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| ==Etymology== | | ==Etymology== |
| [[Latin]] reciprocus returning the same way, alternating | | [[Latin]] reciprocus returning the same way, alternating |
− | *Date: 1570 ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/16th_century 16th Century] | + | *Date: 1570 ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/16th_century 16th Century] |
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− | <center>For lessons on the [[topic]] of '''''Reciprocity''''', follow [http://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Reciprocity '''''this link'''''].</center> | + | <center>For lessons on the [[topic]] of '''''Reciprocity''''', follow [https://nordan.daynal.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Reciprocity '''''this link'''''].</center> |
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| ==Definitions== | | ==Definitions== |
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| :b : marked by or based on reciprocity <reciprocal trade agreements> | | :b : marked by or based on reciprocity <reciprocal trade agreements> |
| ==Description== | | ==Description== |
− | The social [[norm]] of '''reciprocity''' is the [[expectation]] that people will [[respond]] to each other in similar ways—responding to gifts and [[kindness]]es from others with similar benevolence of their own, and responding to harmful, hurtful [[acts]] from others with either indifference or some form of retaliation. Such norms can be crude and [[mechanical]], such as a [[literal]] reading of the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eye_for_an_eye eye-for-an-eye rule lex talionis], or they can be [[complex]] and sophisticated, such as a [[subtle]] [[understanding]] of how [[anonymous]] donations to an international organization can be a form of reciprocity for the receipt of very [[personal]] benefits, such as the [[love]] of a [[parent]]. | + | The social [[norm]] of '''reciprocity''' is the [[expectation]] that people will [[respond]] to each other in similar ways—responding to gifts and [[kindness]]es from others with similar benevolence of their own, and responding to harmful, hurtful [[acts]] from others with either indifference or some form of retaliation. Such norms can be crude and [[mechanical]], such as a [[literal]] reading of the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eye_for_an_eye eye-for-an-eye rule lex talionis], or they can be [[complex]] and sophisticated, such as a [[subtle]] [[understanding]] of how [[anonymous]] donations to an international organization can be a form of reciprocity for the receipt of very [[personal]] benefits, such as the [[love]] of a [[parent]]. |
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| The norm of reciprocity varies widely in its details from situation to situation, and from [[society]] to society. Anthropologists and sociologists have often claimed, however, that having some version of the norm appears to be a social inevitability.[1] | | The norm of reciprocity varies widely in its details from situation to situation, and from [[society]] to society. Anthropologists and sociologists have often claimed, however, that having some version of the norm appears to be a social inevitability.[1] |
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| What is the [[relation]] between reciprocity and [[love]], [[friendship]] or [[family]] [[relationships]]? If such relationships are [[ideal]]ly ones in which the parties are connected by mutual [[affection]] and benevolence, shouldn’t justice and reciprocity stay out of their way? Isn’t impartiality inconsistent with love? Doesn’t acting on principle take the [[affection]] out of [[friendship]] or [[family]] relationships? Doesn’t follow the norm of reciprocity eliminate unconditional love or [[loyalty]]? | | What is the [[relation]] between reciprocity and [[love]], [[friendship]] or [[family]] [[relationships]]? If such relationships are [[ideal]]ly ones in which the parties are connected by mutual [[affection]] and benevolence, shouldn’t justice and reciprocity stay out of their way? Isn’t impartiality inconsistent with love? Doesn’t acting on principle take the [[affection]] out of [[friendship]] or [[family]] relationships? Doesn’t follow the norm of reciprocity eliminate unconditional love or [[loyalty]]? |
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− | Some contemporary [[philosophers]] have criticized major figures in the history of Western philosophy, including [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ John Rawls]’ early [[work]], for making familial relationships more or less opaque in theories of justice. The [[argument]] is that families can be grossly unjust, and have often been so. Since the family is “the school of justice,” if it is unjust the [[moral]] [[education]] of children is distorted, and the injustice tends to spread to the [[society]] at large, and to be perpetuated in following generations. If that is right, then justice and reciprocity must define the boundaries within which we pursue even the most [[intimate]] [[relationships]]. | + | Some contemporary [[philosophers]] have criticized major figures in the history of Western philosophy, including [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ John Rawls]’ early [[work]], for making familial relationships more or less opaque in theories of justice. The [[argument]] is that families can be grossly unjust, and have often been so. Since the family is “the school of justice,” if it is unjust the [[moral]] [[education]] of children is distorted, and the injustice tends to spread to the [[society]] at large, and to be perpetuated in following generations. If that is right, then justice and reciprocity must define the boundaries within which we pursue even the most [[intimate]] [[relationships]]. |
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| A somewhat different thread on these matters begins with Aristotle’s discussion of [[friendship]], in ''Nicomachean Ethics'' 1155-1172a. He proposes that the highest or best form of friendship involves a relationship between equals – one in which a genuinely reciprocal relationship is possible. This thread appears throughout the [[history]] of Western [[ethics]] in discussions of personal and social relationships of many sorts: between [[children]] and [[parents]], spouses, humans and other animals, and humans and god(s). The question is the extent to which the kind of reciprocity possible in various relationships determines the kind of mutual affection and [[Goodness|benevolence]] possible in those relationships. | | A somewhat different thread on these matters begins with Aristotle’s discussion of [[friendship]], in ''Nicomachean Ethics'' 1155-1172a. He proposes that the highest or best form of friendship involves a relationship between equals – one in which a genuinely reciprocal relationship is possible. This thread appears throughout the [[history]] of Western [[ethics]] in discussions of personal and social relationships of many sorts: between [[children]] and [[parents]], spouses, humans and other animals, and humans and god(s). The question is the extent to which the kind of reciprocity possible in various relationships determines the kind of mutual affection and [[Goodness|benevolence]] possible in those relationships. |