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[[Judaism|Jewish]] [[Jewish philosophy|philosophy]] stresses that free will is a product of the intrinsic human soul, using the word ''neshama'' (from the [[Hebrew language|Hebrew root]] ''n.sh.m.'' or .נ.ש.מ meaning "breath"), but the ability to make a free choice is through ''Yechida'' (from Hebrew word "yachid", יחיד, singular), the part of the soul which is united with God, the only being that is not hindered by or dependent on cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does not belong to the realm of the physical reality, and inability of natural philosophy to account for it is expected).  In [[Islam]] the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's ''jabr'', or divine commanding power.  [[Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari|al-Ash'ari]] developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine ''jabr'' were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant [[Ash'ari]] position.<ref>Watt, Montgomery.  Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam. Luzac & Co.: London 1948; Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of Kalam, Harvard University Press 1976 and [http://umcc.ais.org/~maftab/ip/pdf/bktxt/kalam.pdf]{{Dead link|date=June 2008}}</ref>  In [[Shia]] Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward [[predestination]] is challenged by most theologists<ref>[http://www.al-islam.org/mananddestiny/3.htm Man and His Destiny]</ref> .  Free will, according to Shia Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life.  All actions taken by man's free will are said to be counted on the [[Day of Judgement]] because they are his/her own and not God's.

[[Judaism|Jewish]] [[Jewish philosophy|philosophy]] stresses that free will is a product of the intrinsic human soul, using the word ''neshama'' (from the [[Hebrew language|Hebrew root]] ''n.sh.m.'' or .נ.ש.מ meaning "breath"), but the ability to make a free choice is through ''Yechida'' (from Hebrew word "yachid", יחיד, singular), the part of the soul which is united with God, the only being that is not hindered by or dependent on cause and effect (thus, freedom of will does not belong to the realm of the physical reality, and inability of natural philosophy to account for it is expected).  In [[Islam]] the theological issue is not usually how to reconcile free will with God's foreknowledge, but with God's ''jabr'', or divine commanding power.  [[Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari|al-Ash'ari]] developed an "acquisition" or "dual-agency" form of compatibilism, in which human free will and divine ''jabr'' were both asserted, and which became a cornerstone of the dominant [[Ash'ari]] position.<ref>Watt, Montgomery.  Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam. Luzac & Co.: London 1948; Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of Kalam, Harvard University Press 1976 and [http://umcc.ais.org/~maftab/ip/pdf/bktxt/kalam.pdf]{{Dead link|date=June 2008}}</ref>  In [[Shia]] Islam, Ash'aris understanding of a higher balance toward [[predestination]] is challenged by most theologists<ref>[http://www.al-islam.org/mananddestiny/3.htm Man and His Destiny]</ref> .  Free will, according to Shia Islamic doctrine is the main factor for man's accountability in his/her actions throughout life.  All actions taken by man's free will are said to be counted on the [[Day of Judgement]] because they are his/her own and not God's.

The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent.<ref>Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212.</ref>

The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212.

 

== References ==

== References ==

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