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The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212.

The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>Jackson, Timothy P. (1998) "Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will" in ''Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good ... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga]]'s "[[theodicy#Contemporary philosophy of religion|free will defense]]" is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent. Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence," ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–212.

===Urantia Book===

===Quote===

All [[volition]] is [[relative]]. In the originating sense, only the Father-I AM possesses finality of volition; in the absolute sense, only the Father, the Son, and the Spirit exhibit the prerogatives of volition unconditioned by [[time]] and unlimited by [[space]]. Mortal man is endowed with free will, the [[power]] of choice, and though such choosing is not [[absolute]], nevertheless, it is relatively final on the [[finite]] level and concerning the [[destiny]] of the choosing [[personality]].

All [[volition]] is [[relative]]. In the originating sense, only the Father-I AM possesses finality of volition; in the absolute sense, only the Father, the Son, and the Spirit exhibit the prerogatives of volition unconditioned by [[time]] and unlimited by [[space]]. Mortal man is endowed with free will, the [[power]] of choice, and though such choosing is not [[absolute]], nevertheless, it is relatively final on the [[finite]] level and concerning the [[destiny]] of the choosing [[personality]].