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# Does free will exist?
# Does free will exist?
[[Determinism]] is roughly defined as the view that all current and future events are necessitated by past events combined with the laws of nature. According to McKenna (2004), neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the debate about free will.<ref name="CompSEP">McKenna, Michael, "Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/ ((online))]</ref>{{POV-statement|date=June 2008}}
[[Determinism]] is roughly defined as the view that all current and future events are necessitated by past events combined with the laws of nature. According to McKenna (2004), neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the debate about free will.("Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/])
[[Compatibilism]] is the view that the existence of free will and the truth of determinism are compatible with each other; this is opposed to [[incompatibilism]] which is the view that there is no way to reconcile a belief in a deterministic universe with a belief in free will.<ref>Ginet, C. 1983. "In Defense of Incompatibilism" in ''Philosophical Studies'' 44, pp. 391–400</ref> [[Hard determinism]] is the version of incompatibilism that accepts the truth of determinism and rejects the idea that humans have any free will.<ref>Koons, J.R. "Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?" in ''The Philosophical Forum''. 33:1</ref> [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarianism]] topically agrees with hard determinism only in rejecting compatibilism. Because libertarians accept the existence of free will, they must reject determinism and argue for some version of indeterminism that is compatible with freedom.<ref name="GStraw">Strawson, G. (1998, 2004). "Free will". In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved August 17, 2006, [http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014 ((online))]</ref>
[[Compatibilism]] is the view that the existence of free will and the truth of determinism are compatible with each other; this is opposed to [[incompatibilism]] which is the view that there is no way to reconcile a belief in a deterministic universe with a belief in free will.<ref>Ginet, C. 1983. "In Defense of Incompatibilism" in ''Philosophical Studies'' 44, pp. 391–400</ref> [[Hard determinism]] is the version of incompatibilism that accepts the truth of determinism and rejects the idea that humans have any free will.<ref>Koons, J.R. "Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?" in ''The Philosophical Forum''. 33:1</ref> [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarianism]] topically agrees with hard determinism only in rejecting compatibilism. Because libertarians accept the existence of free will, they must reject determinism and argue for some version of indeterminism that is compatible with freedom. [http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014]
===Determinism ===
===Determinism ===
[[Determinism]] is a broad term with a variety of meanings. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem of free will.<ref name="Viv">Vihvelin, Kadri, "Arguments for Incompatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ ((online))]</ref>
[[Determinism]] is a broad term with a variety of meanings. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem of free will.[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/]
''Causal'' (or ''nomological'') determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]]. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. Such an entity may be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.<ref>Suppes, P., 1993, “The Transcendental Character of Determinism,” ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'', 18: 242–257.</ref>
''Causal'' (or ''nomological'') determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. Such determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]]. Imagine an entity that knows all facts about the past and the present, and knows all natural laws that govern the universe. Such an entity may be able to use this knowledge to foresee the future, down to the smallest detail.
''Logical'' determinism is the notion that all [[proposition]]s, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.<ref name="Viv" />
''Logical'' determinism is the notion that all [[proposition]]s, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present.
''[[Theological determinism|Theological]]'' determinism is the [[thesis]] that there is a [[God]] who determines all that humans will do, either by knowing their actions in advance, via some form of [[omniscience]]<ref name = "Fischer"> Fischer, John Martin (1989) ''God, Foreknowledge and Freedom''. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ISBN 1-55786-857-3</ref> or by decreeing their actions in advance.<ref name="Watt">Watt, Montgomery (1948) ''Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam''. London:Luzac & Co. </ref> The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free, if there is a being who has determined them for us ahead of time.
''[[Theological determinism|Theological]]'' determinism is the [[thesis]] that there is a [[God]] who determines all that humans will do, either by knowing their actions in advance, via some form of [[omniscience]] (''God, Foreknowledge and Freedom''. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ISBN 1-55786-857-3) or by decreeing their actions in advance. The problem of free will, in this [[context]], is the problem of how our actions can be free, if there is a being who has determined them for us ahead of time.
''[[Biological determinism|Biological]]'' determinism is the idea that all behavior, belief, and desire are fixed by our genetic endowment. There are other theses on determinism, including ''[[cultural determinism]]'' and ''psychological determinism''.<ref name="Viv" /> Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, e.g. ''bio-environmental determinism'', are even more common.
''[[Biological determinism|Biological]]'' determinism is the idea that all behavior, belief, and desire are fixed by our genetic endowment. There are other theses on determinism, including ''[[cultural determinism]]'' and ''psychological determinism''.<ref name="Viv" /> Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, e.g. ''bio-environmental determinism'', are even more common.
===Compatibilism===
===Compatibilism===
[[Image:Thomas Hobbes (portrait).jpg|right|thumb|[[Thomas Hobbes]] was a classical compatibilist.]]
[[Compatibilism|Compatibilists]] maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. A common strategy employed by "classical compatibilists", such as [[Thomas Hobbes]], is to claim that a person acts freely only when the person willed the act and the person could have done otherwise, ''if the person had decided to''. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to the ''person'' and not to some abstract notion of ''will'', asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe" In articulating this crucial proviso, [[David Hume]] writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains".( ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' 1967 edition).
To illustrate their position, compatibilists point to clear-cut cases of someone's free will being denied, through rape, murder, theft, or other forms of constraint. In these cases, free will is lacking not because the past is causally determining the future, but because the aggressor is overriding the victim's desires and preferences about his own actions. The aggressor is ''[[coercion|coercing]]'' the victim and, according to compatibilists, this is what overrides free will. Thus, they argue that determinism does not matter; what matters is that individuals' choices are the results of their own desires and preferences, and are not overridden by some external (or internal) force. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will.<
[[William James]]'s views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds," he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work ''[[Pragmatism]]'', he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories. He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief", - it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines [[meliorism]]—the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.
[[William James]]'s views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds," he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it.<ref>See Bricklin, Jonathan, "A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will", in Libet (1999), ''The Volitional Brain: Toward a Neuroscience of Free Will'' (Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic).</ref> Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work ''[[Pragmatism]]'', he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories.<ref name="JW">James, W. (1907) ''Pragmatism'' (1979 edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press</ref> He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief"—it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines [[meliorism]]—the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world.<ref name="JW" />
"Modern compatibilists", such as [[Harry Frankfurt]] and [[Daniel Dennett]], argue that there are cases where a coerced agent's choices are still free because such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires ''Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person'' in "Journal of Philosophy" ''Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting''. Bradford Books. ISBN 0-262-54042-8) Frankfurt, in particular, argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is to be identified with her effective first-order desire, i.e., the one that she acts on. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts." All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug to which they are addicted and to not want to take it.
"Modern compatibilists", such as [[Harry Frankfurt]] and [[Daniel Dennett]], argue that there are cases where a coerced agent's choices are still free because such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.<ref>Frankfurt, H. (1971) ''Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person'' in "Journal of Philosophy"</ref><ref name="DD1">Dennett, D., (1984) ''Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting''. Bradford Books. ISBN 0-262-54042-8</ref> Frankfurt, in particular, argues for a version of compatibilism called the "hierarchical mesh". The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A person's will is to be identified with her effective first-order desire, i.e., the one that she acts on. So, for example, there are "wanton addicts", "unwilling addicts" and "willing addicts." All three groups may have the conflicting first-order desires to want to take the drug to which they are addicted and to not want to take it.
The first group, "wanton addicts", have no second-order desire not to take the drug. The second group, "unwilling addicts", have a second-order desire not to take the drug, while the third group, "willing addicts", have a second-order desire to take it. According to Frankfurt, the members of the first group are to be considered devoid of will and therefore no longer persons. The members of the second group freely desire not to take the drug, but their will is overcome by the addiction. Finally, the members of the third group willingly take the drug to which they are addicted. Frankfurt's theory can ramify to any number of levels. Critics of the theory point out that there is no certainty that conflicts will not arise even at the higher-order levels of desire and preference.
In ''[[Elbow Room]]'', Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book ''[[Freedom Evolves]]''. The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful [[demon]], and other such possibilities, then because of [[chaos theory|chaos]] and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown and unknowable future.
According to Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist.<ref name="DD2" /> Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance. More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.<ref name="CompSEP" />
According to Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist.<ref name="DD2" /> Incompatibilists claim the problem with this idea is that we may be mere "automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance.<ref name="Kaney">Kane, R. ''The Oxford Handbook to Free Will''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-513336-6.</ref> More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques.<ref name="CompSEP" />
===Incompatibilism===
===Incompatibilism===
"Hard determinists", such as [[Baron d'Holbach|d'Holbach]], are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. "[[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarians]]", such as [[Thomas Reid]], [[Peter van Inwagen]], and [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]], are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true.<ref name="Wagen">van Invagen, P. (1983) ''An Essay on Free Will''. Oxford:Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-824924-1</ref> Another view is that of [[hard incompatibilism]] which states that free will is incompatible with both [[determinism]] and [[indeterminism]]. This view is defended by Derk Pereboom.<ref>Pereboom, D. (2003) ''Living without Free Will''. Cambridge University Press.</ref>
"Hard determinists", such as [[Baron d'Holbach|d'Holbach]], are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. "[[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|Metaphysical libertarians]]", such as [[Thomas Reid]], [[Peter van Inwagen]], and [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]], are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true. Another view is that of [[hard incompatibilism]] which states that free will is incompatible with both [[determinism]] and [[indeterminism]]. This view is defended by Derk Pereboom.
One of the traditional arguments for incompatibilism is based on an "[[intuition pump]]": if a person is determined in his or her choices of actions, then he or she must be like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot. Because these things have no free will, then people must have no free will, if determinism is true.<ref> Fischer, J.M. (1983) "Incompatibilism" in ''Philosophical Studies''. 43:121-37 </ref><ref name="Wagen" /> This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it does not follow that there are no important differences.<ref name="DD1" />
One of the traditional arguments for incompatibilism is based on an "[[intuition pump]]": if a person is determined in his or her choices of actions, then he or she must be like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot. Because these things have no free will, then people must have no free will, if determinism is true. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it does not follow that there are no important differences.
Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain." Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that man must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. He must be a ''[[causa sui]]'', in the traditional phrase. To be responsible for one's choices is to be the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if man has free will, then man is the ultimate cause of his actions. If determinism is true, then all of man's choices are caused by events and facts outside his control. So, if everything man does is caused by events and facts outside his control, then he cannot be the ultimate cause of his actions. Therefore, he cannot have free will.<ref>Kane, R. (1996) ''The Significance of Free Will'', Oxford:Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512656-4</ref><ref>Campbell, C.A. (1957) ''On Selfhood and Godhood'', London: George Allen and Unwin. ISBN 0-415-29624-2</ref><ref>Sartre, J.P. (1943) ''Being and Nothingness'', reprint 1993. New York:Washington Square Press. Sartre also provides a psychological version of the argument by claiming that if man's actions are not his own, he would be in ''bad faith''.</ref> This argument has also been challenged by various compatibilist philosophers.<ref>Fischer, R.M. (1994) ''The Metaphysics of Free Will'', Oxford:Blackwell</ref><ref>Bok, H. (1998) ''Freedom and Responsibility'', Princeton:Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01566-X</ref>
Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain." Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that man must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. He must be a ''[[causa sui]]'', in the traditional phrase. To be responsible for one's choices is to be the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if man has free will, then man is the ultimate cause of his actions. If determinism is true, then all of man's choices are caused by events and facts outside his control. So, if everything man does is caused by events and facts outside his control, then he cannot be the ultimate cause of his actions. Therefore, he cannot have free will.
A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by [[Carl Ginet]] in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the ''consequences'' of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the ''consequence argument''.<ref>Ginet, C. (1966) "Might We Have No Choice?" In Lehrer, 1966: 87–104.</ref><ref name="Ving"> Van Inwagen, P. and Zimmerman, D. (1998) ''Metaphysics: The Big Questions''. Oxford:Blackwell</ref> Peter van Inwagen remarks that C.D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s.<ref>Inwagen, P. (n.d.) [http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/HowThinkFW.doc "How to think about free will"], p. 15.</ref>
A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by [[Carl Ginet]] in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the ''consequences'' of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the ''consequence argument''.
The difficulty of this argument for compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained standing, if she had so desired. But it follows from the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider".<ref name="Ving" /> [[David Kellogg Lewis|David Lewis]] suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if ''different circumstances'' had actually obtained in the past.<ref>Lewis, D. "Are We Free to Break the Laws?"
The difficulty of this argument for compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained standing, if she had so desired. But it follows from the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider".
===Libertarian incompatibilism===
===Libertarian incompatibilism===
Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into supernatural theories and scientific or naturalistic theories. Supernatural theories hold that a non-physical [[mind]] or [[soul]] overrides physical causality, so that physical events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation. This approach is allied to mind-body [[dualism]], and sometimes has a [[theological]] motivation.
Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into supernatural theories and scientific or naturalistic theories. Supernatural theories hold that a non-physical [[mind]] or [[soul]] overrides physical causality, so that physical events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation. This approach is allied to mind-body [[dualism]], and sometimes has a [[theological]] motivation.
Scientific explanations of libertarianism (described as "naturalistic") sometimes involve invoking [[panpsychism]], the theory that a quality of [[mind]] is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both sentient and non-sentient entities.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://cms.brookes.ac.uk/staff/PeterElls/FreeWill/NaturalisticFreeWill.rtf |title=Naturalistic, Libertarian Free Will |publisher=Peter Ells}}{{Dead link|date=June 2008}}</ref>. Other naturalistic approaches do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe; ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" believed to be necessary by libertarians. Free [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism. An example of this kind of approach has been developed by [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]].
Scientific explanations of libertarianism (described as "naturalistic") sometimes involve invoking [[panpsychism]], the theory that a quality of [[mind]] is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both sentient and non-sentient entities. [http://cms.brookes.ac.uk/staff/PeterElls/FreeWill/NaturalisticFreeWill.rtf]. Other naturalistic approaches do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe; ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" believed to be necessary by libertarians. Free [[Volition (psychology)|volition]] is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism. An example of this kind of approach has been developed by [[Robert Kane (philosopher)|Robert Kane]].
===Other views===
===Other views===
Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. [[John Locke]], for example, denied that the phrase "free will" made any sense (compare with [[theological noncognitivism]], a similar stance on the existence of God). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to ''postpone'' a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose".<ref>Locke, J. (1689). ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'' (1998, ed). Book II, Chap. XXI, Sec. 17. Penguin Classics, Toronto.</ref> Similarly, David Hume discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He also suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a ''velleity'') which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.<ref>Hume, D. (1765)''An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding'', Indianaplolis: Hacket Publishing Co. Second edition. 1993. ISBN 0-87220-230-5</ref>
Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. [[John Locke]], for example, denied that the phrase "free will" made any sense (compare with [[theological noncognitivism]], a similar stance on the existence of God). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to ''postpone'' a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or choose". Similarly, David Hume discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He also suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a ''velleity'') which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along.
[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] put the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in these terms:
[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] put the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in these terms:
<blockquote>Everyone believes himself ''a priori'' to be perfectly free, even in his individual actions, and thinks that at every moment he can commence another manner of life. ... But ''a posteriori'', through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but subjected to necessity, that in spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it, he must carry out the very character which he himself condemns...."<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur, ''The Wisdom of Life'', p 147</ref></blockquote>
<blockquote>Everyone believes himself ''a priori'' to be perfectly free, even in his individual actions, and thinks that at every moment he can commence another manner of life. ... But ''a posteriori'', through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but subjected to necessity, that in spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it, he must carry out the very character which he himself condemns...."<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur, ''The Wisdom of Life'', p 147</ref></blockquote>
In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."<ref>[[Schopenhauer]], Arthur, ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Oxford: Basil Blackwell ISBN 0-631-14552-4</ref>
In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can ''will'' only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."
[[Rudolf Steiner]], who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work<ref>{{cite web|title=Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden. Mit Einleitung von Dr. Rudolf Steiner, Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, o.J. [1894-96]|author=Rudolf Steiner|url=http://www.pitt.edu/~kafka/k_s_bibII.html}}</ref>, wrote The [[Philosophy of Freedom]], which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: freedom of thought and freedom of action. He argues that inner freedom is achieved when we bridge the gap between our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, and our thoughts, which give us access to the inner nature of the world. Outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with ''moral imagination''. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united.<ref> Steiner, R. (1964). Rudolf Steiner Press, London, 1964, 1970, 1972, 1979, 230 pp., translated from the 12th German edition of 1962 by Michael Wilson. [http://www.rsarchive.org/Books/GA004/ ((online))] </ref>
[[Rudolf Steiner]], who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work (http://www.pitt.edu/~kafka/k_s_bibII.html], wrote The [[Philosophy of Freedom]], which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom: freedom of thought and freedom of action. He argues that inner freedom is achieved when we bridge the gap between our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, and our thoughts, which give us access to the inner nature of the world. Outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with ''moral imagination''. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united. [http://www.rsarchive.org/Books/GA004/]
The contemporary philosopher [[Galen Strawson]] agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the
The contemporary philosopher [[Galen Strawson]] agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the
problem.<ref name="GStraw" /> He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless.
problem. He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless.
According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because in order to be responsible for the way one is in some situation "S", one must have been responsible for the way one was at "S<sup>-1</sup>". In order to be responsible for the way one was at "S<sup>-1</sup>", one must have been responsible for the way one was at "S<sup>-2</sup>", and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states ''[[ex nihilo]]''. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as [[hard incompatibilism]].<ref name="GStraw" />
According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because in order to be responsible for the way one is in some situation "S", one must have been responsible for the way one was at "S<sup>-1</sup>". In order to be responsible for the way one was at "S<sup>-1</sup>", one must have been responsible for the way one was at "S<sup>-2</sup>", and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states ''[[ex nihilo]]''. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as [[hard incompatibilism]].
[[Ted Honderich]] holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are [[Abstract object|abstract]] entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if determinism is true, incompatibilists have not, and cannot, provide an adequate account of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are needed in order to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.<ref>Honderich, T. "Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False and the Real Problem" in ''The Free Will Handbook'' , edited by Robert Kane of the University of Texas, published by Oxford University Press in 2001.</ref>
[[Ted Honderich]] holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are [[Abstract object|abstract]] entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if determinism is true, incompatibilists have not, and cannot, provide an adequate account of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are needed in order to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.
== Moral responsibility ==
== Moral responsibility ==
