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[[Things]] are [[time]] conditioned, but '''truth''' is timeless. The more truth you know, the more truth you are, the more of the past you can understand and of the future you can comprehend.

[[Things]] are [[time]] conditioned, but '''truth''' is timeless. The more truth you know, the more truth you are, the more of the past you can understand and of the future you can comprehend.

English ''[[:wikt:true|true]]'' is from Old English ([[West Saxon]]) ''(ge)tríewe, [[:wikt:treowe|tréowe]]'', cognate to [[Old Saxon]] ''(gi)trûui'', [[Old High German]] ''(ga)triuwu'' ([[Modern German]] ''treu'' "faithful"), [[Old Norse]] ''tryggr'', [[Gothic language|Gothic]] ''triggws''.<ref>see [[Holtzmann's law]] for the ''-ww-'' : ''-gg-'' alternation.</ref>, all from a [[Proto-Germanic]] ''*trewwj-'' "having [[good faith]]".

English ''[[:wikt:true|true]]'' is from Old English ([[West Saxon]]) ''(ge)tríewe, [[:wikt:treowe|tréowe]]'', cognate to [[Old Saxon]] ''(gi)trûui'', [[Old High German]] ''(ga)triuwu'' ([[Modern German]] ''treu'' "faithful"), [[Old Norse]] ''tryggr'', [[Gothic language|Gothic]] ''triggws''.<ref>see [[Holtzmann's law]] for the ''-ww-'' : ''-gg-'' alternation.</ref>, all from a [[Proto-Germanic]] ''*trewwj-'' "having [[good faith]]".

Old Norse ''{{lang|is|trú}}'', means "faith, word of honour; religious faith, belief"<ref>Zoega (1910)[http://www.northvegr.org/zoega/h442.php]</ref> (archaic English ''[[:wikt:troth|troth]]'' "loyalty, honesty, good faith", compare ''{{lang|is|[[Ásatrú]]}}'').

Old Norse ''{{lang|is|trú}}'', means "faith, word of honour; religious faith, belief"<ref>Zoega (1910)[http://www.northvegr.org/zoega/h442.php] (archaic English ''[[:wikt:troth|troth]]'' "loyalty, honesty, good faith", compare ''{{lang|is|[[Ásatrú]]}}'').

Thus, ''truth'' in its original sense is the quality of "faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity",<ref>[[OED]] on ''true'' has "Steadfast in adherence to a commander or friend, to a principle or cause, to one's promises, faith, etc.; firm in allegiance; faithful, loyal, constant, trusty; Honest, honourable, upright, virtuous, trustworthy; free from deceit, sincere, truthful " besides "Conformity with fact; agreement with reality; accuracy, correctness, verity; Consistent with fact; agreeing with the reality; representing the thing as it is; Real, genuine; rightly answering to the description; properly so called; not counterfeit, spurious, or imaginary."</ref>, and the narrowed sense "in agreement with [[fact]] or [[reality]]", in Anglo-Saxon expressed by ''[[:wikt:sōþ|sōþ]]'', is a secondary development coupled to the process of "[[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]]" in [[17th century philosophy]].<ref>Attested since the early 17th century. E.g., [[Shakespeare]] in ''[[As You Like It]]'' (5.4) has "If there be truth in sight, you are my daughter.";  [[William Prynne]] in his ''A briefe survay and censure of Mr Cozens his couzening devotions '' (1628) has "I haue here sufficiently euidenced the trueth of this Assertion." </ref>

Thus, ''truth'' in its original sense is the quality of "faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity",<ref>[[OED]] on ''true'' has "Steadfast in adherence to a commander or friend, to a principle or cause, to one's promises, faith, etc.; firm in allegiance; faithful, loyal, constant, trusty; Honest, honourable, upright, virtuous, trustworthy; free from deceit, sincere, truthful " besides "Conformity with fact; agreement with reality; accuracy, correctness, verity; Consistent with fact; agreeing with the reality; representing the thing as it is; Real, genuine; rightly answering to the description; properly so called; not counterfeit, spurious, or imaginary."</ref>, and the narrowed sense "in agreement with [[fact]] or [[reality]]", in Anglo-Saxon expressed by ''[[:wikt:sōþ|sōþ]]'', is a secondary development coupled to the process of "[[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]]" in [[17th century philosophy]].<ref>Attested since the early 17th century. E.g., [[Shakespeare]] in ''[[As You Like It]]'' (5.4) has "If there be truth in sight, you are my daughter.";  [[William Prynne]] in his ''A briefe survay and censure of Mr Cozens his couzening devotions '' (1628) has "I haue here sufficiently euidenced the trueth of this Assertion."  

All Germanic languages besides English have introduced a terminological distinction between truth "fidelity" and truth "factuality". To express "factuality", [[North Germanic]] opted for nouns derived from ''sanna'' "to assert, affirm", while continental [[West Germanic]] (German and Dutch) opted for continuations of ''wâra'' "faith, trust, pact" (cognate to Slavic ''věra'' "(religious) faith", but influenced by Latin ''[[veritas|verus]]''). [[Romance language]]s use terms continuing Latin ''[[veritas]]'', while Greek with ''[[aletheia]]'' and Slavic with ''[[:wikt:pravda|pravda]]'' have unrelated terms.

All Germanic languages besides English have introduced a terminological distinction between truth "fidelity" and truth "factuality". To express "factuality", [[North Germanic]] opted for nouns derived from ''sanna'' "to assert, affirm", while continental [[West Germanic]] (German and Dutch) opted for continuations of ''wâra'' "faith, trust, pact" (cognate to Slavic ''věra'' "(religious) faith", but influenced by Latin ''[[veritas|verus]]''). [[Romance language]]s use terms continuing Latin ''[[veritas]]'', while Greek with ''[[aletheia]]'' and Slavic with ''[[:wikt:pravda|pravda]]'' have unrelated terms.

Questions about what is a proper basis on which to decide how words, symbols, ideas and beliefs may properly be said to constitute truth, whether for a single person or an entire community or society, are among the many questions addressed by the theories introduced below.

Questions about what is a proper basis on which to decide how words, symbols, ideas and beliefs may properly be said to constitute truth, whether for a single person or an entire community or society, are among the many questions addressed by the theories introduced below.

Each of the five substantive theories below deal with truth as something with a nature, a phenomenon, or thing, or type of human experience about which significant things can be said.  These theories each present perspectives that are widely agreed by published scholars to apply in some way to a broad set of occurrences that can be observed in human interaction, or which offer significant, stable explanations for issues related to the idea of truth in human experience.<ref name=EPT>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref><ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999),''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Includes papers by James, Ramsey, Russell, Tarski, and more recent work.</ref>  There also have more recently arisen "[[deflationary theory of truth|deflationary]]" or "minimalist" theories of truth based on the idea that the application of a term like ''true'' to a statement does not assert anything significant about it, for instance, anything about its ''nature'', but that the label ''truth'' is a tool of discourse used to express agreement, to emphasize claims, or to form certain types of generalizations.<ref name=EPT>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref><ref>Horwich, Paul, ''Truth'', (2nd edition, 1988),</ref><ref>Field, Hartry, ''Truth and the Absence of Fact'' (2001).</ref>

Each of the five substantive theories below deal with truth as something with a nature, a phenomenon, or thing, or type of human experience about which significant things can be said.  These theories each present perspectives that are widely agreed by published scholars to apply in some way to a broad set of occurrences that can be observed in human interaction, or which offer significant, stable explanations for issues related to the idea of truth in human experience.<ref name=EPT>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996) Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999),''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Includes papers by James, Ramsey, Russell, Tarski, and more recent work. There also have more recently arisen "[[deflationary theory of truth|deflationary]]" or "minimalist" theories of truth based on the idea that the application of a term like ''true'' to a statement does not assert anything significant about it, for instance, anything about its ''nature'', but that the label ''truth'' is a tool of discourse used to express agreement, to emphasize claims, or to form certain types of generalizations. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref><ref>Horwich, Paul, ''Truth'', (2nd edition, 1988), Field, Hartry, ''Truth and the Absence of Fact'' (2001).

===Substantive theories===

===Substantive theories===

For coherence theories in general, truth requires a proper fit of elements within a whole system. Very often, though, coherence is taken to imply something more than simple logical consistency; often there is a demand that the propositions in a coherent system lend mutual inferential support to each other.  So, for example, the completeness and comprehensiveness of the underlying set of concepts is a critical factor in judging the validity and usefulness of a coherent system.<ref>[[Immanuel Kant]], for instance, assembled a controversial but quite coherent system in the early 19th century, whose validity and usefulness continues to be debated even today.  Similarly, the systems of [[Leibniz]] and [[Spinoza]] are characteristic systems that are internally coherent but controversial in terms of their utility and validity.</ref>  A pervasive tenet of coherence theories is the idea that truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to individual propositions only according to their coherence with the whole.  Among the assortment of perspectives commonly regarded as coherence theory, theorists differ on the question of whether coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or only a single absolute system.   

For coherence theories in general, truth requires a proper fit of elements within a whole system. Very often, though, coherence is taken to imply something more than simple logical consistency; often there is a demand that the propositions in a coherent system lend mutual inferential support to each other.  So, for example, the completeness and comprehensiveness of the underlying set of concepts is a critical factor in judging the validity and usefulness of a coherent system.<ref>[[Immanuel Kant]], for instance, assembled a controversial but quite coherent system in the early 19th century, whose validity and usefulness continues to be debated even today.  Similarly, the systems of [[Leibniz]] and [[Spinoza]] are characteristic systems that are internally coherent but controversial in terms of their utility and validity.</ref>  A pervasive tenet of coherence theories is the idea that truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to individual propositions only according to their coherence with the whole.  Among the assortment of perspectives commonly regarded as coherence theory, theorists differ on the question of whether coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or only a single absolute system.   

Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to characterize the essential and intrinsic properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p130-131 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>  However, formal reasoners are content to contemplate [[independence (mathematical logic)|axiomatically independent]] and sometimes mutually contradictory systems side by side, for example, the various [[noneuclidean geometry|alternative geometries]].  On the whole, coherence theories have been criticized as lacking justification in their application to other areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the [[natural world]], [[empirical]] data in general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used without support from the other major theories of truth.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p131-133, ''see'' esp., section on "Epistemological assumptions" (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>

Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to characterize the essential and intrinsic properties of formal systems in logic and mathematics.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p130-131 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>  However, formal reasoners are content to contemplate [[independence (mathematical logic)|axiomatically independent]] and sometimes mutually contradictory systems side by side, for example, the various [[noneuclidean geometry|alternative geometries]].  On the whole, coherence theories have been criticized as lacking justification in their application to other areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the [[natural world]], [[empirical]] data in general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used without support from the other major theories of truth. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p131-133, ''see'' esp., section on "Epistemological assumptions" (Macmillan, 1969)

Coherence theories distinguish the thought of [[rationalism|rationalist]] philosophers, particularly of [[Spinoza]], [[Leibniz]], and [[G.W.F. Hegel]], along with the British philosopher [[F.H. Bradley]].<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p130</ref>  They have found a resurgence also among several proponents of [[logical positivism]], notably [[Otto Neurath]] and [[Carl Hempel]].

Coherence theories distinguish the thought of [[rationalism|rationalist]] philosophers, particularly of [[Spinoza]], [[Leibniz]], and [[G.W.F. Hegel]], along with the British philosopher [[F.H. Bradley]].<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p130</ref>  They have found a resurgence also among several proponents of [[logical positivism]], notably [[Otto Neurath]] and [[Carl Hempel]].

[[Consensus theory of truth|Consensus theory]] holds that truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. Such a group might include all human beings, or a [[subset]] thereof consisting of more than one person.

[[Consensus theory of truth|Consensus theory]] holds that truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. Such a group might include all human beings, or a [[subset]] thereof consisting of more than one person.

Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of "truth" is  the philosopher [[Jürgen Habermas]].<ref>''See, e.g.'', Habermas, Jürgen, ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (English translation, 1972).</ref> Habermas maintains that truth is what would be agreed upon in an ideal speech situation.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Habermas, Jürgen, ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (English translation, 1972), esp. PART III, pp 187 ''ff''.</ref> Among the current strong critics of consensus theory is the philosopher [[Nicholas Rescher]].<ref>Rescher, Nicholas, ''Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus'' (1995).</ref>

Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of "truth" is  the philosopher [[Jürgen Habermas]]. ''See, e.g.'', Habermas, Jürgen, ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (English translation, 1972). Habermas maintains that truth is what would be agreed upon in an ideal speech situation.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Habermas, Jürgen, ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (English translation, 1972), esp. PART III, pp 187 ''ff''.</ref> Among the current strong critics of consensus theory is the philosopher [[Nicholas Rescher]]. Rescher, Nicholas, ''Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus'' (1995).

====Pragmatic theory====

====Pragmatic theory====

The three most influential forms of the ''pragmatic theory of truth'' were introduced around the turn of the 20th century by [[Charles Peirce|Charles S. Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]].  Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other proponents of pragmatic theory, they hold in common that truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.5, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth", 427 (Macmillan, 1969).</ref>  

The three most influential forms of the ''pragmatic theory of truth'' were introduced around the turn of the 20th century by [[Charles Peirce|Charles S. Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]].  Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other proponents of pragmatic theory, they hold in common that truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.5, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth", 427 (Macmillan, 1969).   

[[Charles Peirce|Peirce]] defines truth as follows:  "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth."<ref>Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573.</ref>  This statement emphasizes Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he describes elsewhere as ''[[fallibilism]]'' and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper conception of truth.  Although Peirce uses words like ''concordance'' and ''correspondence'' to describe one aspect of the pragmatic [[sign relation]], he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than ''nominal'' definitions, which he accords a lower status than ''real'' definitions.

[[Charles Peirce|Peirce]] defines truth as follows:  "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth." Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573. This statement emphasizes Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he describes elsewhere as ''[[fallibilism]]'' and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper conception of truth.  Although Peirce uses words like ''concordance'' and ''correspondence'' to describe one aspect of the pragmatic [[sign relation]], he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than ''nominal'' definitions, which he accords a lower status than ''real'' definitions.

[[William James]]'s version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving."<ref name=WJP>James, William, ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism','' (1909).</ref>  By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic").   

[[William James]]'s version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving." James, William, ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism','' (1909).</ref>  By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic").   

[[John Dewey]], less broadly than James but  more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time ''if''  openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths.<ref> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Dewey, John", auth Richard J. Bernstein, p383 (Macmillan, 1969) </ref>

[[John Dewey]], less broadly than James but  more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time ''if''  openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths.<ref> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Dewey, John", auth Richard J. Bernstein, p383 (Macmillan, 1969) </ref>

*as ''deflationary'' theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of the words "true" or ''truth'',  

*as ''deflationary'' theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of the words "true" or ''truth'',  

*as ''disquotational'' theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in cases like the above example, or  

*as ''disquotational'' theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in cases like the above example, or  

*as ''minimalist'' theories of truth.<ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'' in the Introductory section of the book.</ref><ref name=EPT>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref> 

*as ''minimalist'' theories of truth.<ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'' in the Introductory section of the book. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)

Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that "[t]he predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis."<ref name=EPT/> Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. Among the theoretical concerns of these views is to explain away those special cases where it ''does'' appear that the concept of truth has peculiar and interesting properties. (See, e.g., [[Semantic paradox]]es, and below.)

Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that "[t]he predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis." Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. Among the theoretical concerns of these views is to explain away those special cases where it ''does'' appear that the concept of truth has peculiar and interesting properties. (See, e.g., [[Semantic paradox]]es, and below.)

In addition to highlighting such formal aspects of the predicate "is true", some deflationists point out that the concept enables us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences. For example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:  

In addition to highlighting such formal aspects of the predicate "is true", some deflationists point out that the concept enables us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences. For example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:  

:''Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red or he says ... etc.''

:''Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red or he says ... etc.''

But it can be expressed succinctly by saying: ''Whatever Michael says is true''.<ref>Kirkham, Theories of Truth, MIT Press, 1992.</ref>

But it can be expressed succinctly by saying: ''Whatever Michael says is true''. Kirkham, Theories of Truth, MIT Press, 1992.  

====Performative theory of truth====

====Performative theory of truth====

====Redundancy and related theories====

====Redundancy and related theories====

According to the [[redundancy theory of truth]], asserting that a statement is true is completely equivalent to asserting the statement itself.  For example, making the assertion that "&nbsp;'Snow is white' is true" is equivalent to asserting "Snow is white".  Redundancy theorists infer from this premise that truth is a redundant concept; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to anything in reality.  This theory is commonly attributed to [[Frank P. Ramsey]], who held that the use of words like ''fact'' and ''truth'' was nothing but a [[periphrasis|roundabout]] way of asserting a proposition, and that treating these words as separate problems in isolation from judgment was merely a "linguistic muddle".<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref><ref>Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990</ref>

According to the [[redundancy theory of truth]], asserting that a statement is true is completely equivalent to asserting the statement itself.  For example, making the assertion that "&nbsp;'Snow is white' is true" is equivalent to asserting "Snow is white".  Redundancy theorists infer from this premise that truth is a redundant concept; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to anything in reality.  This theory is commonly attributed to [[Frank P. Ramsey]], who held that the use of words like ''fact'' and ''truth'' was nothing but a [[periphrasis|roundabout]] way of asserting a proposition, and that treating these words as separate problems in isolation from judgment was merely a "linguistic muddle".<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996) Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990

A variant of redundancy theory is the disquotational theory which uses a modified form of [[Tarski]]'s [[Truth#Semantic theory of truth|schema]]: To say that '"P" is true' is to say that P.  Yet another version of deflationism is the [[prosentential theory of truth]], first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and [[Nuel Belnap]] as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims.  They argue that sentences like "That's true", when said in response to "It's raining", are [[prosentence]]s, expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions.  In the same way that ''it'' means the same as ''my dog'' in the sentence ''My dog was hungry, so I fed it'', ''That's true'' is supposed to mean the same as ''It's raining'' &mdash; if you say the latter and I then say the former.  These variations do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is ''not'' a property, but rather can be understood to say that, for instance, the assertion "P" may well involve a substantial truth, and the theorists in this case are minimalizing only the redundancy or prosentence involved in the statement such as "that's true."<ref name=EPT/>

A variant of redundancy theory is the disquotational theory which uses a modified form of [[Tarski]]'s [[Truth#Semantic theory of truth|schema]]: To say that '"P" is true' is to say that P.  Yet another version of deflationism is the [[prosentential theory of truth]], first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and [[Nuel Belnap]] as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims.  They argue that sentences like "That's true", when said in response to "It's raining", are [[prosentence]]s, expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions.  In the same way that ''it'' means the same as ''my dog'' in the sentence ''My dog was hungry, so I fed it'', ''That's true'' is supposed to mean the same as ''It's raining'' &mdash; if you say the latter and I then say the former.  These variations do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is ''not'' a property, but rather can be understood to say that, for instance, the assertion "P" may well involve a substantial truth, and the theorists in this case are minimalizing only the redundancy or prosentence involved in the statement such as "that's true."

Deflationary principles do not apply to representations that are not analogous to sentences, and also do not apply to many other things that are commonly judged to be true or otherwise.  Consider the analogy between the sentence "Snow is white" and the person Snow White, both of which can be true in a sense.  To a minimalist, saying "Snow is white is true" is the same as saying "Snow is white", but to say "Snow White is true" is ''not'' the same as saying "Snow White".

Deflationary principles do not apply to representations that are not analogous to sentences, and also do not apply to many other things that are commonly judged to be true or otherwise.  Consider the analogy between the sentence "Snow is white" and the person Snow White, both of which can be true in a sense.  To a minimalist, saying "Snow is white is true" is the same as saying "Snow is white", but to say "Snow White is true" is ''not'' the same as saying "Snow White".

In addition, from at least the time of [[Hilbert's program]] at the turn of the twentieth century to the proof of [[Gödel's theorem]] and the development of the [[Church-Turing thesis]] in the early part of that century, true statements in mathematics were generally assumed to be those statements which are provable in a formal axiomatic system.   

In addition, from at least the time of [[Hilbert's program]] at the turn of the twentieth century to the proof of [[Gödel's theorem]] and the development of the [[Church-Turing thesis]] in the early part of that century, true statements in mathematics were generally assumed to be those statements which are provable in a formal axiomatic system.   

The works of [[Kurt Gödel]], [[Alan Turing]], and others shook this assumption, with the development of statements that are true but cannot be proven within the system.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' Chaitin, Gregory L., ''The Limits of Mathematics'' (1997) esp. 89 ''ff''.</ref> Two examples of the latter can be found in [[Hilbert's problems]]. Work on [[Hilbert's 10th problem]] led in the late twentieth century to the construction of specific [[Diophantine equations]] for which it is undecidable whether they have a solution,<ref>M. Davis. "Hilbert's Tenth Problem is Unsolvable." ''American Mathematical Monthly'' 80, pp. 233-269, 1973</ref> or even if they do, whether they have a finite or infinite number of solutions. More fundamentally, [[Hilbert's first problem]] was on the [[continuum hypothesis]].<ref>Yandell, Benjamin H.. ''The Honors Class. Hilbert's Problems and Their Solvers'' (2002).</ref> Gödel and [[Paul Cohen (mathematician)|Paul Cohen]] showed that this hypothesis cannot be proved or disproved using the standard [[axiom]]s of [[set theory]] and a finite number of proof steps.<ref>Chaitin, Gregory L., ''The Limits of Mathematics'' (1997) 1-28, 89 ''ff''.</ref> In the view of some, then, it is equally reasonable to take either the continuum hypothesis or its negation as a new axiom.

The works of [[Kurt Gödel]], [[Alan Turing]], and others shook this assumption, with the development of statements that are true but cannot be proven within the system. ''See, e.g.,'' Chaitin, Gregory L., ''The Limits of Mathematics'' (1997) esp. 89 ''ff''. Two examples of the latter can be found in [[Hilbert's problems]]. Work on [[Hilbert's 10th problem]] led in the late twentieth century to the construction of specific [[Diophantine equations]] for which it is undecidable whether they have a solution, M. Davis. "Hilbert's Tenth Problem is Unsolvable." ''American Mathematical Monthly'' 80, pp. 233-269, 1973</ref> or even if they do, whether they have a finite or infinite number of solutions. More fundamentally, [[Hilbert's first problem]] was on the [[continuum hypothesis]]. Yandell, Benjamin H.. ''The Honors Class. Hilbert's Problems and Their Solvers'' (2002) Gödel and [[Paul Cohen (mathematician)|Paul Cohen]] showed that this hypothesis cannot be proved or disproved using the standard [[axiom]]s of [[set theory]] and a finite number of proof steps.<ref>Chaitin, Gregory L., ''The Limits of Mathematics'' (1997) 1-28, 89 ''ff''. In the view of some, then, it is equally reasonable to take either the continuum hypothesis or its negation as a new axiom.

===Semantic theory of truth===

===Semantic theory of truth===

* Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for ''The barn is big''; then for "''The barn is big'' is true"; then for "'''The barn is big'' is true' is true", and so on.  

* Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for ''The barn is big''; then for "''The barn is big'' is true"; then for "'''The barn is big'' is true' is true", and so on.  

Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like ''This sentence is false'', since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the [[Principle of bivalence]]: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.<ref>Kripke, Saul. "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 690-716</ref>

Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like ''This sentence is false'', since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the [[Principle of bivalence]]: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved. Kripke, Saul. "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 690-716

===Ancient philosophers===

===Ancient philosophers===

The ancient [[Greek language|Greek]] origins of the words "true" and "truth" have some consistent definitions throughout great spans of history that were often associated with topics of [[logic]], [[geometry]], [[mathematics]], [[deduction]], [[induction]], and [[natural philosophy]].

The ancient [[Greek language|Greek]] origins of the words "true" and "truth" have some consistent definitions throughout great spans of history that were often associated with topics of [[logic]], [[geometry]], [[mathematics]], [[deduction]], [[induction]], and [[natural philosophy]].

[[Socrates]]', [[Plato]]'s and [[Aristotle]]'s ideas about truth are commonly seen as consistent with correspondence theory.  In his ''Metaphysics'', Aristotle stated:  “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.<ref name=StanfordCorr>David, Marion (2005) "Correspondence Theory of Truth" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1]</ref> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy proceeds to say of Aristotle:

[[Socrates]]', [[Plato]]'s and [[Aristotle]]'s ideas about truth are commonly seen as consistent with correspondence theory.  In his ''Metaphysics'', Aristotle stated:  “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”. StanfordCorr David, Marion (2005) "Correspondence Theory of Truth" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1]</ref> The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy proceeds to say of Aristotle:

<blockquote>Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence theorist in the ''Categories'' (12b11, 14b14), where he talks of “underlying things” that make statements true and implies that these “things” (pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz., his sitting, his not sitting). Most influential is his claim in ''De Interpretatione'' (16a3) that thoughts are “likenessess” (homoiosis) of things. Although he nowhere defines truth in terms of a thought's likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a definition would fit well into his overall philosophy of mind.<ref name=StanfordCorr/></blockquote>

"Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence theorist in the ''Categories'' (12b11, 14b14), where he talks of “underlying things” that make statements true and implies that these “things” (pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz., his sitting, his not sitting). Most influential is his claim in ''De Interpretatione'' (16a3) that thoughts are “likenessess” (homoiosis) of things. Although he nowhere defines truth in terms of a thought's likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a definition would fit well into his overall philosophy of mind."

Very similar statements can also be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).<ref name=StanfordCorr/>

Very similar statements can also be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).

In ancient [[Indian philosophy]] and [[Buddhist philosophy]], [[Gautama Buddha]] developed the theory of the [[Four Noble Truths]], which are one of the most fundamental teachings of [[Buddhism]] and commonly appear in the earliest Buddhist texts, the ''[[Pali Canon]]''.<ref>Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000), ''The Collected Discourses of the Buddha: A new translation of the Samyutta Nikaya''.</ref>

In ancient [[Indian philosophy]] and [[Buddhist philosophy]], [[Gautama Buddha]] developed the theory of the [[Four Noble Truths]], which are one of the most fundamental teachings of [[Buddhism]] and commonly appear in the earliest Buddhist texts, the ''[[Pali Canon]]''. Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000), ''The Collected Discourses of the Buddha: A new translation of the Samyutta Nikaya''.  

===Medieval philosophers===

===Medieval philosophers===

[[Immanuel Kant]] discussed the correspondence theory of truth in the following manner. Kant's criticism of correspondence theory is one of numerous examples of why so many thinkers who examine the question of truth are not satisfied to rest with this first theory that usually comes to mind.[[Image:Kant_2.jpg|thumb|125px|right|Immanuel Kant]]

[[Immanuel Kant]] discussed the correspondence theory of truth in the following manner. Kant's criticism of correspondence theory is one of numerous examples of why so many thinkers who examine the question of truth are not satisfied to rest with this first theory that usually comes to mind.[[Image:Kant_2.jpg|thumb|125px|right|Immanuel Kant]]

<blockquote>Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object. According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it. My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth. For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object. Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients Diallelos. And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man.<ref>Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic. Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.) (2005)</ref></blockquote>

 

According to Kant, the definition of truth as correspondence is a "mere verbal definition", here making use of Aristotle's distinction between a nominal definition, a definition in name only, and a real definition, [[Definition#Essence|a definition that shows the true cause or essence of the thing whose term is being defined]]. From Kant's account of the history, the definition of truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical times, the "skeptics" criticizing the "logicians" for a form of circular reasoning, though the extent to which the "logicians" actually held such a theory is not evaluated.<ref>Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic. Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.) (2005)</ref>

"Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object. According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it. My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth. For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object. Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients Diallelos. And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man." Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic. Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.) (2005)

 

According to Kant, the definition of truth as correspondence is a "mere verbal definition", here making use of Aristotle's distinction between a nominal definition, a definition in name only, and a real definition, [[Definition#Essence|a definition that shows the true cause or essence of the thing whose term is being defined]]. From Kant's account of the history, the definition of truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical times, the "skeptics" criticizing the "logicians" for a form of circular reasoning, though the extent to which the "logicians" actually held such a theory is not evaluated. Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic. Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.) (2005)

====Kierkegaard====

====Kierkegaard====

When [[Søren Kierkegaard]], as his character ''Johannes Climacus'', wrote that ''"Truth is Subjectivity"'', he does not advocate for [[subjectivism]] in its extreme form (the theory that something is true simply because one believes it to be so), but rather that the objective approach to matters of personal truth cannot shed any light upon that which is most essential to a person's life. Objective truths are concerned with the facts of a person's being, while subjective truths are concerned with a person's way of being. Kierkegaard agrees that objective truths for the study of subjects like mathematics, science, and history are relevant and necessary, but argues that objective truths do not shed any light on a person's inner relationship to existence. At best, these truths can only provide a severely narrowed perspective that has little to do with one's actual experience of life.<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. ''Concluding Unscientific Postscript''. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992</ref>

When [[Søren Kierkegaard]], as his character ''Johannes Climacus'', wrote that ''"Truth is Subjectivity"'', he does not advocate for [[subjectivism]] in its extreme form (the theory that something is true simply because one believes it to be so), but rather that the objective approach to matters of personal truth cannot shed any light upon that which is most essential to a person's life. Objective truths are concerned with the facts of a person's being, while subjective truths are concerned with a person's way of being. Kierkegaard agrees that objective truths for the study of subjects like mathematics, science, and history are relevant and necessary, but argues that objective truths do not shed any light on a person's inner relationship to existence. At best, these truths can only provide a severely narrowed perspective that has little to do with one's actual experience of life. Kierkegaard, Søren. ''Concluding Unscientific Postscript''. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992  

While objective truths are final and static, subjective truths are continuing and dynamic. The truth of one's existence is a living, inward, and subjective experience that is always in the process of becoming. The values, morals, and spiritual approaches a person adopts, while not denying the existence of objective truths of those beliefs, can only become truly known when they have been inwardly appropriated through subjective experience. Thus, Kierkegaard criticizes all systematic philosophies which attempt to know life or the truth of existence via theories and objective knowledge about reality. As Kierkegaard claims, human truth is something that is continually occurring, and a human being cannot find truth separate from the subjective experience of one's own existing, defined by the values and fundamental essence that consist of one's way of life.<ref>Watts, Michael. ''Kierkegaard'', Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003</ref>

While objective truths are final and static, subjective truths are continuing and dynamic. The truth of one's existence is a living, inward, and subjective experience that is always in the process of becoming. The values, morals, and spiritual approaches a person adopts, while not denying the existence of objective truths of those beliefs, can only become truly known when they have been inwardly appropriated through subjective experience. Thus, Kierkegaard criticizes all systematic philosophies which attempt to know life or the truth of existence via theories and objective knowledge about reality. As Kierkegaard claims, human truth is something that is continually occurring, and a human being cannot find truth separate from the subjective experience of one's own existing, defined by the values and fundamental essence that consist of one's way of life. Watts, Michael. ''Kierkegaard'', Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003  

====Nietzsche====

====Nietzsche====

[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] believed the search for truth or 'the will to truth' was a consequence of the will to power of philosophers. He thought that truth should be used as long as it promoted life and the will to power, and he thought untruth was better than truth if it had this life enhancement as a consequence. As he wrote in ''Beyond Good and Evil'', "''The falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment... The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding...''" (aphorism 4). He proposed the will to power as a truth only because according to him it was the most life affirming and sincere perspective one could have.

[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] believed the search for truth or 'the will to truth' was a consequence of the will to power of philosophers. He thought that truth should be used as long as it promoted life and the will to power, and he thought untruth was better than truth if it had this life enhancement as a consequence. As he wrote in ''Beyond Good and Evil'', "''The falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment... The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding...''" (aphorism 4). He proposed the will to power as a truth only because according to him it was the most life affirming and sincere perspective one could have.

Robert Wicks discusses Nietzsche's basic view of truth as follows: <blockquote>Some scholars regard Nietzsche's 1873 unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" ("Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn") as a keystone in his thought. In this essay, Nietzsche rejects the idea of universal constants, and claims that what we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms." His view at this time is that arbitrariness completely prevails within human experience: concepts originate via the very artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images; "truth" is nothing more than the invention of fixed conventions for merely practical purposes, especially those of repose, security and consistence.<ref>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#2</ref></blockquote>

Robert Wicks discusses Nietzsche's basic view of truth as follows: <blockquote>Some scholars regard Nietzsche's 1873 unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" ("Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn") as a keystone in his thought. In this essay, Nietzsche rejects the idea of universal constants, and claims that what we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms." His view at this time is that arbitrariness completely prevails within human experience: concepts originate via the very artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images; "truth" is nothing more than the invention of fixed conventions for merely practical purposes, especially those of repose, security and consistence. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#2

====Gandhi====

====Gandhi====

====Nishida====

====Nishida====

According to [[Kitaro Nishida]], "[k]nowledge of things in the world begins with the differentiation of unitary consciousness into knower and known and ends with self and things becoming one again. Such unification takes form not only in knowing but in the valuing (of truth) that directs knowing, the willing that directs action, and the feeling or emotive reach that directs sensing."<ref>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Nishida Kitaro" at [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro]</ref>

According to [[Kitaro Nishida]], "[k]nowledge of things in the world begins with the differentiation of unitary consciousness into knower and known and ends with self and things becoming one again. Such unification takes form not only in knowing but in the valuing (of truth) that directs knowing, the willing that directs action, and the feeling or emotive reach that directs sensing." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Nishida Kitaro" at [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro]

====Fromm====

====Fromm====

====Foucault====

====Foucault====

Truth, for [[Michel Foucault]], is problematic when any attempt is made to see truth as an "objective" quality.  He prefers not to use the term truth itself but "Regimes of Truth".  In his historical investigations he found truth to be something that was itself a part of, or embedded within, a given power structure.  Thus Foucault's view shares much in common with the concepts of [[Truth#Nietzsche|Nietzsche]].  Truth for Foucault is also something that shifts through various [[episteme]] throughout history.<ref>Foucault, M. "The Order of Things", London: Vintage Books, 1970 (1966)</ref>

Truth, for [[Michel Foucault]], is problematic when any attempt is made to see truth as an "objective" quality.  He prefers not to use the term truth itself but "Regimes of Truth".  In his historical investigations he found truth to be something that was itself a part of, or embedded within, a given power structure.  Thus Foucault's view shares much in common with the concepts of [[Truth#Nietzsche|Nietzsche]].  Truth for Foucault is also something that shifts through various [[episteme]] throughout history. Foucault, M. "The Order of Things", London: Vintage Books, 1970 (1966)

====Baudrillard====

====Baudrillard====

[[Jean Baudrillard]] considers truth to be largely simulated, that is pretending to have something, as opposed to dissimulation, pretending to not have something.  He takes his cue from [[iconoclast]]s who he claims knew that images of God demonstrated the fact that God did not exist.<ref>Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1994.</ref> Baudrillard writes in "Precession of the Simulacra":

[[Jean Baudrillard]] considers truth to be largely simulated, that is pretending to have something, as opposed to dissimulation, pretending to not have something.  He takes his cue from [[iconoclast]]s who he claims knew that images of God demonstrated the fact that God did not exist. Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1994. Baudrillard writes in "Precession of the Simulacra":

::The [[simulacrum]] is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that there is none.  The simulacrum is true.

::The [[simulacrum]] is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that there is none.  The simulacrum is true.

::—Ecclesiastes<ref>Baudrillard, Jean: "Simulacra and Simulations", in ''Selected Writings'' ed. Mark Poster (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1988) 166 ''ff''[http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html]</ref><ref>Baudrillard's attribution of this quote to [[Ecclesiastes]] is deliberately fictional. "Baudrillard attributes this quote to Ecclesiastes.  However, the quote is a fabrication (see Jean Baudrillard.  Cool Memories III, 1991-95.  London:  Verso, 1997). Editor’s note: In Fragments: Conversations With François L’Yvonnet.  New York: Routledge, 2004:11, Baudrillard acknowledges this 'Borges-like' fabrication." Cited in footnote #4 in Smith, Richard G., "Lights, Camera, Action: Baudrillard and the Performance of Representations" International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 2, Number 1 (January 2005) [http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2_1/smith.htm#_edn4]</ref>

::—Ecclesiastes Baudrillard, Jean: "Simulacra and Simulations", in ''Selected Writings'' ed. Mark Poster (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1988) 166 ''ff''[http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html] Baudrillard's attribution of this quote to [[Ecclesiastes]] is deliberately fictional. "Baudrillard attributes this quote to Ecclesiastes.  However, the quote is a fabrication (see Jean Baudrillard.  Cool Memories III, 1991-95.  London:  Verso, 1997). Editor’s note: In Fragments: Conversations With François L’Yvonnet.  New York: Routledge, 2004:11, Baudrillard acknowledges this 'Borges-like' fabrication." Cited in footnote #4 in Smith, Richard G., "Lights, Camera, Action: Baudrillard and the Performance of Representations" International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 2, Number 1 (January 2005) [http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2_1/smith.htm#_edn4]

Some example simulacra that Baudrillard cites are: that prisons simulate the "truth" that society is free; scandals (eg, [[Watergate scandal|Watergate]]) simulate that corruption is corrected; Disney simulates that the U.S. itself is an adult place. One must remember that though such examples seem extreme, such extremity is an important part of Baudrillard's philosophy. For a less extreme example consider how movies, almost without exception, end with the bad guy being punished, thus drilling into the viewers that successful businessmen and politicians are good or, if not, will be caught.<ref>Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1994.</ref>

Some example simulacra that Baudrillard cites are: that prisons simulate the "truth" that society is free; scandals (eg, [[Watergate scandal|Watergate]]) simulate that corruption is corrected; Disney simulates that the U.S. itself is an adult place. One must remember that though such examples seem extreme, such extremity is an important part of Baudrillard's philosophy. For a less extreme example consider how movies, almost without exception, end with the bad guy being punished, thus drilling into the viewers that successful businessmen and politicians are good or, if not, will be caught. Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1994.  

==Types of truth==

==Types of truth==

===Mythology===

===Mythology===

A myth is a narrative that a particular [[culture]] believes to be both true and significant, typical involving the  [[supernatural]] or aiming to explain the nature of the universe and humanity. In the opinion of [[J. R. R. Tolkien]],  

A myth is a narrative that a particular [[culture]] believes to be both true and significant, typical involving the  [[supernatural]] or aiming to explain the nature of the universe and humanity. In the opinion of [[J. R. R. Tolkien]],  

:"Legends and myths are largely made of 'truth', and indeed present aspects of truth that can only be received in this mode."<ref>''[[The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien|Letters]]'', no. 147.</ref>

:"Legends and myths are largely made of 'truth', and indeed present aspects of truth that can only be received in this mode." ''[[The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien|Letters]]'', no. 147.

===Religious truth===

===Religious truth===

Most religious traditions have a body of doctrine that adherents of that religion view as truth.  This may take the form of a creed or catechism, it may refer to a book such as the [[Bible]] or the [[Koran]], or it may be an unwritten code shared by believers.  Unlike scientific truth or observed truth, religious truth often makes the claim of being either revealed or inspired by God.

Most religious traditions have a body of doctrine that adherents of that religion view as truth.  This may take the form of a creed or catechism, it may refer to a book such as the [[Bible]] or the [[Koran]], or it may be an unwritten code shared by believers.  Unlike scientific truth or observed truth, religious truth often makes the claim of being either revealed or inspired by God.

- When there is a clash between religious truth and scientific truth, various methods have been used to reconcile the two. During the [[Middle Ages]], for example, there was conflict between [[Roman Catholic]] dogma on the one hand and an emerging body of [[science|scientific knowledge]] on the other. Sometimes the established church sought to suppress scientific truth, as in the case of [[Galileo]], but sometimes the two truths were allowed to coexist, which led to the doctrine of the two truths. According to this compromise, there is a lesser truth, scientific truth, which holds that the earth orbits the sun, and a greater truth, religious truth, that holds that the earth is the fixed center of the universe. According to the doctrine of the two truths, these two truths were both true in their own sphere. <ref> Will Durant, ''The Reformation'', Simon and Schuster, 1957. </ref><ref>See also, [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-04 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'' Double Truth]</ref> In the [[20th Century]], there were similar attempts to explain apparent conflicts between religious truth and scientific truth, especially where the [[age of the earth]], the historicity of a universal [[flood]], and the [[evolution]] of species were concerned. The conflict between religious truth and scientific truth continues.

- When there is a clash between religious truth and scientific truth, various methods have been used to reconcile the two. During the [[Middle Ages]], for example, there was conflict between [[Roman Catholic]] dogma on the one hand and an emerging body of [[science|scientific knowledge]] on the other. Sometimes the established church sought to suppress scientific truth, as in the case of [[Galileo]], but sometimes the two truths were allowed to coexist, which led to the doctrine of the two truths. According to this compromise, there is a lesser truth, scientific truth, which holds that the earth orbits the sun, and a greater truth, religious truth, that holds that the earth is the fixed center of the universe. According to the doctrine of the two truths, these two truths were both true in their own sphere. Will Durant, ''The Reformation'', Simon and Schuster, 1957. See also, [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-04 ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas'' Double Truth]</ref> In the [[20th Century]], there were similar attempts to explain apparent conflicts between religious truth and scientific truth, especially where the [[age of the earth]], the historicity of a universal [[flood]], and the [[evolution]] of species were concerned. The conflict between religious truth and scientific truth continues.

==References==

==References==

==External links==

==External links==

* [http://www.galilean-library.org/int10.html An Introduction to Truth] by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.

* [http://www.galilean-library.org/int10.html An Introduction to Truth] by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.

*[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]:

*[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]: