Moral philosophers since [[David Hume]] have debated whether values are objective, and thus factual. In [[A Treatise of Human Nature]] [[Hume]] pointed out that there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ought to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what is the case. Those who insist that there is a logical gulf between facts and values, such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values from facts, include [[G. E. Moore]], who called attempting to do so the [[Naturalistic Fallacy]]. | Moral philosophers since [[David Hume]] have debated whether values are objective, and thus factual. In [[A Treatise of Human Nature]] [[Hume]] pointed out that there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ought to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what is the case. Those who insist that there is a logical gulf between facts and values, such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values from facts, include [[G. E. Moore]], who called attempting to do so the [[Naturalistic Fallacy]]. |