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New page: Image:lighterstill.jpgright|frame The philosophy of '''materialism''' holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to exist is [[matt...
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The [[philosophy]] of '''materialism''' holds that the only thing that can be truly proven to [[existence|exist]] is [[matter]], and is considered a form of physicalism. Fundamentally, all [[things]] are composed of ''material'' and all [[phenomena]] (including [[consciousness]]) are the result of material interactions; therefore, [[matter]] is the only substance. As a theory, materialism belongs to the class of [[Monist|monist]] ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on [[dualism]] or [[pluralism]]. For singular explanations of the phenomenal [[reality]], materialism would be in contrast to [[idealism]].

==Overview==
The view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, famously by [[René Descartes]]. However, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice it is frequently assimilated to one variety of physicalism or another.

Materialism is often associated with the methodological principle of [[reductionism]], according to which the objects or [[phenomena]] individuated at one level of description, if they are genuine, must be explicable in terms of the objects or phenomena at some other level of description -- typically, a more general level than the reduced one. ''Non-reductive materialism'' explicitly rejects this notion, however, taking the material constitution of all particulars to be consistent with the existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena not explicable in the terms canonically used for the basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws and explanations in "special sciences" like [[psychology]] or [[geology]] are invisible from the perspective of basic [[physics]]. A lot of vigorous [[literature]] has grown up around the relation between these views.

Modern philosophical materialists extend the definition of [[matter]] to include other scientifically observable entities such as [[energy]], [[force]]s, and the curvature of [[space]]. However philosophers such as [[Mary Midgley]] suggest that the concept of "matter" is elusive and poorly defined.

Materialism typically contrasts with [[dualism]], [[phenomenalism]], [[idealism]], [[vitalism]] and [[dual-aspect monism]]. Its materiality can, in some ways, be linked to the concept of [[Determinism]], as espoused by Enlightenment thinkers.

Materialism has been criticised by religious thinkers opposed to it, who regard it as a [[Spirituality|spiritually ]] empty philosophy. [[Marxism]] also uses ''materialism'' to refer to a "materialist conception of [[history]]", which is not concerned with [[metaphysics]] but centers on the roughly empirical world of human activity (practice, including labor) and the [[institution]]s created, reproduced, or destroyed by that activity.

==History of materialism==
===Axial Age===
Materialism developed, possibly independently, in several geographically separated regions of Eurasia during the "Axial Age".

In Ancient Indian [[Indian philosophy|philosophy]], materialism developed around 600 BCE with the works of Ajita Kesakambali, Payasi, Kanada, and the proponents of the [[Cārvāka]] school of philosophy. Kanada was one of the early proponents of [[atomism]]. The Nyaya-Vaisesika school (600 BCE - 100 BCE) developed one of the earliest forms of atomism. The tradition was carried forward by Buddhist atomism and the Jainan school.

Xun Zi developed a Confucian doctrine oriented on realism and materialism in Ancient China. Other notable Chinese materialists of this time include Yang Xiong and Wang Chong.

Ancient [[Greek philosophy|Greek philosophers]] like Thales, [[Parmenides]], Anaxagoras, [[Democritus]], Epicurus, prefigure later materialists. The poem ''[[De Rerum Natura]]'' by [[Lucretius]] recounts the [[mechanistic]] philosophy of [[Democritus]] and [[Epicurus]]. According to this view, all that exists is [[matter]] and void, and all phenomena are the result of different motions and conglomerations of base material particles called "atoms." ''De Rerum Natura'' provides mechanistic explanations for phenomena such as erosion, evaporation, wind, and sound. Famous principles like "nothing can come from nothing" and "nothing can touch body but body" first appeared in the works of Lucretius.

===Common Era===
Later Indian materialist Jayaraashi Bhatta (6th century CE) in his work ''Tattvopaplavasimha'' ("the Upsetting of all principles") refuted the Nyaya Sutra [[epistemology]]. The materialistic Cārvāka philosophy appears to have died out some time after 1400 CE.

In early 12th-century al-Andalus], the Arabian philosopher, Ibn Tufail (Abubacer), wrote discussions on materialism in his philosophical novel, ''[[Hayy ibn Yaqdhan]]'' (''Philosophus Autodidactus''), while vaguely foreshadowing the idea of a [[historical materialism]].(ISBN 9004093001)

===European Enlightenment===
Later on, [[Thomas Hobbes]] and [[Pierre Gassendi]] represent the materialist [[tradition]], in opposition to [[René Descartes]]' attempts to provide the [[natural sciences]] with [[dualist]] foundations. Later materialists included [[Denis Diderot]] and other French enlightenment thinkers, as well as [[Ludwig Feuerbach]], and, in England, the pedestrian traveller [[John "Walking" Stewart]], whose insistence that all matter is endowed with a [[moral]] [[dimension]] had a major impact on the philosophical poetry of [[William Wordsworth]].

[[Schopenhauer]] wrote that "...materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself." (''The World as Will and Representation'', II, Ch. 1). He claimed that an observing subject can only know material objects through the mediation of the brain and its particular organization. The way that the brain knows determines the way that material objects are experienced. "Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this (especially if it should ultimately result in thrust and counter-thrust) can leave nothing to be desired. But all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time." (''ibid.'', I, §7)

===Marx's Social Materialism===
[[Karl Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels]], turning the [[idealism|idealist]] [[dialectic]]s of [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Georg Hegel]] upside down, came up with ''[[dialectical materialism]]'', and with a materialist account of the course of history, known as ''[[historical materialism]].'' For Marx, the base material of the world is social relations (and mainly class relations eg, between serfs and lord or today, between employer and employee), as an expression of these basic social relations all other ideas ([[ideology]]) form, including those of [[science]] and of [[economics]], [[law]], morality etc..

This term was used by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to refer to a theoretical perspective which holds that the satisfaction of everyday economic needs is the primary [[reality]] in every epoch of history. Opposed to German idealist philosophy, materialism takes the position that [[society]] and reality originate from a set of simple economic acts which human beings carry out in order to provide the material necessities of food, shelter and clothing. Materialism takes as its starting point that, before anything else, human beings must produce their everyday economic needs through their physical labor and practical productive activity. This single economic act, Marx believed, gives rise to a system of social relations which include political, legal and religious structures of society.

==Scientific Materialists==
Many current and recent philosophers e.g., [[Daniel Dennett|Dennett]], [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]], [[Donald Davidson|Davidson]], [[John Rogers Searle|Searle]], [[Jerry Fodor|Fodor]] and [[Jaegwon Kim|Kim]]; operate within a broadly physicalist or materialist framework, producing rival accounts of how best to accommodate [[mind]] [[functionalism]], [[anomalous monism]], [[identity theory]] and so on.

In recent years, [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]] have advocated a more extreme position, ''[[eliminativist materialism]]'', which holds that mental [[phenomena]] simply do not exist at all -- that talk of the mental reflects a totally spurious "[[folk psychology]]" that simply has no basis in [[fact]], something like the way that folk science speaks of demon-caused illness.

==Defining matter==

The [[nature]] and definition of [[matter]] have been subject to much debate [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10053b.htm}, as have other key [[concepts]] in [[science]] and [[philosophy]]. Is there a single kind of matter which everything is made of ([[hyle]]), or multiple kinds? Is matter a continuous substance capable of expressing multiple forms (hylomorphism) [http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-9041771], or a number of discrete, unchanging constituents ([[atomism]])? [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-21]\
[http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-22 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'':Atomism in the Seventeenth Century]
[http://people.umass.edu/schaffer/papers/Fundamental.pdf Article by a philosopher who opposes atomism]
[http://www.abstractatom.com/buddhist_atomism_and_the_r_theory_of_time.htm Information on Buddhist atomism]
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democritus/ Article on traditional Greek atomism]
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-modern/ Atomism from the 17th to the 20th Century at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] Does it have intrinsic properties [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on substance theory][http://www.friesian.com/essence.htm The Friesian School on Substance and Essence], or is it lacking them ([[prima materia]])?

Without question science has made unexpected discoveries about matter. Some paraphrase departures from traditional or [[common-sense]] concepts of matter as "disproving the existence of matter". However, most physical scientists take the view that the concept of matter has merely changed, rather than being eliminated.

One challenge to the traditional concept of matter as tangible "stuff" is the rise of field physics
in the 19th century. However the conclusion that materialism is false may be premature. [[Special relativity|Relativity]] shows that matter and energy (including the spatially distributed energy of fields) are interchangeable. This enables the ontological view that energy is [[prima materia]] and matter is one of its forms. On the other hand, [[quantum field theory]] models fields as exchanges of particles- [[photon]]s for [[electromagnetic fields]] and so on. On this view it could be said that fields are "really matter".

All known solid, liquid, and gaseous substances are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons. All three are [[fermions]] or spin-half particles, whereas the particles that mediate fields in [[quantum field theory]] are [[bosons]]. Thus matter can be said to divide into a more tangible fermionic kind and a less tangible bosonic kind. However it is now known that less than 5% of the physical composition of the universe is made up of such "matter", and the majority of the universe is composed of [[Dark Matter]] and [[Dark Energy]] - with no agreement amongst scientists about what these are made of. This obviously refutes the traditional materialism that held that the only things that exist are things composed of the kind of matter with which we are broadly familiar ("traditional matter") - which was anyway under great strain as noted above from [[Relativity]] and [[quantum field theory]]. But if the definition of "matter" is extended to "anything whose existence can be inferred from the observed behaviour of traditional matter" then there is no reason ''in principle'' why entities whose existence materialists normally deny should not be considered as "matter"

Some philosophers feel that these dichotomies necessitate a switch from materialism to physicalism. Others use materialism and physicalism interchangeably.[http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/materialism.html]

==Criticism and alternatives ==

Theologian-philosopher [[Alvin Plantinga]] criticises it, and Theologian-philosopher [[Keith Ward]] suggests that materialism is rare amongst contemporary UK philosophers: "Looking around my philosopher colleagues in Britain, virtually all of whom I know at least from their published work, I would say that very few of them are materialists."''[[Is Religion Dangerous?]]'' p 91

===Religious and spiritual objections===
According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, materialism denies the existence of both God and the soul It is therefore incompatible with most world religions including [[Islam]], [[Christianity]], [[Judaism]], and arguably some schools of [[Buddhism]].

In most of [[Hinduism]] and [[Transcendentalism]], all matter is believed to be an illusion called [[Maya]], blinding us from knowing the [[truth]]. Maya is the limited, purely physical and mental reality in which our everyday consciousness has become entangled. Maya gets destroyed for a person when they perceive [[Brahman]] with transcendental [[knowledge]].

[[Kant]] argued against all three forms of materialism, normal idealism (which he contrasts with his "transcendental idealism") and dualism.[[Critique of Pure Reason]] (A379, p352 NKS translation).

"If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives; pneumatism [idealism] on the one hand, materialism on the other; would have any sort of basis [...] Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that which underlies inner [[intuition]], is in itself either [[matter]] or a [[thinking]] [[being]], but a ground (to us unknown)..." However, Kant also argues that change and [[time]] require an enduring substrate..[http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT7], and does so in connection with his Refutation of Idealism.

[[Postmodern]]/[[poststructuralist]] thinkers also express a skepticism about any all-encompassing metaphysical scheme.

Philosopher [[Mary Midgley]], among others Reppert, V. (1992). ''Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question''. Metaphilosophy 23: 378-92., argues that materialism is a self-refuting [[idea]], at least in its eliminative form. While some critics hold that matter is an ill-defined concept, it is not clear that substitutes, such as [[Spirit]], or Hegelian [[Geist]] fare any better.

===Other ontologies===

'''Bundle Theory'''. It can be argued that it is the properties of material bodies, such as size and shape, which are perceived, and not the material substrate itself. [[John Locke|Locke]] said we "know not what" the basic substance is.[http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/locke/ctb2c23.htm] As [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]] wrote "I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any [[idea]] in our [[mind]]s". If mind-independent properties (properly speaking property-instances or [[tropes]]) are held to exist
in association with each other but without a material substrate, [[bundle theory]] results. If bundle theory is shown to be illogical or inconceivable, the existence of a substrate is thereby demonstrated conceptually, despite the unpercievability of matter per se.

'''Idealism'''. An argument for [[idealism]], such as those of [[Hegel]] and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]] is ''ipso facto'' an argument against materialism. Matter can be argued to be redundant, as in bundle theory, and mind-independent properties can in turn be reduced to subjective percepts.

'''Dualism'''. If matter is seen as necessary to explain the physical world, but incapable of explaining mind, [[dualism]] results.

'''[[Emergence]]''', '''[[Holism]]''' and '''[[Process]] philosophy''' are some of the approaches that seek to ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of traditional (especially [[mechanistic]]) materialism without abandoning materialism entirely.

=== Materialism as methodology===

Some critics object to materialism as part of an overly skeptical, narrow or [[reductionism|reductivist]] approach to theorizing, rather than to the ontological claim that matter is the only substance.
Particle physicist and [[theology|theologian]] [[John Polkinghorne]] objects to what he calls ''promissory materialism''; claims that materialistic science ''will'' eventually be able to explain [[phenomena]] it has not so far been able to explain. However, critics of materialism are equally guilty of prognosticating that it will ''never'' be able to explain certain phenomena " Over a hundred years ago [[William James]] saw clearly that science would never resolve the [[mind-body dichotomy|mind-body problem]]".[http://www.designinference.com/documents/1999.10.spiritual_machines.htm Dembski, W. Are We Spiritual Machines] He prefers [[dual-aspect monism]] to materialism. [http://www.crosscurrents.org/polkinghorne.htm]]

The psychologist [[Imants Barušs]] suggests that "materialists tend to indiscriminately apply a 'pebbles in a box' schema to explanations of reality even though such a schema is known to be incorrect in general for physical phenomena. Thus, materialism cannot explain matter, let alone anomalous phenomena or subjective experience, but remains entrenched in academia largely for political reasons.

=== The flow of time ===

[[Four-dimensionalism]] is the most commonly accepted theory of time among members of the scientific community. Critics of materialism could argue that it's impossible for our subjective [[sense of time]] to arise from a static, four-dimensional universe. It must be noted that the flow of time isn't the same as the [[arrow of time]].

==Quote==
The very claim of materialism implies a supermaterial [[consciousness]] of the [[mind]] which presumes to assert such dogmas. A mechanism might deteriorate, but it could never progress. Machines do not think, create, [[dream]], aspire, idealize, hunger for [[truth]], or thirst for righteousness. They do not motivate their lives with the passion to serve other machines and to choose as their goal of eternal progression the sublime task of finding [[God]] and striving to be like him. Machines are never [[intellectual]], [[emotion]]al, aesthetic, ethical, moral, or [[spiritual]].[http://urantia.org/cgi-bin/webglimpse/mfs/usr/local/www/data/papers?link=http://mercy.urantia.org/papers/paper195.html&file=/usr/local/www/data/papers/paper195.html&line=187#mfs]

==See also==
*[[Atheism]]
*[[Buddha|Buddhism]]
*[[Idealism]]
*[[Matter]]

==Notes==
# Turner, M. S. (2007). Quarks and the cosmos. Science 315, 59–61. [http://www.stolaf.edu/events/sciencesymposium/speakers.html]
#Mary Midgley The Myths We Live By.
#Dominique Urvoy, "The Rationality of Everyday Life: The Andalusian Tradition? (Aropos of Hayy's First Experiences)", in Lawrence I. Conrad (1996), The World of Ibn Tufayl: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, pp. 38-46, Brill Publishers, ISBN 9004093001.
# "Matter". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 1913. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10053b.htm.
# Concise Britannica on hylomorphism
# Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Atomism: Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century
# Dictionary of the History of Ideas:Atomism in the Seventeenth Century
# Article by a philosopher who opposes atomism
# Information on Buddhist atomism
# Article on traditional Greek atomism
# Atomism from the 17th to the 20th Century at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
# Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on substance theory
#The Friesian School on Substance and Essence
# Bernard Sadoulet Particle Dark Matter in the Universe: At the Brink of Discovery? Science 5 January 2007: Vol. 315. no. 5808, pp. 61 - 63
# eg C. S. Lewis in The Great Divorce suggested that Heaven was composed of super-massive matter that was more substantial than normal matter
# Dictionary of the Philosophy of mind -- "Many philosophers and scientists now use the terms `material' and `physical' interchangeably"
# Is Religion Dangerous? p 91
# "Materialism". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 1913. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Materialism.
# Gunasekara
# see Critique of Pure Reason where he gives a "refutation of idealism" in pp345-52 (1st Ed) and pp 244-7 (2nd Ed) in the Norman Kemp Smith edition
# Critique of Pure Reason (A379, p352 NKS translation). "If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives — pneumatism [idealism] on the one hand, materialism on the other — would have any sort of basis [...] Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown)..."
# "Kant argues that we can determine that there has been a change in the objects of our perception, not merely a change in our perceptions themselves, only by conceiving of what we perceive as successive states of enduring substances (see Substance)".Routledge Encyclopedia of philosophy
# "All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me [...]" Critique of Pure Reason, B274, P245 (NKS translation)
#see Mary Midgley The Myths we Live by
# Baker, L. (1987). Saving Belief Princeton, Princeton University Press
# Reppert, V. (1992). Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question. Metaphilosophy 23: 378-92.
# Boghossian, P. (1990). The Status of Content Philosophical Review 99: 157-84. and (1991)The Status of Content Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 264-78.
# Locke, J. Essan Understay Concerning Humanding/
# However, critics of materialism are equally guilty of prognosticating that it will never be able to explain certain phenomena " Over a hundred years ago William James saw clearly that science would never resolve the mind-body problem".Dembski, W. Are We Spiritual Machines
# Interview with John Polkinghorne
# Baruss, I. (1993). Can we consider matter as ultimate reality? Some fundamental problems with a materialist interpretation of reality. Ultimate Reality and Meaning: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding, 16(3-4), 245-254
# Baruss, I. (2001). The art of science: Science of the future in light of alterations of consciousness. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 15(1), 57-68
==References==
* Churchland, Paul (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. The Philosophy of Science. Boyd, Richard; P. Gasper; J. D. Trout. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.
* Flanagan, Owen (1991). The Science of the Mind. 2nd edition Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press.
* Fodor, J.A. (1974) Special Sciences, Synthese, Vol.28.
* Gunasekara, Victor A. (2001) "Buddhism and the Modern World". Basic Buddhism: A Modern Introduction to the Buddha's Teaching". 18 January 2008 [http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/buddha/Teachings/basicteaching11.htm].
* Kim, J. (1994) Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52.
* Lange, Friedrich A.,(1925) The History of Materialism. New York, Harcourt, Brace, & Co.
* Moser, P. K.; J. D. Trout, Ed. (1995) Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. New York, Routledge.
* Schopenhauer, Arthur, (1969) The World as Will and Representation. New York, Dover Publications, Inc.
* Vitzthum, Richard C. (1995) Materialism: An Affirmative History and Definition. Amhert, New York, Prometheus Books.
* Buchner, L. (1920). Force and Matter. New York, Peter Eckler Publishing CO.
* La Mettrie, Man The machine.

==References==

*Churchland, Paul (1981). ''Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes''. The Philosophy of Science. Boyd, Richard; P. Gasper; J. D. Trout. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press.
*Flanagan, Owen (1991). ''The Science of the Mind''. 2nd edition Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press.
*Fodor, J.A. (1974) Special Sciences, ''Synthese'', Vol.28.
*Gunasekara, Victor A. (2001) "Buddhism and the Modern World". ''Basic Buddhism: A Modern Introduction to the Buddha's Teaching". 18 January 2008 <http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/buddha/Teachings/basicteaching11.htm>.
*Kim, J. (1994) Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'', Vol. 52.
*Lange, Friedrich A.,(1925) ''The History of Materialism''. New York, Harcourt, Brace, & Co.
*Moser, P. K.; J. D. Trout, Ed. (1995) ''Contemporary Materialism: A Reader''. New York, Routledge.
*Schopenhauer, Arthur, (1969) ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]''. New York, Dover Publications, Inc.
*Vitzthum, Richard C. (1995) ''Materialism: An Affirmative History and Definition''. Amhert, New York, Prometheus Books.
*Buchner, L. (1920). ''Force and Matter''. New York, Peter Eckler Publishing CO.
*[[Julien Offray de La Mettrie|La Mettrie]], ''Man The machine''.

==External links==
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ Stanford Encyclopedia article on Physicalism]
*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative Stanford Encyclopedia article on Eliminative Materialism]
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html Philosophical Materialism (by Richard C. Vitzthum)]
*[http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/materialism.html Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind on Materialism]

[[Category: Philosophy]]