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==Origin==
 
==Origin==
 
Late Latin commensuratus, from [[Latin]] com- + Late Latin mensuratus, past participle of mensurare to [[measure]], from Latin mensura  
 
Late Latin commensuratus, from [[Latin]] com- + Late Latin mensuratus, past participle of mensurare to [[measure]], from Latin mensura  
*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17th_century 1641]
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*[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17th_century 1641]
 
==Definitions==
 
==Definitions==
 
*1: [[equal]] in [[measure]] or extent : coextensive <lived a life commensurate with the early years of the [[republic]]>
 
*1: [[equal]] in [[measure]] or extent : coextensive <lived a life commensurate with the early years of the [[republic]]>
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Philosophers argue over the precise nature of value incommensurability, and discussions do not always exhibit a [[consistent]] terminology. It is frequently said that two values are incommensurable if and only if, when compared, neither is better than the other nor are they equally valuable. This result does not follow from the strict definition of incommensurability ([[absence]] of a common [[standard]] of measurement). Thus some prefer to use "incommensurable" when describing pairs that lack a common [[measure]] and to use the word "incomparable" more specifically when describing incommensurable pairs containing members neither of which is better than or [[equal]] to the other.
 
Philosophers argue over the precise nature of value incommensurability, and discussions do not always exhibit a [[consistent]] terminology. It is frequently said that two values are incommensurable if and only if, when compared, neither is better than the other nor are they equally valuable. This result does not follow from the strict definition of incommensurability ([[absence]] of a common [[standard]] of measurement). Thus some prefer to use "incommensurable" when describing pairs that lack a common [[measure]] and to use the word "incomparable" more specifically when describing incommensurable pairs containing members neither of which is better than or [[equal]] to the other.
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Philosophical [[reflection]] about [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason] typically aims for a description of the [[principles]] relevant in answering the question, "What is to be done in this or that [[circumstance]]?" On one popular [[view]], answers to this question can be found by comparing the [[relative]] [[strengths]] of the various [[values]] or [[norms]] in play in some given [[situation]]. For example, if one is trying to [[decide]] on some nice afternoon whether they should stay in to do [[work]] or go for a walk, on this view of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason] they will [[compare]] the merits of these two [[options]]. If going for a walk is the better or more reasonable [[course]] of [[action]], they should put aside my [[books]] and go for a stroll. The topic of incommensurability--and the topic of incomparability in particular--is especially important to those who [[advocate]] this view of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason]. For if one's [[options]] in certain circumstances are of incomparable [[value]], he or she cannot settle the question of what to do by choosing the better option. When the [[competing]] options are incomparable, then by definition neither is better than the other.
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Philosophical [[reflection]] about [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason] typically aims for a description of the [[principles]] relevant in answering the question, "What is to be done in this or that [[circumstance]]?" On one popular [[view]], answers to this question can be found by comparing the [[relative]] [[strengths]] of the various [[values]] or [[norms]] in play in some given [[situation]]. For example, if one is trying to [[decide]] on some nice afternoon whether they should stay in to do [[work]] or go for a walk, on this view of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason] they will [[compare]] the merits of these two [[options]]. If going for a walk is the better or more reasonable [[course]] of [[action]], they should put aside my [[books]] and go for a stroll. The topic of incommensurability--and the topic of incomparability in particular--is especially important to those who [[advocate]] this view of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason practical reason]. For if one's [[options]] in certain circumstances are of incomparable [[value]], he or she cannot settle the question of what to do by choosing the better option. When the [[competing]] options are incomparable, then by definition neither is better than the other.
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In recent decades, incommensurability has figured prominently in recent [[philosophical]] [[debates]] over the possibility of [[moral]] [[dilemmas]] and the [[plausibility]] of certain forms of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism consequentialism] in [[ethics]]. The incommensurability of various [[types]] of moral [[reason]] is often seen as [[explaining]] how moral [[dilemmas]] and other ethical [[conflicts]] might be possible. Incommensurability also presents a [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prima_facie prima facie] [[challenge]] to ethical [[theories]] that contend that the right thing to do is the [[action]] that promotes the most overall [[good]]; if [[value]] incommensurability is widespread enough to make most [[values]] incommensurable with one another, then it seems that the utilitarian calculus is not even [[theoretically]] possible.
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In recent decades, incommensurability has figured prominently in recent [[philosophical]] [[debates]] over the possibility of [[moral]] [[dilemmas]] and the [[plausibility]] of certain forms of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism consequentialism] in [[ethics]]. The incommensurability of various [[types]] of moral [[reason]] is often seen as [[explaining]] how moral [[dilemmas]] and other ethical [[conflicts]] might be possible. Incommensurability also presents a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prima_facie prima facie] [[challenge]] to ethical [[theories]] that contend that the right thing to do is the [[action]] that promotes the most overall [[good]]; if [[value]] incommensurability is widespread enough to make most [[values]] incommensurable with one another, then it seems that the utilitarian calculus is not even [[theoretically]] possible.
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The [[topic]] of incommensurability has also frequently arisen in [[discussions]] of the version of [[natural law]] [[theory]] associated with [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Finnis John Finnis] and others.
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The [[topic]] of incommensurability has also frequently arisen in [[discussions]] of the version of [[natural law]] [[theory]] associated with [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Finnis John Finnis] and others.
 
==See also==
 
==See also==
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commensurability_(philosophy_of_science) Commensurability] (philosophy of science)
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* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commensurability_(philosophy_of_science) Commensurability] (philosophy of science)
 
==References==
 
==References==
 
* Chang, Ruth (editor). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.
 
* Chang, Ruth (editor). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.

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