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In [[linguistics]], [[logic]], [[philosophy]], and other fields, an '''intension''' is any property or [[quality]] connoted by a [[word]], [[phrase]] or other [[symbol]]. In the case of a [[word]], it is often implied by the word's [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition definition]. The term may also refer to all such intensions [[collectively]], although the term [[comprehension]] is [[technically]] more correct for this.
The [[meaning]] of a [[word]] can be [[thought]] of as the bond between the [[idea]] or [[thing]] the [[word]] refers to and the word itself. Swiss linguist [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_de_Saussure Ferdinand de Saussure] [[contrasts]] three [[concepts]]:
* the ''signifier'' — the "[[sound]] image" or string of [[letters]] on a page that one [[recognizes]] as a sign.
* the ''signified'' — the [[concept]] or [[idea]] that a sign evokes.
* the ''referent'' — the [[actual]] [[thing]] or set of things a sign refers to. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign_(semiotics)#Dyadic_signs Dyadic signs and Reference] ([[semantics]]).
Intension is [[analogous]] to the signified, extension to the referent. The intension thus links the signifier to the sign's extension. Without intension of some sort, [[words]] can have no [[meaning]].
In [[philosophical]] [[arguments]] about [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism dualism] versus [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism monism], it is noted that [[thoughts]] have intensionality and [[physical]] objects do not (S.E. Palmer, 1999)
Intension and intensionality (the state of having intension) should not be confused with [[intention]] and intentionality, which are pronounced the same and occasionally arise in the same [[philosophical]] [[context]]. Where this happens, the [[letter]] s or t is sometimes ''italicized'' to emphasize the [[distinction]].
==References==
* Ferdinand De Saussure: Course in General Linguistics. Open Court Classics, July 1986. ISBN 0-812-69023-0
* S. E. Palmer, Vision Science: From Photons to Phenomenology, 1999. MIT Press, ISBN 78-0262161831
==External links==
* Rapaport, William J. "[http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/intensional.html Intensionality v. Intentionality]".
[[Category: Philosophy]]
[[Category: Languages and Literature]]
In [[linguistics]], [[logic]], [[philosophy]], and other fields, an '''intension''' is any property or [[quality]] connoted by a [[word]], [[phrase]] or other [[symbol]]. In the case of a [[word]], it is often implied by the word's [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition definition]. The term may also refer to all such intensions [[collectively]], although the term [[comprehension]] is [[technically]] more correct for this.
The [[meaning]] of a [[word]] can be [[thought]] of as the bond between the [[idea]] or [[thing]] the [[word]] refers to and the word itself. Swiss linguist [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_de_Saussure Ferdinand de Saussure] [[contrasts]] three [[concepts]]:
* the ''signifier'' — the "[[sound]] image" or string of [[letters]] on a page that one [[recognizes]] as a sign.
* the ''signified'' — the [[concept]] or [[idea]] that a sign evokes.
* the ''referent'' — the [[actual]] [[thing]] or set of things a sign refers to. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign_(semiotics)#Dyadic_signs Dyadic signs and Reference] ([[semantics]]).
Intension is [[analogous]] to the signified, extension to the referent. The intension thus links the signifier to the sign's extension. Without intension of some sort, [[words]] can have no [[meaning]].
In [[philosophical]] [[arguments]] about [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism dualism] versus [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism monism], it is noted that [[thoughts]] have intensionality and [[physical]] objects do not (S.E. Palmer, 1999)
Intension and intensionality (the state of having intension) should not be confused with [[intention]] and intentionality, which are pronounced the same and occasionally arise in the same [[philosophical]] [[context]]. Where this happens, the [[letter]] s or t is sometimes ''italicized'' to emphasize the [[distinction]].
==References==
* Ferdinand De Saussure: Course in General Linguistics. Open Court Classics, July 1986. ISBN 0-812-69023-0
* S. E. Palmer, Vision Science: From Photons to Phenomenology, 1999. MIT Press, ISBN 78-0262161831
==External links==
* Rapaport, William J. "[http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/intensional.html Intensionality v. Intentionality]".
[[Category: Philosophy]]
[[Category: Languages and Literature]]
