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===Positive and negative noumena===

===Positive and negative noumena===

Kant also makes a distinction between ''positive'' and ''negative'' noumena<ref>[http://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/phi175/phenomlec.html Mattey, G.J]</ref>

Kant also makes a distinction between ''positive'' and ''negative'' noumena [http://philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/phi175/phenomlec.html]

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The positive noumena, if they existed, would roughly correspond with [[Plato]]'s Forms or Idea &mdash; immaterial entities which can only be apprehended by a special, non-sensory, faculty: "intellectual intuition".<ref>"The noumena are ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’, which exist in a realm beyond space and time." [http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/modules/ihmp0304/units/unit05/dcreason.html University of Leeds course notes]</ref>

The positive noumena, if they existed, would roughly correspond with [[Plato]]'s Forms or Idea &mdash; immaterial entities which can only be apprehended by a special, non-sensory, faculty: "intellectual intuition".

Kant doubts that we have such a faculty, because for him intellectual intuition would mean that thinking of an entity, and its being represented, would be the same. He argues that humans have no way to apprehend the meaning of positive noumena:

Kant doubts that we have such a faculty, because for him intellectual intuition would mean that thinking of an entity, and its being represented, would be the same. He argues that humans have no way to apprehend the meaning of positive noumena:

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Since, however, such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience. Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be  intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, could not in the least apply to them. That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense.<ref>''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' B309,P270(NKS)</ref>

Since, however, such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the objects of experience. Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be  intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, could not in the least apply to them. That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumenon' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense.

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===The noumenon as a limiting concept===

===The noumenon as a limiting concept===