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From Nordan Symposia
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==Origin==
[http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=English#ca._1100-1500_.09THE_MIDDLE_ENGLISH_PERIOD Middle English], from Late Latin apprehension-, apprehensio, from [[Latin]] apprehendere
*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/14th_century 14th Century]
==Definitions==
*1a : the [[act]] or [[power]] of [[perceiving]] or [[comprehending]] <a person of dull apprehension>
:b : the result of apprehending [[mentally]] : [[conception]] <according to popular apprehension>
*2: seizure by [[legal]] [[process]] : arrest <apprehension of a [[criminal]]>
*3: [[suspicion]] or [[fear]] especially of [[future]] [[evil]] : foreboding <an atmosphere of nervous apprehension>
==Description==
In [[psychology]], '''apprehension''' (Lat. ad, "to"; prehendere, "to seize") is a term applied to a [[model]] of [[consciousness]] in which nothing is affirmed or denied of the object in question, but the [[mind]] is merely [[aware]] of ("seizes") it.
"[[Judgment]]" (says Reid, ed. Hamilton, i. p. 414) "is an [[act]] of the [[mind]], specifically [[different]] from simple apprehension or the bare [[conception]] of a [[thing]]". "Simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false." This distinction provides for the large class of mental [[acts]] in which we are simply [[aware]] of, or "take in" a number of familiar objects, about which we in general make no judgment, unless our [[attention]] is suddenly called by a new feature. Or again, two alternatives may be apprehended without any resultant [[judgment]] as to their respective merits.
Similarly, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Stout G.F. Stout] stated that while we have a very vivid [[idea]] of a [[character]] or an incident in a [[work]] of [[fiction]], we can hardly be said in any real sense to have any [[belief]] or to make any judgment as to its [[existence]] or [[truth]]. With this mental state may be compared the purely [[aesthetic]] [[contemplation]] of [[music]], wherein apart from, say, a false note, the [[faculty]] of [[judgment]] is for the time inoperative. To these examples may be added the [[fact]] that one can fully [[understand]] an [[argument]] in all its bearings, without in any way judging its validity. Without going into the question fully, it may be pointed out that the distinction between [[judgment]] and ''apprehension'' is [[relative]]. In every kind of [[thought]], there is judgment of some sort in a greater or less [[degree]] of prominence.
Judgment and [[thought]] are in fact [[psychologically]] distinguishable merely as [[different]], though correlative, [[activities]] of [[consciousness]]. Professor Stout further investigates the [[phenomena]] of apprehension, and comes to the conclusion that "it is possible to distinguish and identify a [[whole]] without apprehending any of its constituent details." On the other hand, there is an [[expectation]] that such details will, as it were, emerge into [[consciousness]]. Hence, he describes such apprehension as "implicit", and insofar as the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implication_(pragmatics) implicit] apprehension [[determines]] the order of such [[emergence]], he describes it as "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schematic schematic]".
A good example of this [[process]] is the use of formulae in [[calculation]]s; ordinarily the [[formula]] is used without question; if [[attention]] is fixed upon it, the steps by which it is shown to be [[universally]] applicable emerge, and the "schema " is complete in detail. With this result may be compared [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kant Kant]'s theory of apprehension as a synthetic [[act]] (the "synthesis of apprehension") by which the sensory elements of a [[perception]] are subjected to the [[formal]] conditions of [[time and space]].
[[Category: Psychology]]
==Origin==
[http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=English#ca._1100-1500_.09THE_MIDDLE_ENGLISH_PERIOD Middle English], from Late Latin apprehension-, apprehensio, from [[Latin]] apprehendere
*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/14th_century 14th Century]
==Definitions==
*1a : the [[act]] or [[power]] of [[perceiving]] or [[comprehending]] <a person of dull apprehension>
:b : the result of apprehending [[mentally]] : [[conception]] <according to popular apprehension>
*2: seizure by [[legal]] [[process]] : arrest <apprehension of a [[criminal]]>
*3: [[suspicion]] or [[fear]] especially of [[future]] [[evil]] : foreboding <an atmosphere of nervous apprehension>
==Description==
In [[psychology]], '''apprehension''' (Lat. ad, "to"; prehendere, "to seize") is a term applied to a [[model]] of [[consciousness]] in which nothing is affirmed or denied of the object in question, but the [[mind]] is merely [[aware]] of ("seizes") it.
"[[Judgment]]" (says Reid, ed. Hamilton, i. p. 414) "is an [[act]] of the [[mind]], specifically [[different]] from simple apprehension or the bare [[conception]] of a [[thing]]". "Simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false." This distinction provides for the large class of mental [[acts]] in which we are simply [[aware]] of, or "take in" a number of familiar objects, about which we in general make no judgment, unless our [[attention]] is suddenly called by a new feature. Or again, two alternatives may be apprehended without any resultant [[judgment]] as to their respective merits.
Similarly, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Stout G.F. Stout] stated that while we have a very vivid [[idea]] of a [[character]] or an incident in a [[work]] of [[fiction]], we can hardly be said in any real sense to have any [[belief]] or to make any judgment as to its [[existence]] or [[truth]]. With this mental state may be compared the purely [[aesthetic]] [[contemplation]] of [[music]], wherein apart from, say, a false note, the [[faculty]] of [[judgment]] is for the time inoperative. To these examples may be added the [[fact]] that one can fully [[understand]] an [[argument]] in all its bearings, without in any way judging its validity. Without going into the question fully, it may be pointed out that the distinction between [[judgment]] and ''apprehension'' is [[relative]]. In every kind of [[thought]], there is judgment of some sort in a greater or less [[degree]] of prominence.
Judgment and [[thought]] are in fact [[psychologically]] distinguishable merely as [[different]], though correlative, [[activities]] of [[consciousness]]. Professor Stout further investigates the [[phenomena]] of apprehension, and comes to the conclusion that "it is possible to distinguish and identify a [[whole]] without apprehending any of its constituent details." On the other hand, there is an [[expectation]] that such details will, as it were, emerge into [[consciousness]]. Hence, he describes such apprehension as "implicit", and insofar as the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implication_(pragmatics) implicit] apprehension [[determines]] the order of such [[emergence]], he describes it as "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schematic schematic]".
A good example of this [[process]] is the use of formulae in [[calculation]]s; ordinarily the [[formula]] is used without question; if [[attention]] is fixed upon it, the steps by which it is shown to be [[universally]] applicable emerge, and the "schema " is complete in detail. With this result may be compared [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kant Kant]'s theory of apprehension as a synthetic [[act]] (the "synthesis of apprehension") by which the sensory elements of a [[perception]] are subjected to the [[formal]] conditions of [[time and space]].
[[Category: Psychology]]
