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What is Narrative? Ricoeur, Bakhtin, and Process Approaches

'''What is Narrative?: Ricoeur, Bakhtin, and Process Approaches''', by Jenny Rankin

 

Jenny Rankin

Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry, Swinburne University,

Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry, Swinburne University,

P.O. Box 218, Hawthorn, Vic., 3122 Australia

P.O. Box 218, Hawthorn, Vic., 3122 Australia

Abstract— Centuries of indifference to narrative have, according to some insightful writers, culminated in a breakdown or crisis in narrative, characterised by a reduced significance of literary works and by a fragmented temporal organisation of people’s lives.  Yet in the twentieth century new academic interest in narrative emerged, particularly through the works of Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Mikhail Bakhtin.  Building on their works we may now posit narrative as a triad of the narrative work or artefact, the narrative mode of consciousness, and the relation between these two, characterised as communication.  This re-conceptualisation reveals the ongoing, unfolding, temporal, and creative, or in other words, the processual nature of narrative.  It also allows us to see that narrative is fundamental to other human processes, such as those of dialogue, intentionality, consciousness, knowledge, culture, community, reality construction, and, ultimately, personal identity.  Narrative can now be regarded as primordial to all human affairs and the source of what MacIntyre terms ‘the unity of a life.’

Centuries of indifference to narrative have, according to some insightful writers, culminated in a breakdown or crisis in narrative, characterised by a reduced significance of literary works and by a fragmented temporal organisation of people’s lives.  Yet in the twentieth century new academic interest in narrative emerged, particularly through the works of Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Mikhail Bakhtin.  Building on their works we may now posit narrative as a triad of the narrative work or artefact, the narrative mode of consciousness, and the relation between these two, characterised as communication.  This re-conceptualisation reveals the ongoing, unfolding, temporal, and creative, or in other words, the processual nature of narrative.  It also allows us to see that narrative is fundamental to other human processes, such as those of dialogue, intentionality, consciousness, knowledge, culture, community, reality construction, and, ultimately, personal identity.  Narrative can now be regarded as primordial to all human affairs and the source of what MacIntyre terms ‘the unity of a life.’

Keywords— Narrative, consciousness, communication, Ricoeur, MacIntyre, Bakhtin, process

Narrative, consciousness, communication, Ricoeur, MacIntyre, Bakhtin, process

Over the last few centuries narrative has been slowly emerging from the mists of philosophical denigration and neglect to reveal itself as a process primordial to human affairs.  Narrative is gradually coming to be comprehended as the ground in which, the relations through which and the vehicle by which humans develop knowledge of themselves and the world they inhabit.  It can now be seen that human agency, intentionality, actions, perceptions, and experiences are conceived, understood and mediated by cultural and personal narratives, and that the struggle for recognition is played out between humans in the narrative field.  Through a process of ongoing creation and recreation, a continual dialectical movement between memory and anticipation, and the relations between humans that it facilitates, narrative brings forth the human processes of knowledge, culture, tradition, truth, reality, consciousness and identity.  

Over the last few centuries narrative has been slowly emerging from the mists of philosophical denigration and neglect to reveal itself as a process primordial to human affairs.  Narrative is gradually coming to be comprehended as the ground in which, the relations through which and the vehicle by which humans develop knowledge of themselves and the world they inhabit.  It can now be seen that human agency, intentionality, actions, perceptions, and experiences are conceived, understood and mediated by cultural and personal narratives, and that the struggle for recognition is played out between humans in the narrative field.  Through a process of ongoing creation and recreation, a continual dialectical movement between memory and anticipation, and the relations between humans that it facilitates, narrative brings forth the human processes of knowledge, culture, tradition, truth, reality, consciousness and identity.  

To illustrate the processual nature of narrative I would like at this point to propose a three-way approach to the question: What is a narrative?  The first is to consider narrative as a cultural artefact, a work or text or product that can take many forms but which has the ultimate purpose of telling or unfolding a story.  The second approach is to consider narrative as the fundamental mode of human consciousness and self-consciousness.  The third approach is to consider the relation between narrative as product and narrative as mode of consciousness.  This relation may be characterised as communicative, and as such is the ultimate purpose of language and narrative.  Each of these three aspects of narrative is dependent on the other; no one of them could exist without the other two, yet of the three, narrative relation is the most important.  From this relation it can be posited that narrative is an ongoing temporal process from which can emerge other processes, of dialogue, intentionality, consciousness of the world and of other, conceptions of temporality beyond that of lived experience, and ultimately personal identity.

To illustrate the processual nature of narrative I would like at this point to propose a three-way approach to the question: What is a narrative?  The first is to consider narrative as a cultural artefact, a work or text or product that can take many forms but which has the ultimate purpose of telling or unfolding a story.  The second approach is to consider narrative as the fundamental mode of human consciousness and self-consciousness.  The third approach is to consider the relation between narrative as product and narrative as mode of consciousness.  This relation may be characterised as communicative, and as such is the ultimate purpose of language and narrative.  Each of these three aspects of narrative is dependent on the other; no one of them could exist without the other two, yet of the three, narrative relation is the most important.  From this relation it can be posited that narrative is an ongoing temporal process from which can emerge other processes, of dialogue, intentionality, consciousness of the world and of other, conceptions of temporality beyond that of lived experience, and ultimately personal identity.

I. NARRATIVE AS STORY OR PRODUCT  

===I.NARRATIVE AS STORY OR PRODUCT===

Generally and perhaps intuitively we know what narrative is: A story – factual, fictitious, or somewhere between the two – that is usually told verbally or in writing, but may be expressed in other symbolic systems, such as those of art, of sign language, or of gesture.  We may conceptualise a narrative work as any form of telling, where a telling involves a teller or narrator, an audience, and a subject.  The subject concerns the arrangement of elements – actions, events, characters, experiences, and situations – into an unfolding temporal configuration that makes sense of or gives meaning to these elements.  This unfolding is a temporal ordering but is not necessarily represented in the strict chronological order in which the events actions or experiences actually occurred.  As Patrick O’Neill (1996) comments, narrative is a “…purely discursive system of presentation…[and in this sense all narrative]…is in principle fictional to begin with.” (p. 15).  A story is defined, almost unanimously, as a synthesising of heterogeneous elements; a synthesis in which a beginning, middle, and end are construed, where each element and each stage contribute to the whole, and where each are resolved to produce ‘closure.’  To this extent, it might be argued, all telling has some degree of the fictional about it, since it brings together parts (events, characters, actions, situations or circumstances) that seem otherwise unrelated, into a comprehensible unity or whole that did not have prior existence.  To the extent that scientific explanations, histories, or critiques are syntheses of unrelated parts they all stories and all contain a degree of the fictional.

Generally and perhaps intuitively we know what narrative is: A story – factual, fictitious, or somewhere between the two – that is usually told verbally or in writing, but may be expressed in other symbolic systems, such as those of art, of sign language, or of gesture.  We may conceptualise a narrative work as any form of telling, where a telling involves a teller or narrator, an audience, and a subject.  The subject concerns the arrangement of elements – actions, events, characters, experiences, and situations – into an unfolding temporal configuration that makes sense of or gives meaning to these elements.  This unfolding is a temporal ordering but is not necessarily represented in the strict chronological order in which the events actions or experiences actually occurred.  As Patrick O’Neill (1996) comments, narrative is a “…purely discursive system of presentation…[and in this sense all narrative]…is in principle fictional to begin with.” (p. 15).  A story is defined, almost unanimously, as a synthesising of heterogeneous elements; a synthesis in which a beginning, middle, and end are construed, where each element and each stage contribute to the whole, and where each are resolved to produce ‘closure.’  To this extent, it might be argued, all telling has some degree of the fictional about it, since it brings together parts (events, characters, actions, situations or circumstances) that seem otherwise unrelated, into a comprehensible unity or whole that did not have prior existence.  To the extent that scientific explanations, histories, or critiques are syntheses of unrelated parts they all stories and all contain a degree of the fictional.

Most theorists, including Paul Ricoeur and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, treat the words ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ as synonymous.  Thomas Leitch (1986), however, makes a distinction between story and narrative, referring to the closure, the framework or structure of story as its ‘promise.’  A story, he suggests, may be judged good or poor according to how well it fulfils its promise.  For Leitch story is but one form of narrative – he intimates that some narratives no longer constitute story when removed from their original context, that some narratives are potential stories waiting to be fleshed out, and that some are never stories because they remain open-ended.  Thus we might see the project of science, for example, or social formations, as ongoing or open-ended narratives, constituted by stories but not stories in themselves.  Leitch’s ideas seem to be analogous to those of Bakhtin, who talks of ‘utterance’ or ‘text’ to cover all those things Leitch would call narrative.

Most theorists, including Paul Ricoeur and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, treat the words ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ as synonymous.  Thomas Leitch (1986), however, makes a distinction between story and narrative, referring to the closure, the framework or structure of story as its ‘promise.’  A story, he suggests, may be judged good or poor according to how well it fulfils its promise.  For Leitch story is but one form of narrative – he intimates that some narratives no longer constitute story when removed from their original context, that some narratives are potential stories waiting to be fleshed out, and that some are never stories because they remain open-ended.  Thus we might see the project of science, for example, or social formations, as ongoing or open-ended narratives, constituted by stories but not stories in themselves.  Leitch’s ideas seem to be analogous to those of Bakhtin, who talks of ‘utterance’ or ‘text’ to cover all those things Leitch would call narrative.

However, this distinction between story and narrative is not as clear as Leitch would have us believe.  It often occurs that an element of one story – a  statement, an exclamation, an expletive, a gesture – is taken out of its original context, but this is not to say that it is now context-less.  On the contrary, we might contend that the element takes on a new significance as it becomes an element in another telling, a different story.  David Carr (1991), drawing on the work of Husserl, argues that there is nothing presented to human consciousness that does not already have a structure similar to that of narrative.  Every event, action, or experience, at least, is perceived as having a beginning, a middle and an end, and to unfold over time.  They are not received as potential stories but as stories in and of themselves.  Moreover, each event, action, or experience is composed of a series of smaller constituent events, actions or experiences, and in turn is part of a larger series of events, actions, or experiences.  This accords with Rimmon-Kenan’s idea that “…any single event may be decomposed into a series of mini events and intermediary states…[and] a vast number of events may be subsumed under a single event-title.” (1989, p. 15).

However, this distinction between story and narrative is not as clear as Leitch would have us believe.  It often occurs that an element of one story – a  statement, an exclamation, an expletive, a gesture – is taken out of its original context, but this is not to say that it is now context-less.  On the contrary, we might contend that the element takes on a new significance as it becomes an element in another telling, a different story.  David Carr (1991), drawing on the work of Husserl, argues that there is nothing presented to human consciousness that does not already have a structure similar to that of narrative.  Every event, action, or experience, at least, is perceived as having a beginning, a middle and an end, and to unfold over time.  They are not received as potential stories but as stories in and of themselves.  Moreover, each event, action, or experience is composed of a series of smaller constituent events, actions or experiences, and in turn is part of a larger series of events, actions, or experiences.  This accords with Rimmon-Kenan’s idea that “…any single event may be decomposed into a series of mini events and intermediary states…[and] a vast number of events may be subsumed under a single event-title.” (1989, p. 15).

In this sense of narrative we see that it is ubiquitous, limitless, and applicable to everything that humans encounter.  As Barthes (1987) states:

In this sense of narrative we see that it is ubiquitous, limitless, and applicable to everything that humans encounter.  As Barthes (1987) states:

“The narratives of the world are numberless.  Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances – as though any material were fit to receive man’s stories.  Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting…stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news items, conversation.  …[N]arrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative.  Narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself.” (p. 79).   

“The narratives of the world are numberless.  Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances – as though any material were fit to receive man’s stories.  Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting…stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news items, conversation.  …[N]arrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative.  Narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself.” (p. 79).   

Structuralism aside, there remains dissension among literary theorists regarding what constitutes narrative – whether it is the body of literary works that are the stuff of literary studies, or individual examples from this body; the recounting of events that fit into a particular form or structure, or a diversity of such structures; whether significance and meaning are to be found inherent in the work, or in active engagement with the work, or whether the work is itself a product of a meaning-making process.

Structuralism aside, there remains dissension among literary theorists regarding what constitutes narrative – whether it is the body of literary works that are the stuff of literary studies, or individual examples from this body; the recounting of events that fit into a particular form or structure, or a diversity of such structures; whether significance and meaning are to be found inherent in the work, or in active engagement with the work, or whether the work is itself a product of a meaning-making process.

Yet such questions tend to mask the narrative composition of literary theory’s own critiques.  They obscure the notion that a story is only a story in its telling – that it unfolds over time.  Their methods of analysis exclude the underlying importance of the narrative mode of human thought, conceptions, and activity – to human self-consciousness and consciousness of existence itself.  And since literary theory “…is careful to maintain the distinction between the inside of the text and its outside.” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 26) it evades the function and intention of narrative, to communicate meaning and possibilities.

Yet such questions tend to mask the narrative composition of literary theory’s own critiques.  They obscure the notion that a story is only a story in its telling – that it unfolds over time.  Their methods of analysis exclude the underlying importance of the narrative mode of human thought, conceptions, and activity – to human self-consciousness and consciousness of existence itself.  And since literary theory “…is careful to maintain the distinction between the inside of the text and its outside.” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 26) it evades the function and intention of narrative, to communicate meaning and possibilities.

II. NARRATIVE AS MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

===II.NARRATIVE AS MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS===

Despite the appropriation of the term ‘narrative’ by literary theorists to describe novelistic story, we must here consider narrative as a broader realm, one in which, as Barbara Hardy suggests, “…we dream…daydream… remember, anticipate, hope despair, believe, doubt, plan revise, criticise, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative…” (cited in MacIntyre, 1984, p. 211).  Although it is presupposed in the previous section, we hear or read very little of narrative as our mode of consciousness and perception of the world.  While this is not the place for a full dissertation on the nature of consciousness and perception a few points of view will clarify what is meant by ‘narrative mode of consciousness.’  In this role we might argue that narrative both shapes and informs our knowledge – of ourselves as temporal and social beings, and of the world – and is this knowledge.

Despite the appropriation of the term ‘narrative’ by literary theorists to describe novelistic story, we must here consider narrative as a broader realm, one in which, as Barbara Hardy suggests, “…we dream…daydream… remember, anticipate, hope despair, believe, doubt, plan revise, criticise, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative…” (cited in MacIntyre, 1984, p. 211).  Although it is presupposed in the previous section, we hear or read very little of narrative as our mode of consciousness and perception of the world.  While this is not the place for a full dissertation on the nature of consciousness and perception a few points of view will clarify what is meant by ‘narrative mode of consciousness.’  In this role we might argue that narrative both shapes and informs our knowledge – of ourselves as temporal and social beings, and of the world – and is this knowledge.

   

   

Perhaps, as the phenomenologists Husserl and Merleau-Ponty argue, perception is already a means of interpreting the world we encounter and is therefore always already narrative.  And if, as Ricoeur suggests we are receiving the world semantically, then we are already ordering the world in our very perception of it.  Symbolic, linguistic, or semantic understanding already suggests an understanding that relates elements together, that unfolds over time, and that has already been told and received – that has, in short, a narrative structure and a history.  Carr proposes that humans are intimately and inevitably connected to their historical past.  This past gives definition to our everyday lives as the ground of our present-as-experienced, and for conceptions of the world and conceptions of self and others.  It is a ‘pre-thematic background awareness’ which ‘pre-figures’ cognition.  History “…serves as the horizon and background for our everyday experience.” (Carr, p. 4).  And while the narrative nature of history has been disputed, Carr is suggesting that history follows the same structures as narrative – of identifying beginnings, middles and ends, of turning a chronological succession into a configured sequence.

Perhaps, as the phenomenologists Husserl and Merleau-Ponty argue, perception is already a means of interpreting the world we encounter and is therefore always already narrative.  And if, as Ricoeur suggests we are receiving the world semantically, then we are already ordering the world in our very perception of it.  Symbolic, linguistic, or semantic understanding already suggests an understanding that relates elements together, that unfolds over time, and that has already been told and received – that has, in short, a narrative structure and a history.  Carr proposes that humans are intimately and inevitably connected to their historical past.  This past gives definition to our everyday lives as the ground of our present-as-experienced, and for conceptions of the world and conceptions of self and others.  It is a ‘pre-thematic background awareness’ which ‘pre-figures’ cognition.  History “…serves as the horizon and background for our everyday experience.” (Carr, p. 4).  And while the narrative nature of history has been disputed, Carr is suggesting that history follows the same structures as narrative – of identifying beginnings, middles and ends, of turning a chronological succession into a configured sequence.

Bakhtin applies himself to the signs, symbols, and words of human consciousness, and finds that no words and no symbols are neutral.  “No natural phenomena has ‘meaning,’ only signs (including words) have meaning. ” (1986, p. 113).  He finds that signs, symbols and words are given their sense and meaning through dialogical processes:

Bakhtin applies himself to the signs, symbols, and words of human consciousness, and finds that no words and no symbols are neutral.  “No natural phenomena has ‘meaning,’ only signs (including words) have meaning. ” (1986, p. 113).  He finds that signs, symbols and words are given their sense and meaning through dialogical processes:

  “The word (or in general any sign) is interindividual.  Everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the ‘soul’ of the speaker and does not belong to him.  The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker.  The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word before the author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there are no words that belong to no one).  The word is a drama in which three characters participate…” (1986, pp. 121-2).

“The word (or in general any sign) is interindividual.  Everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the ‘soul’ of the speaker and does not belong to him.  The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker.  The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word before the author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there are no words that belong to no one).  The word is a drama in which three characters participate…” (1986, pp. 121-2).

The signs, symbols, rules, and norms of our experience are already mediated by the narratives through which we have come to know them – we already have a historical and narrative knowledge of them.  Thus if the world is already and always received semantically, the need to transform this understanding into narrative begins to look superfluous.

The signs, symbols, rules, and norms of our experience are already mediated by the narratives through which we have come to know them – we already have a historical and narrative knowledge of them.  Thus if the world is already and always received semantically, the need to transform this understanding into narrative begins to look superfluous.

Yet even accepting the notion of narrative as the fundamental mode of consciousness does not explain how consciousnesses communicate with each other, how ideas and thoughts are generated and transmitted.  To suspend the analysis of narrative here is to invite ideas of a narcissistic and egoistic self, of fragmentation of identity since it is not connected to the moderating influence of others, and of the individualism that seems to predominate advanced capitalistic societies today.  The narrative consciousness itself is not concerned with morality and ethics, with the struggle for recognition, both of self and for other, until it connects with other such consciousnesses.  Thus, a simple acceptance of narrative as thus far explicated masks the idea that self-consciousness can only arise from connection with others, that identity is constituted through the reflections we see of ourselves in others.  

Yet even accepting the notion of narrative as the fundamental mode of consciousness does not explain how consciousnesses communicate with each other, how ideas and thoughts are generated and transmitted.  To suspend the analysis of narrative here is to invite ideas of a narcissistic and egoistic self, of fragmentation of identity since it is not connected to the moderating influence of others, and of the individualism that seems to predominate advanced capitalistic societies today.  The narrative consciousness itself is not concerned with morality and ethics, with the struggle for recognition, both of self and for other, until it connects with other such consciousnesses.  Thus, a simple acceptance of narrative as thus far explicated masks the idea that self-consciousness can only arise from connection with others, that identity is constituted through the reflections we see of ourselves in others.  

III. NARRATIVE AS COMMUNICATION

===III.NARRATIVE AS COMMUNICATION===

Thus the third and most important aspect proposed for consideration is the relation between narrative as work or product and narrative as mode of consciousness. The relation is multifaceted, forging links and relations between the author, the work and the audience; between individual audience members; and between various authors, various works and various audiences.  As Bakhtin suggests of any relations – any study of the ordering of parts into a whole, or any architectonics – the relations between the narrative work and narrative consciousnesses are “…never static , but always in the process of being made or unmade.” (Holquist, 1991, p. 29).  These relations, as suggested earlier, may be characterised as communication, the essence of which, as with any act, is conscious or unconscious intentionality.  We are agents in the narratives we produce, interact with and use to communicate.

Thus the third and most important aspect proposed for consideration is the relation between narrative as work or product and narrative as mode of consciousness. The relation is multifaceted, forging links and relations between the author, the work and the audience; between individual audience members; and between various authors, various works and various audiences.  As Bakhtin suggests of any relations – any study of the ordering of parts into a whole, or any architectonics – the relations between the narrative work and narrative consciousnesses are “…never static , but always in the process of being made or unmade.” (Holquist, 1991, p. 29).  These relations, as suggested earlier, may be characterised as communication, the essence of which, as with any act, is conscious or unconscious intentionality.  We are agents in the narratives we produce, interact with and use to communicate.

“I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with the help of another.  The most important acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by a relationship toward another consciousness (toward a thou)…  The very being of man (both external and internal) is the deepest communication.  To be means to communicate…  To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself.  A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary: looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another…  I cannot manage without another, I cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in another by finding another in myself (in mutual reflection and mutual acceptance).” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 287, cited in Danow, 1991, p. 59).

“I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with the help of another.  The most important acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by a relationship toward another consciousness (toward a thou)…  The very being of man (both external and internal) is the deepest communication.  To be means to communicate…  To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself.  A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary: looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another…  I cannot manage without another, I cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in another by finding another in myself (in mutual reflection and mutual acceptance).” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 287, cited in Danow, 1991, p. 59).

IV. CONCLUSION

===IV.CONCLUSION===

In this essay it has been suggested that narrative can be defined as a Bakhtinian triad, of the narrative work or product, of the narrative mode of consciousness, and of the relation between these two, characterised as communication.  Yet still there is a need to clarify what the word ‘narrative’ refers to.  Is it a narrative work, a narrative mode of consciousness, or a narrative communication?  It is not one but all of these.  It is a synthesis of all three, and is thus an activity and a temporal process.  This process entails the absorbing, synthesising, producing, reproducing and transforming of a narrative work by a narrative consciousness, and the transfiguring of a narrative consciousness by a narrative work, where the purpose and the end is communication between consciousnesses.  Narrative as such is an ongoing, emergent and creative process.  And since narrative is a process it is a temporal phenomenon.  It is the vehicle, the means of communication and it is the communication, as it unfolds over time, between narrative consciousnesses.  

In this essay it has been suggested that narrative can be defined as a Bakhtinian triad, of the narrative work or product, of the narrative mode of consciousness, and of the relation between these two, characterised as communication.  Yet still there is a need to clarify what the word ‘narrative’ refers to.  Is it a narrative work, a narrative mode of consciousness, or a narrative communication?  It is not one but all of these.  It is a synthesis of all three, and is thus an activity and a temporal process.  This process entails the absorbing, synthesising, producing, reproducing and transforming of a narrative work by a narrative consciousness, and the transfiguring of a narrative consciousness by a narrative work, where the purpose and the end is communication between consciousnesses.  Narrative as such is an ongoing, emergent and creative process.  And since narrative is a process it is a temporal phenomenon.  It is the vehicle, the means of communication and it is the communication, as it unfolds over time, between narrative consciousnesses.  

It has also been suggested that identity emerges from this process of narrative, from the intimate communication with other that narrative makes possible.  Identity is a phenomenon of temporality – we have a sense of our own endurance, of an endurance of ourselves as a constant yet changing entity.  Yet this sense can only be comprehended through narrative communication and can only be expressed in narrative.  Without narrative product, narrative consciousness or narrative communication there would be no such comprehension.  It was thus found that Ricoeur’s ideas of mimesis1, or non-narrative prefiguration, of narrative identity, as the combination of self-constancy and the appropriation of stories, and of the authorship of a life are somewhat less than adequate.  Mimesis1 does not account for the narrative structure of perception suggested by phenomenology, and therefore makes the transformation from perception to meaning-making seem magical and fictional.  His idea of narrative identity require further development, since it does not account sufficiently for the role of the dialogic relation between consciousnesses.  And the question of the authorship of a life is better dealt with by MacIntyre and Bakhtin that by Ricoeur.  While Ricoeur has thrown open the doors to the debate about the importance of narrative to human existence, supplying a basis from which further investigations may be launched, his work requires revising, amending and supplementing.  Bakhtin, Carr, MacIntyre and the phenomenologists all make significant and substantial contributions to this ongoing dialectical debate.

It has also been suggested that identity emerges from this process of narrative, from the intimate communication with other that narrative makes possible.  Identity is a phenomenon of temporality – we have a sense of our own endurance, of an endurance of ourselves as a constant yet changing entity.  Yet this sense can only be comprehended through narrative communication and can only be expressed in narrative.  Without narrative product, narrative consciousness or narrative communication there would be no such comprehension.  It was thus found that Ricoeur’s ideas of mimesis1, or non-narrative prefiguration, of narrative identity, as the combination of self-constancy and the appropriation of stories, and of the authorship of a life are somewhat less than adequate.  Mimesis1 does not account for the narrative structure of perception suggested by phenomenology, and therefore makes the transformation from perception to meaning-making seem magical and fictional.  His idea of narrative identity require further development, since it does not account sufficiently for the role of the dialogic relation between consciousnesses.  And the question of the authorship of a life is better dealt with by MacIntyre and Bakhtin that by Ricoeur.  While Ricoeur has thrown open the doors to the debate about the importance of narrative to human existence, supplying a basis from which further investigations may be launched, his work requires revising, amending and supplementing.  Bakhtin, Carr, MacIntyre and the phenomenologists all make significant and substantial contributions to this ongoing dialectical debate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

==ACKNOWLEDGEMENT==

Dr. Arran Gare has my heartfelt gratitude for patiently guiding and supervising my study.  His approach made the writing of this paper possible.

Dr. Arran Gare has my heartfelt gratitude for patiently guiding and supervising my study.  His approach made the writing of this paper possible.

REFERENCES

==REFERENCES==

Bakhtin, MM,  “The problem of the text in linguistics, philology, and the human sciences:  An experiment in philosophical analysis.”  Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,  trans. Vern W McGee, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.  

Bakhtin, MM,  “The problem of the text in linguistics, philology, and the human sciences:  An experiment in philosophical analysis.”  Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,  trans. Vern W McGee, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.  

Rimmon-Kenan, S.  Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics.  London: Routledge, 1989.

Rimmon-Kenan, S.  Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics.  London: Routledge, 1989.

Winterson, J, recording of autobiography broadcast on ABC RN,  7th and 8th March 2002.

Winterson, J, recording of autobiography broadcast on ABC RN,  7th and 8th March 2002.