon an object, whether real or imaginary". Originally intentionality was a concept from scholastic philosophy but was reintroduced in 19th century [[philosophy]] by [[Franz Brentano]] in his work ''Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint''.  Brentano defined intentionality as one characteristic of "mental phenomena", by which they could be distinguished from "physical [[phenomenon|phenomena]]" (''physische Phänomene''), using such phrases as "reference to a content", the "direction towards an object" and "the immanent objectivity".

 

==Etymology==

==Etymology==

[a. OF. en-, intencion, -ciun, -tion, -çon stretching, intensity, will, thought, opinion, etc. (12th c. in Hatz.-Darm.), ad. L. intenti{omac}n-em stretching, straining, effort, attention, application, design, purpose, etc., n. of action from intend{ebreve}re to INTEND. A doublet of intension; see note to INTENT a.]  

[a. OF. en-, intencion, -ciun, -tion, -çon stretching, intensity, will, thought, opinion, etc. (12th c. in Hatz.-Darm.), ad. L. intenti{omac}n-em stretching, straining, effort, attention, application, design, purpose, etc., n. of action from intend{ebreve}re to INTEND. A doublet of intension; see note to INTENT a.]  

:3. The way in which anything is to be understood; meaning, significance, import. Obs. or blending with 5.

:3. The way in which anything is to be understood; meaning, significance, import. Obs. or blending with 5.

:4. The action of intending or purposing; volition which one is minded to carry out; purpose. {dag}of intention, on purpose, intentionally (obs.).

:4. The action of intending or purposing; [[volition]] which one is minded to carry out; purpose. of intention, on purpose, intentionally (obs.).

[[Image:Intention_1375.jpg|center]]

[[Image:Intention_1375.jpg|center]]

::b. colloq. in pl. Purposes in respect of a proposal of marriage.

::b. colloq. in pl. Purposes in respect of a proposal of marriage.

:6. a. Ultimate purpose; the aim of an action; {dag}that for which anything is intended (obs.).

:6. a. Ultimate purpose; the aim of an action; that for which anything is intended (obs.).

::b. In literary criticism: the aim or design which a critic detects in a writer's work.

::b. In literary criticism: the aim or design which a critic detects in a writer's work.

*II. Specific uses.

*II. Specific uses.

:10. Surg. and Med.    a. An aim or purpose in a healing process; hence, a plan or method of treatment. [med.L. curationis intentio, transl. {oasper} {tau}{ghfrown}{fsigma} {ilenis}{gaacu}{sigma}{epsilon}{omega}{fsigma} {sigma}{kappa}{omicron}{pi}{goacu}{fsigma} Galen (ed. Kühn I. 385).] arch.

:10. Surg. and Med.    a. An aim or purpose in a [[healing]] process; hence, a plan or method of treatment. [med.L. curationis intentio, transl. {oasper} {tau}{ghfrown}{fsigma} {ilenis}{gaacu}{sigma}{epsilon}{omega}{fsigma} {sigma}{kappa}{omicron}{pi}{goacu}{fsigma} Galen (ed. Kühn I. 385).] arch.

::b. spec. in first intention, the healing of a lesion or fracture by the immediate re-union of the severed parts, without granulation; second intention, the healing of a wound by granulation after suppuration.

::b. spec. in first intention, the healing of a lesion or fracture by the immediate re-union of the severed parts, without granulation; second intention, the healing of a wound by granulation after suppuration.

:11. Logic. The direction or application of the mind to an object; a conception formed by directing the mind to some object; a general concept. first intentions, primary conceptions of things, formed by the first or direct application of the mind to the things themselves; e.g. the concepts of a tree, an oak. second intentions, secondary conceptions formed by the application of thought to first intentions in their relations to each other; e.g. the concepts of genus, species, variety, property, accident, difference, identity.

:11. [[Logic]]. The direction or application of the mind to an object; a conception formed by directing the mind to some object; a general concept. first intentions, primary conceptions of things, formed by the first or direct application of the mind to the things themselves; e.g. the concepts of a tree, an oak. second intentions, secondary conceptions formed by the application of thought to first intentions in their relations to each other; e.g. the concepts of genus, species, variety, property, accident, difference, identity.

    

    

The introduction of these terms is due to the early Latin translation of Avicenna, in which the Arabic ma{ayinold}q{umac}l{amac}t ‘perceptions, notions’, pl. of ma{ayinold}q{umac}l ‘what is perceived by the intellect, intelligible, known’, is rendered by intentiones. Thus tr. Avicenna Metaph. I, 2 (Prantl II. 321) Subjectum vero logicæ, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectæ secundo [al-ma{ayinold}q{umac}l{amac}t al-{th}{amac}niyah], quæ apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis [al-ma{ayinold}q{umac}l{amac}t al-{umac}l{amac}y], secundum quod per eas pervenitur de cognito ad incognitum. Hence in Albertus Magnus (1193-1280) Metaph. I; I, 1 (Opp. ed. Jammy, Lugd. 1651, III. 3/1) Scientiæ logicæ non considerant ens et partem entis aliquam, sed intentiones secundas circa res per sermonem positas, per quas viæ habentur veniendi de noto ad ignotum. Pacius (Aristot. Organ., 1584) identifies intentio with notio ‘notion’: ‘prima notio seu prima intentio’.

The introduction of these terms is due to the early Latin translation of [[Avicenna]], in which the Arabic ma{ayinold}q{umac}l{amac}t ‘perceptions, notions’, pl. of ma{ayinold}q{umac}l ‘what is perceived by the intellect, intelligible, known’, is rendered by intentiones. Thus tr. Avicenna Metaph. I, 2 (Prantl II. 321) Subjectum vero logicæ, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectæ secundo [al-ma{ayinold}q{umac}l{amac}t al-{th}{amac}niyah], quæ apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis [al-ma{ayinold}q{umac}l{amac}t al-{umac}l{amac}y], secundum quod per eas pervenitur de cognito ad incognitum. Hence in [[Albertus Magnus]] (1193-1280) Metaph. I; I, 1 (Opp. ed. Jammy, Lugd. 1651, III. 3/1) Scientiæ logicæ non considerant ens et partem entis aliquam, sed intentiones secundas circa res per sermonem positas, per quas viæ habentur veniendi de noto ad ignotum. Pacius (Aristot. Organ., 1584) identifies intentio with notio ‘notion’: ‘prima notio seu prima intentio’.

:12. Theol.    a. One of the three things necessary, according to the Schoolmen, to the effectual administration and validity of a Sacrament, the two others being matter and form: see quots.

:12. Theol.    a. One of the three things necessary, according to the Schoolmen, to the effectual administration and validity of a Sacrament, the two others being matter and form: see quots.

:15. Special Comb.: intention movement [tr. G. intentionsbewegung (O. Heinroth)], a movement or action on the part of an animal which itself performs no function except to reveal or signal that a further movement or action may follow or is contemplated; intention tremor, a tremor which is manifested when a voluntary action is performed.

:15. Special Comb.: intention movement [tr. G. intentionsbewegung (O. Heinroth)], a movement or action on the part of an animal which itself performs no function except to reveal or signal that a further movement or action may follow or is contemplated; intention tremor, a tremor which is manifested when a voluntary action is performed.

==Overview==

==Overview==

The theory of intentionality states that every mental phenomenon (that is, every psychological act) has a content, and is directed at an object (the ''intentional object''). Intentionality states that every belief, desire, etc. has an object that it is about: the believed, the wanted, etc.. Brentano used the expression "intentional inexistence" (existence in) to indicate the status of the objects of thought in the mind. The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, was the key feature to distinguish mental phenomena and physical phenomena, because physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether.

The theory of intentionality states that every mental [[phenomenon]] (that is, every [[psychology|psychological]] act) has a content, and is directed at an object (the ''intentional object''). Intentionality states that every [[belief]], desire, etc. has an object that it is about: the believed, the wanted, etc.. Brentano used the expression "intentional inexistence" (existence in) to indicate the status of the objects of [[thought]] in the mind. The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, was the key feature to distinguish mental phenomena and physical phenomena, because physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether.

Through the works of [[Edmund Husserl|Husserl]], who took it over from Brentano, the concept of intentionality received more widespread attention in current philosophy, both [[Continental philosophy|continental]] and [[Analytic philosophy|analytic]]. French philosopher [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], in ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'', identified intentionality with [[consciousness]], stating that they were indistinguishable from one another, a position that was a stark contrast to Brentano's position that intentionality is but one quality of mental phenomena. German philosopher [[Martin Heidegger]], in ''[[Being and Time]]'', defined intentionality as "care" (''Sorge''), a [[sentience|sentient]] condition where an individual's [[existentialism]], facticity, and forfeiture to the world identifies their [[ontology|ontological significance]], in contrast to that which is the mere ontic (thinghood).

Through the works of [[Edmund Husserl|Husserl]], who took it over from Brentano, the concept of intentionality received more widespread attention in current philosophy, both [[Continental philosophy|continental]] and [[Analytic philosophy|analytic]]. French philosopher [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], in ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'', identified intentionality with [[consciousness]], stating that they were indistinguishable from one another, a position that was a stark contrast to Brentano's position that intentionality is but one quality of mental phenomena. German philosopher [[Martin Heidegger]], in ''[[Being and Time]]'', defined intentionality as "care" (''Sorge''), a [[sentience|sentient]] condition where an individual's [[existentialism]], facticity, and forfeiture to the world identifies their [[ontology|ontological significance]], in contrast to that which is the mere ontic (thinghood).

In current [[artificial intelligence]] and [[philosophy of mind]] intentionality is a controversial subject and sometimes claimed to be something that a machine will never achieve. [[John Searle]] argued for this position with the [[Chinese room]] thought experiment, according to which no [[syntactic]] operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with [[semantic]] content. As he noted in the article, Searle's view was a minority position in artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind.  

In current [[artificial intelligence]] and [[philosophy of mind]] intentionality is a controversial subject and sometimes claimed to be something that a machine will never achieve. [[John Searle]] argued for this position with the [[Chinese room]] thought experiment, according to which no [[syntactic]] operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with [[semantic]] content. As he noted in the article, Searle's view was a minority position in artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind.  

Whereas humans can conceive with some difficulty 6th order intentionality (Robin Dunbar - 6th Order Intentionality Story[http://www.uboeschenstein.ch/texte/dunbar43.html]), a future superintelligence or could comfortably envision many more. The most complex mental trains of thought, that we can hold fleetingly and with the utmost concentration and effort, will to it be almost effortless.[http://www.kurzweilai.net/ KurzweilAI.net]

Whereas humans can conceive with some difficulty 6th order intentionality (Robin Dunbar - 6th Order Intentionality Story[https://www.uboeschenstein.ch/texte/dunbar43.html]), a future superintelligence or could comfortably envision many more. The most complex mental trains of thought, that we can hold fleetingly and with the utmost concentration and effort, will to it be almost effortless.[https://www.kurzweilai.net/ KurzweilAI.net]

===Dennett's [[Taxonomy]] of Current [[Theory|Theories]] about Intentionality===

===Dennett's Taxonomy of Current Theories about Intentionality===

[[Daniel Dennett]] offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book "[[Intentional stance|The Intentional Stance]]". Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge:

[[Daniel Dennett]] offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book "[[Intentional stance|The Intentional Stance]]". Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge:

==Intentionality vs. intensionality==

==Intentionality vs. intensionality==

Intentionality should not be confused with [[intension]]ality, a concept from [[semantics]] though it is related to the modern understanding of [[intention]].

Intentionality should not be confused with [[intension]]ality, a concept from [[semantics]] though it is related to the modern understanding of [[intention]].

== References ==

== References ==

==External links==

==External links==

*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

**[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ Intentionality]

**[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ Intentionality]

**[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ Consciousness and Intentionality]

**[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ Consciousness and Intentionality]

**[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality-ancient/ Ancient Theories of Intentionality]

**[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality-ancient/ Ancient Theories of Intentionality]

[[Category: Philosophy]]

[[Category: Philosophy]]