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===Noumenon and the thing-in-itself===

===Noumenon and the thing-in-itself===

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous. However,"noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only ''loosely'' synonymous inasmuch as they represent the same thing but viewed from two different perspectives [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms]</ref><ref>Thing in itself: an object considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions under which a subject can gain knowledge of it. Hence the thing in itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)" - [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms]. Palmquist defends his definitions of these terms in his article, "Six Perspectives on the Object in Kant's Theory of Knowledge", ''Dialectica'' 40:2 (1986), pp.121-151; revised and reprinted as Chapter VI in Palmquist's book, ''Kant's System of Perspectives'' (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).</ref>, and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.<ref>Oizerman, T. I., “Kant's Doctrine of the "Things in Themselves" and Noumena”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, Mar., 1981, 333-350.</ref>  [[Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy|Schopenhauer criticised Kant]] for changing the meaning of "noumenon". Opinion is of course far from unanimous.<ref>"Other interpreters have introduced an almost unending stream of varying suggestions as to how these terms ought to be used. A handful of examples will be sufficient to make this point clear, without any claim to represent an exhaustive overview. Perhaps the most commonly accepted view is expressed by Paulsen, who equates 'thing in itself' and 'noumenon', equates 'appear­ance' and 'phenomenon', distinguishes 'positive noumenon' and 'negative noumenon', and treats 'negative noumenon' as equivalent to 'transcendental object' [P4:148-50,154-5,192]. Al-Azm and Wolff also seem satisfied to equat­e 'phe­no­menon' and 'appearance', though they both carefully distinguish 'thing in itself' from 'negative noumenon' and 'positive noumenon' [A4:520; W21:165, 313-5; s.a. W9:162]. Gotterbarn similarly equates the former pair, as well as 'thing in itself' and 'positive noumenon', but distinguishes be­tween 'transcen­dental object', 'negative noumenon' and 'thing in itself' [G11: 201]. By contrast, Bird and George both dis­tinguish between 'appearance' and 'phenomenon', but not between 'thing in it­self' and 'noumenon' [B20:18,19, 53-7; G7:513-4n]; and Bird sometimes blurs the dis­tinction between 'thing in itself' and 'transcendental object' as well.[2] Gram equates 'thing in itself' not with 'noumenon', but with 'phenome­non' [G13:1,5-6]! Allison cites different official meanings for each term, yet he tends to equate 'thing in itself' at times with 'negative noumenon' and at times with 'transcendental object', usu­ally ignoring the role of the 'posi­tive noumenon' [A7:94; A10:58,69]. And Buchdahl responds to the fact that the thing in itself seems to be connect­ed in some way with each of the other ob­ject-terms by re­garding it as 'Kant's umbrella term'.[3]" [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSP6A.html Stephen Palmquist on Kan't object terms]</ref>  Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous. However,"noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only ''loosely'' synonymous inasmuch as they represent the same thing but viewed from two different perspectives [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html] Thing in itself: an object considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions under which a subject can gain knowledge of it. Hence the thing in itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)" -  

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"...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears." <ref>''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' Bxxvi-xxvii.</ref>

"...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."  

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"But in that case a  noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition". <ref>''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' A256,B312,p273(NKS)</ref>

"But in that case a  noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition".  

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A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing in itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim some kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing in itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing in itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But [[Stephen Palmquist]] explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing in itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.<ref>"The Radical Unknowability of Kant's 'Thing in Itself'", Cogito 3:2 (March 1985), pp.101-115; revised and reprinted as Appendix V in [[Stephen Palmquist]], [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1 Kant's System of Perspectives] (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).</ref>

A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing in itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim some kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing in itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing in itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But [[Stephen Palmquist]] explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing in itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.

===Positive and negative noumena===

===Positive and negative noumena===