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==Definition==
*1. An ‘internal’ [[sense]] which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the five [[senses]], in which the various impressions received were reduced to the [[unity]] of a common [[consciousness]]. Obs.
*2. The endowment of natural [[intelligence]] possessed by [[rational]] [beings]; ordinary, normal or average understanding; the plain [[wisdom]] which is everyone's inheritance. (This is ‘common sense’ at its minimum, without which one is foolish or insane.) Formerly also in pl., in phr. besides his common senses: out of his senses or wits, ‘beside himself’.
:b. More emphatically: Good sound [[practical]] sense; combined [[tact]] and readiness in dealing with the every-day affairs of life; general sagacity.
:c. Ordinary or untutored [[perception]]. Obs.
:d. As a [[quality]] of [[things]] said or done (= ‘something accordant to or approved by common sense’).
*3. The general sense, [[feeling]], or [[judgement]] of [[mankind]], or of a [[community]].
*4. Philos. The [[faculty]] of primary [[truth]]s; ‘the complement of those [[cognition]]s or convictions which we receive from [[nature]]; which all men therefore possess in common; and by which they test the [[truth]] of [[knowledge]], and the [[morality]] of [[action]]s’ (Hamilton Reid's Wks. II. 756).
Philosophy of Common Sense: that [[philosophy]] which accepts as the ultimate criterion of [[truth]] the primary [[cognition]]s or [[belief]]s of mankind; e.g. in the theory of [[perception]], the universal [[belief]] in the existence of a [[material]] world. Applied to the Scotch school which arose in the 18th c. in opposition to the views of Berkeley and Hume.
==Description==
Common sense (or, when used attributively as an adjective, commonsense, common-sense, or commonsensical), based on a strict construction of the term, consists of what people in common would agree on: that which they "sense" as their common natural understanding. Some people (such as the authors of Merriam-Webster Online) use the phrase to refer to [[beliefs]] or propositions that — in their opinion — most people would consider prudent and of sound [[judgment]], without reliance on [[esoteric]] [[knowledge]] or study or [[research]], but based upon what they see as knowledge held by people "in common". Thus "common sense" (in this view) equates to the knowledge and [[experience]] which most people allegedly have, or which the [[person]] using the term believes that they do or should have.
Whatever definition one uses, identifying particular items of knowledge as "common sense" becomes difficult. Philosophers may choose to avoid using the phrase when using [[precise]] [[language]]. But common sense remains a perennial topic in [[epistemology]] and many philosophers make wide use of the [[concept]] or at least refer to it. Some related concepts include [[intuitions]], pre-theoretic [[belief]], ordinary language, the frame problem, [[foundation]]al [[belief]]s, good sense, endoxa, and [[axiom]]s.
Common-sense ideas tend to relate to events within human experience (such as good will), and thus appear commensurate with human scale. Humans lack any commonsense intuition of, for example, the [[behavior]] of the universe at subatomic distances; or speeds approaching that of [[light]].
===Aristotle and Ibn Sina===
According to [[Aristotle]] and Ibn Sina ([[Avicenna]]), common sense provides the place in which the senses come together, and which [[process]]es sense-data and makes the results available to [[consciousness]]. Thus the modern [[psychological]] term, "[[perception]]", fulfills the same [[function]]. Individuals could have different common senses depending on how their personal and social experience has taught them to categorize sensation.
===Locke and the Empiricists===
[[John Locke]] proposed one [[meaning]] of "common sense" in his [[An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]]. This interpretation builds on phenomenological [[experience]]. Each of the senses gives input, and then something [[integrates]] the sense-data into a single impression. This something Locke sees as the common sense — the sense of things in common between disparate impressions. It therefore allies with "fancy", and opposes "judgment", or the capacity to divide like things into separates. (The French theologian Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet arguably developed this theory a decade before Locke.[1]) Each of the empiricist philosophers approaches the problem of the unification of sense-[[data]] in their own way, giving various names to the operation. However, the approaches agree that a sense in the human understanding exists that sees commonality and does the combining: "common sense" has the same [[meaning]].
===Epistemology===
Appeal to common sense characterises a general epistemological orientation called '''epistemological particularism''' (the appellation derives from Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999)). This orientation contrasts with '''epistemological methodism'''. The particularist gathers a list of propositions that seem obvious and unassailable and then requires consistency with this set of propositions as a condition of adequacy for any abstract philosophical theory. (Particularism allows, however, rejection of an entry on the list for inconsistency with other, seemingly more secure, entries.) Epistemological methodists, on the other hand, begin with a theory of [[cognition]] or justification and then apply it to see which of our pre-theoretical beliefs survive. Reid and Moore represent [[paradigm]]atic particularists, while Descartes and Hume stand as paradigmatic methodists. Methodist methodology tends toward [[skepticism]], as the rules for acceptable or [[rational]] [[belief]] tend to the very restrictive (for instance, Descartes demanded the elimination of doubt; and Hume required the construction of acceptable belief entirely from impressions and ideas).
Particularist methodology, on the other hand, tends toward a kind of conservatism, granting perhaps an undue privilege to beliefs in which we happen to have [[confidence]]. One interesting question asks whether epistemological thought can mix the methodologies. In such a case, does it not become problematical to attempt [[logic]], [[metaphysics]] and epistemology absent original assumptions stemming from common sense? Particularism, applied to [[ethics]] and [[politics]], may seem to simply entrench prejudice and other contingent products of social inculcation (compare cultural determinism). Can one provide a principled distinction between areas of [[inquiry]] where reliance on the dictates of common sense seems legitimate (because necessary) and areas where it seems illegitimate (as for example an obstruction to [[intellectual]] and [[practical]] progress)? A meta-philosophical discussion of common sense may then, indeed, proceed: What is common sense? Supposing that one cannot give a precise characterization of it: does that mean that appeal to common sense remains off-limits in [[philosophy]]? What utility does it have to discern whether a belief is a matter of common sense or not? And under what circumstances, if any, might one advocate a view that seems to run contrary to common sense? Should considerations of common sense play any decisive role in philosophy? If not common sense, then could another similar concept (perhaps "[[intuition]]") play such a role? In general, does [[epistemology]] have "philosophical starting points", and if so, how can one characterize them? Supposing that no beliefs exist which we will willingly hold come what may, do there though exist some we ought to hold more stubbornly at least?
==Alternative views==
Opponents of one of the [[tradition]]al views of common sense sometime regard reliance on common sense (in its disguise as "received knowledge") as an impediment to abstract and even to [[logic]]al thinking. This view appears especially popular in [[mathematics]] and [[physics]], where human intuition often conflicts with "probably correct" or [[experiment]]ally verified results. A definition attributed to [[Albert Einstein]] states: "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen."
[[Category: Philosophy]]
==Definition==
*1. An ‘internal’ [[sense]] which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the five [[senses]], in which the various impressions received were reduced to the [[unity]] of a common [[consciousness]]. Obs.
*2. The endowment of natural [[intelligence]] possessed by [[rational]] [beings]; ordinary, normal or average understanding; the plain [[wisdom]] which is everyone's inheritance. (This is ‘common sense’ at its minimum, without which one is foolish or insane.) Formerly also in pl., in phr. besides his common senses: out of his senses or wits, ‘beside himself’.
:b. More emphatically: Good sound [[practical]] sense; combined [[tact]] and readiness in dealing with the every-day affairs of life; general sagacity.
:c. Ordinary or untutored [[perception]]. Obs.
:d. As a [[quality]] of [[things]] said or done (= ‘something accordant to or approved by common sense’).
*3. The general sense, [[feeling]], or [[judgement]] of [[mankind]], or of a [[community]].
*4. Philos. The [[faculty]] of primary [[truth]]s; ‘the complement of those [[cognition]]s or convictions which we receive from [[nature]]; which all men therefore possess in common; and by which they test the [[truth]] of [[knowledge]], and the [[morality]] of [[action]]s’ (Hamilton Reid's Wks. II. 756).
Philosophy of Common Sense: that [[philosophy]] which accepts as the ultimate criterion of [[truth]] the primary [[cognition]]s or [[belief]]s of mankind; e.g. in the theory of [[perception]], the universal [[belief]] in the existence of a [[material]] world. Applied to the Scotch school which arose in the 18th c. in opposition to the views of Berkeley and Hume.
==Description==
Common sense (or, when used attributively as an adjective, commonsense, common-sense, or commonsensical), based on a strict construction of the term, consists of what people in common would agree on: that which they "sense" as their common natural understanding. Some people (such as the authors of Merriam-Webster Online) use the phrase to refer to [[beliefs]] or propositions that — in their opinion — most people would consider prudent and of sound [[judgment]], without reliance on [[esoteric]] [[knowledge]] or study or [[research]], but based upon what they see as knowledge held by people "in common". Thus "common sense" (in this view) equates to the knowledge and [[experience]] which most people allegedly have, or which the [[person]] using the term believes that they do or should have.
Whatever definition one uses, identifying particular items of knowledge as "common sense" becomes difficult. Philosophers may choose to avoid using the phrase when using [[precise]] [[language]]. But common sense remains a perennial topic in [[epistemology]] and many philosophers make wide use of the [[concept]] or at least refer to it. Some related concepts include [[intuitions]], pre-theoretic [[belief]], ordinary language, the frame problem, [[foundation]]al [[belief]]s, good sense, endoxa, and [[axiom]]s.
Common-sense ideas tend to relate to events within human experience (such as good will), and thus appear commensurate with human scale. Humans lack any commonsense intuition of, for example, the [[behavior]] of the universe at subatomic distances; or speeds approaching that of [[light]].
===Aristotle and Ibn Sina===
According to [[Aristotle]] and Ibn Sina ([[Avicenna]]), common sense provides the place in which the senses come together, and which [[process]]es sense-data and makes the results available to [[consciousness]]. Thus the modern [[psychological]] term, "[[perception]]", fulfills the same [[function]]. Individuals could have different common senses depending on how their personal and social experience has taught them to categorize sensation.
===Locke and the Empiricists===
[[John Locke]] proposed one [[meaning]] of "common sense" in his [[An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]]. This interpretation builds on phenomenological [[experience]]. Each of the senses gives input, and then something [[integrates]] the sense-data into a single impression. This something Locke sees as the common sense — the sense of things in common between disparate impressions. It therefore allies with "fancy", and opposes "judgment", or the capacity to divide like things into separates. (The French theologian Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet arguably developed this theory a decade before Locke.[1]) Each of the empiricist philosophers approaches the problem of the unification of sense-[[data]] in their own way, giving various names to the operation. However, the approaches agree that a sense in the human understanding exists that sees commonality and does the combining: "common sense" has the same [[meaning]].
===Epistemology===
Appeal to common sense characterises a general epistemological orientation called '''epistemological particularism''' (the appellation derives from Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999)). This orientation contrasts with '''epistemological methodism'''. The particularist gathers a list of propositions that seem obvious and unassailable and then requires consistency with this set of propositions as a condition of adequacy for any abstract philosophical theory. (Particularism allows, however, rejection of an entry on the list for inconsistency with other, seemingly more secure, entries.) Epistemological methodists, on the other hand, begin with a theory of [[cognition]] or justification and then apply it to see which of our pre-theoretical beliefs survive. Reid and Moore represent [[paradigm]]atic particularists, while Descartes and Hume stand as paradigmatic methodists. Methodist methodology tends toward [[skepticism]], as the rules for acceptable or [[rational]] [[belief]] tend to the very restrictive (for instance, Descartes demanded the elimination of doubt; and Hume required the construction of acceptable belief entirely from impressions and ideas).
Particularist methodology, on the other hand, tends toward a kind of conservatism, granting perhaps an undue privilege to beliefs in which we happen to have [[confidence]]. One interesting question asks whether epistemological thought can mix the methodologies. In such a case, does it not become problematical to attempt [[logic]], [[metaphysics]] and epistemology absent original assumptions stemming from common sense? Particularism, applied to [[ethics]] and [[politics]], may seem to simply entrench prejudice and other contingent products of social inculcation (compare cultural determinism). Can one provide a principled distinction between areas of [[inquiry]] where reliance on the dictates of common sense seems legitimate (because necessary) and areas where it seems illegitimate (as for example an obstruction to [[intellectual]] and [[practical]] progress)? A meta-philosophical discussion of common sense may then, indeed, proceed: What is common sense? Supposing that one cannot give a precise characterization of it: does that mean that appeal to common sense remains off-limits in [[philosophy]]? What utility does it have to discern whether a belief is a matter of common sense or not? And under what circumstances, if any, might one advocate a view that seems to run contrary to common sense? Should considerations of common sense play any decisive role in philosophy? If not common sense, then could another similar concept (perhaps "[[intuition]]") play such a role? In general, does [[epistemology]] have "philosophical starting points", and if so, how can one characterize them? Supposing that no beliefs exist which we will willingly hold come what may, do there though exist some we ought to hold more stubbornly at least?
==Alternative views==
Opponents of one of the [[tradition]]al views of common sense sometime regard reliance on common sense (in its disguise as "received knowledge") as an impediment to abstract and even to [[logic]]al thinking. This view appears especially popular in [[mathematics]] and [[physics]], where human intuition often conflicts with "probably correct" or [[experiment]]ally verified results. A definition attributed to [[Albert Einstein]] states: "Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by age eighteen."
[[Category: Philosophy]]
